20. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France1

3439. We must face the fact that the basic US attitude toward colonial problems is displeasing to the French as well as to others of our allies. It is therefore unrealistic to hope for the creation of an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding and confidence between French and ourselves with regard to North Africa.

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However, we are continually casting about for ways to alleviate French suspicion and resentment of our role and intentions, to make them feel we genuinely sympathize with their difficulties and to encourage their efforts to find real solutions to their problems.

It occurs to us that it might be useful for you to call on Mollet after your speech on March 20,2 while its hoped for soothing effect is still operative, and to talk to him along following line:

“US Government has been of course aware of a certain volume of criticism and resentment in France directed at the US for its alleged lack of sympathy and support for the French in their difficulties in North Africa. My recent public comments on this subject and my government’s statement recently on Morocco and Tunisia3 were designed specifically to reduce this resentment, to try to allay doubts with regard to our role and attitude and to reassure French opinion that the US is following events in North Africa with understanding of what is involved and real sympathy for France’s efforts.

“We are anxious to be helpful to France and we hope M. Mollet understands that we are. The French program in this area has not always been known to us. The French Government has not indicated just what it feels the US should or could do in the circumstances. I have therefore come to ask the Prime Minister informally for his personal comments on the situation. We are anxious to have his views and of course will give them most earnest consideration.”

Request your reaction to above idea and any other suggestions you might have as to what we could do to improve present climate.

Hoover
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/3–1756. Secret. Drafted by Tyler on March 15, cleared by Rountree, initialed by Merchant, and approved by Murphy.
  2. See infra.
  3. For text of the U.S. Government statement, March 7, at the time of the signing of the Franco-Moroccan Declaration recognizing the independence of Morocco, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 709–10.