Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

315. Operations Coordinating Board Report¹

Washington, December 11, 1957.

OPERATIONS PLAN FOR GREECE

Objectives and Special Operating Guidance

A. National Policy Objectives (Approved August 5, 1957):

1. An independent and stable Greece, cooperating in Free World defense and maintaining the will and ability to resist Communist subversion and influence.

2. Access by the United States and NATO to military facilities in Greece, and Greek cooperation with NATO countries.

3. Greek armed forces capable of resisting, as part of a concerted allied defense, direct Soviet or satellite attack.

4. Improvement of Greek-Turkish relations, and Greek participation in the further development of the Balkan Pact among Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

5. Settlement of the Cyprus dispute.

6. Lessening of Greek irredentism.

7. A Greek economy which can support reasonable economic development and assume a larger share of the cost of the Greek defense establishment.

B. Special Operating Guidance:

8. International Role of Greece. The growth of Greek national self-confidence should be encouraged in the direction of making Greece a stronger ally. Irredentist tendencies, … should be discouraged. The community of Greek and Western interests should be highlighted and the necessity stressed for settling, or at least avoiding intensification of, issues causing interallied tensions. Greek participation in international and regional organizations and projects furthering Western interests should be encouraged. While Greece should be encouraged to keep the Balkan Pact in existence, caution should be observed in view of strained Greek relations with Turkey over Cyprus, and uncertainty as to the future of Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union.

9. Impact of Cyprus on Greek Foreign Policy. The Cyprus question has permeated virtually all aspects of Greek politics and foreign policy. It has seriously harmed Greek-Turk relations, frustrated virtually all policies requiring Greek-Turk cooperation, such as in the Balkan Pact, and has even impaired Greek support for its ties with NATO and its Western allies. This factor should be kept carefully in mind in estimating the degree to which Greece identifies its interests with those of the West and the cooperation which can be expected from Greece in furthering Free World objectives in the area. The long term importance to Greece of good relations with Turkey as a close neighbor and the need for Greek-Turk consultations in facilitating a Cyprus settlement should continue to be emphasized in discussions with the Greek Government.

10. Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute. In encouraging the Greek Government to reach an understanding on the Cyprus question with the United Kingdom and Turkey, the US should continue to emphasize the necessity that Greece assume its full share of responsibility, that both interim and long-term solutions should be sought, and that while the US is prepared to assist the parties concerned procedurally, it does not intend to assume direct responsibility for any particular solution. In any efforts to assist the parties, the US while recognizing the primarily international interests of the three countries, should not ignore the primarily local interests of the Cypriots. The US is prepared to assist NATO in any reasonable attempts to assume a mediatory role.

11. Relations with Political Parties. At the present time the Karamanlis Government provides greater assurance for the promotion of US interests in Greece than any probable alternative and should, therefore, receive our continued support. However, the US should not be overtly identified with any political party or figure and should retain friendly relations as feasible with all responsible leaders. Efforts should be made through these contacts to counteract local Communist influence.

12. Aspirations for Area Leadership. While looking to the US for world leadership, Greece considers that it is capable of playing a larger role in the Near East. Greece is jealous of the role envisaged by Turkey for itself in this area. The Greek desire to play a larger role in the Near East was in part responsible for the decision of the present government to give public support to the American Doctrine after its announcement. However, it should be recognized that Greek sensitivities regarding the Arab states can be a restraint in the degree of open support which Greece can be expected to continue to give the American Doctrine. These sensitivities grow out of such factors as the Cyprus question, the Orthodox Church and Greek communities in such places as Alexandria. For example, the Greek colony in Egypt enables Egypt, if it wishes, to exert pressure on Greece. Greek views on an increased role in the area, therefore, should be entertained sympathetically, but caution should be observed in encouraging Greek initiative.

13. Economic and Technical Assistance. Economic assistance, including Defense Support, PL 480, and the possible financing of sound loan projects under the Development Loan Fund, should continue as necessary in order to make possible the maintenance of an appropriate Greek defense position as well as to continue a modest rate of economic growth. Technical assistance emphasis should continue in the fields of agricultural and industrial productivity and marketing. The Greek Government should also continue to be encouraged to formulate a sound, long-range, economic development program.

14. Military Assistance. The US is reviewing the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Greece and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Greek armed forces, of appropriately revising Greek force levels in the light of NATO requirements. This subject is currently being considered in the NATO annual review process. Nevertheless Greece should be encouraged to continue to increase its share of the total military budget gradually, looking toward a greater degree of military self-sufficiency, especially as the country’s gross national product grows. It must be recognized, however, that no Greek Government is likely to reduce significantly its economic development program in order to increase defense expenditures. Further, it should be noted that Greek opposition leaders have announced their intention to press for a reduction in Greek military spending.

15. NATO military guidance and US military judgments eventually may alter the size and composition of the Greek armed forces somewhat in favor of a smaller and more efficient force. Whether or not these force levels are reduced, US efforts should be directed toward improving their effectiveness. It should be made clear in this connection that the US military assistance program is based on the assumption that the Greeks will try to correct their own military weaknesses and deficiencies. Critical comments on these points may be required from time to time, but US officials should miss no opportunity to commend Greek officials on progress towards improving the effectiveness of their armed forces.

16. …

17. Internal Security. Currently there is no serious Communist threat to Greek internal security. For the past five years there has been political stability and reasonable economic growth. Although the Government is firmly anti-Communist, the Communist-front EDA, in the elections of February 1956, won a degree of political respectability by combining in an electoral coalition with the normally moderate Center parties and won 18 seats in Parliament. In addition, the fellow-traveling DKEL, in the electoral coalition, won 20 seats and several nominally independent Deputies frequently follow the EDA line. The likelihood of the emergence of a similar coalition in the next elections should not be ruled out. Such a development, if it occurs, would be likely to produce a further increase in Communist respectability and influence.

18. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE), which has been illegal since 1947, has been following a policy of active participation in non-Communist and even non-leftist groups in the achievement of its aims. Greek security agencies have noted a significant decline in the fear of communism among the population and a general relaxation of vigilance even by public authorities.

19. As a result of this relaxation and “in the interest of economy”, the Gendarmérie was reduced, in August 1956, from 15,670 to 13,300 and the City Police was reduced from 6,252 to 5,127. The Gendarmérie has an authorized peacetime force of 21,986 which could be increased to 23,356 in the event of international strife or hostilities. The City Police has an authorized strength of 8,573. These Greek security forces are moderately efficient, but there is room for improvement along the lines envisaged by the police training program.

20. In addition to these forces, there is a para-military force (TEA) of 83,530 men, loosely organized into 104 national defense battalions under the supervision of the Greek National Army. It has the mission of providing security to the local rural population and of contributing raw intelligence. One third of the battalions are located close to the northern borders, another third are near army concentrations in rear areas and the remainder are scattered throughout communications zones and in the islands.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. Selected US Arrangements² With or Pertaining to Greece:

22. US Involvements Which May Imply Military Security Guarantees.

a. NATO. In accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States is committed to regard an armed attack against Greece as an attack against itself and to take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security” of Greece.

b. Middle East Resolution. The United States by a Joint Resolution on the Middle East, signed by the President on March 9, 1957, announced its determination to assist Middle Eastern nations to maintain their independence. The resolution declared that the US is prepared to commit its military force, on the determination of the President, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism whenever a victim requests such aid.

23. Other Arrangements.

a. Military and Economic Assistance. The basic agreement concerning all US aid to Greece is that signed on June 20, 1947. Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, further agreements were signed on February 7, 1952 to bring Greece under MDAP.

b. Joint Use of Facilities. A US-Greek Agreement was signed in Athens on October 12, 1953 providing for the improvement and use of certain air and naval facilities in Greece, in implementation of Article 3 of the NATO Treaty.

c. Status of Forces. The basic military assistance agreement of June 20, 1947 provided complete immunity for personnel of the military mission. This immunity was extended to other US military personnel by subsequent agreements. Status was modified by the Status of Forces Agreement of September 7, 1956, based upon the Netherlands formula; however, JUSMAG retains its earlier privilege.

d. Atomic Energy. Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy was signed August 4, 1955. The US agreed to exchange atomic information and to lease to the Government of Greece 6 kilograms of uranium enriched up to twenty percent U–235 for use in research reactors. Greece has expressed interest in an atomic power bilateral agreement and was given a draft copy in May 1957. The US currently is considering a $350,000 grant for a one megawatt “swimming pool” type research reactor, to be located in a suburb of Athens and operated by the University of Athens. It is expected that this reactor will be in operation by Spring 1958.

e. Voice of America Facilities. A ten year agreement for continued operation of Salonika Relay Base and Rhodes USCGS Courier broadcasting station concluded with Greek Government November 28, 1955, also provides for shifting of facilities now on board the Courier to a land-based installation with the consent and cooperation of the Greek authorities. However, this proviso is inoperative due to Greek refusal, growing out of sensitivities regarding the Arab states, to permit a land-based installation intended for use in broadcasting to the Near and Middle East.

[Here follows Section II entitled “Current and Projected Programs and Courses of Action.”]

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Greece. Secret. In a memorandum attached to the source text, Elmer B. Staats noted that the OCB had revised and concurred in the plan at its December 4 board meeting and that the plan superseded the “Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Greece and Recommended Action”, Document 291.
2. See State Department publication Treaties in Force for additional arrangements. [Footnote in the source text.]