Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

319. special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 31–1–57

Washington, November 19, 1957.

YUGOSLAVIA’S INTERNATIONAL POSITION²

Summary and Conclusions

1. The Yugoslav leaders have appeared convinced that the USSR under Khrushchev is willing to live with Yugoslav independence and with gradually increasing autonomy among the Satellite regimes. They hope to insure the security of their country and the maintenance of their own regime and to increase their influence in the Communist world by supporting Khrushchev and what they believe to be Khrushchev’s anti-Stalinist policies. As long as Belgrade assesses Soviet policies favorably, we believe that Yugoslavia will maintain its rapprochement with the USSR and may gradually move toward a somewhat closer alignment within limits which would safeguard its independence.

2. However, we see many possibilities of an interruption in the trend toward closer alignment. A Soviet reversion to tough Stalinist policies, such as undue pressure on Yugoslavia or a tough line in the European Satellites, or a variety of other possible developments could lead again to strained relations or even to another break. The Zhukov ouster, for example, apparently has already prompted Belgrade to take another look at its policy toward the USSR.

3. Moreover, we believe that there are distinct limits on how far Tito feels he can safely go toward Moscow. We believe that he will not be willing to make himself militarily or economically dependent on the USSR, or to join the Warsaw Pact or the Council of Economic Mutual Aid. Within the general trend of his policy, moreover, we think that Tito will be alert to any Soviet attempts to assert control over him, and to any other Soviet actions or policies which appear dangerous to Yugoslav interests; if he feels that such developments are occurring he will almost certainly desire to turn away from a close Soviet alignment.

4. In any event, the Yugoslavs will probably remain sufficiently suspicious of Soviet intentions and concerned enough over possible reversals in Soviet policy to strive to keep a door open to the West. By themselves, Western policies regarding the Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement probably could not decisively influence Yugoslav policies, but they could lead Belgrade to limit its pro-Moscow moves. For example, US aid, while probably not so vital as to cause Tito to alter his basic policy to ensure it, is probably sufficiently important to lead him to take some pains to retain it, at least in part. Hence:

a. Postponement or the threat of further reductions in US aid might cause the Yugoslav regime to make some political gestures favorable to the West, and to be more cautious in its approach to the USSR.

b. Complete withdrawal of US aid and moral support would not only weaken his ability to maintain his independence but would also seriously reduce the US’s leverage on Tito’s future moves.

c. Continuation of substantial US aid, irrespective of Tito’s attitude toward Moscow, would probably reinforce Tito’s confidence that the West was committed to his support, and that he could maintain his independent position even while he aligned some policies more closely with those of the Soviet Union.

[Here follows the “Discussion” section, comprising paragraphs 5–40.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” This estimate was approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on November 19.

   The estimate was discussed at the IAC meeting on November 19 and approved with a few minor changes. The estimate was approved for release to USIA. According to the notes of the meeting, the Secretary commented that the United States might be tempted to overlook the role of the Yugoslav people, as opposed to the Tito regime. (Ibid.,INR Files: Lot 58 D 77)

2. This estimate supersedes NIE 31–57: Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects, 11 June 1957, insofar as Yugoslav foreign policies are concerned. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 31–57 is printed as Document 305.]