153. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State1
2733. Secretary and Robertson from Ambassador. While I recognize that only the US Govt in Washington can weigh all the pertinent considerations in the Girard case and reach final decision in the light thereof, I would like to give you my present estimate of the situation here.
I am convinced that the Japanese will not agree to giving US jurisdiction as a result of the decision reached in the Joint Committee to let Girard be tried by a Japanese court and our subsequent action in officially notifying the Japanese authorities to this effect, which in turn led to the issuance of the indictment. The GOJ is in a position where it will not agree to our exercising jurisdiction. The Japanese feel, after the full and thorough discussions in the Joint Committee, that a responsible decision was taken and that there is no difference with us re the merits of the Girard case. They do not believe he intended to kill the woman, but do believe he was responsible for her death by his actions which in their view were clearly not related to his official duties.
The Japanese also resent very much implications in the American press despatches that their courts do not give fair trials. I am told that the record of Japanese trials is excellent and that sentences are on the whole lighter than would have been given by United States courts martial for similar offenses. But in addition to the question of fairness of trial, I am told that of over fourteen thousand offenses since October 1953 in which Japanese had the right to exercise jurisdiction, they in fact ceded jurisdiction to us in all but four hundred and thirty. This is three percent compared to what I am told is the worldwide average in similar circumstances of twenty-eight percent.
As I see it, given all circumstances and what has transpired, the only alternative to upholding the original finding and agreement in the Joint Committee is for us to proceed unilaterally to exercise jurisdiction. This the Japanese will consider as a deliberate violation of existing international agreements with us. This in turn will of course destroy confidence in and the future utility of the Joint Committee. But much more serious, it will, I fear, shake confidence in the United States and undermine our entire position in Japan.
[Page 316]The Girard case has the most grave and far-reaching implications not only for both Japan and the United States in terms of our vital interests in and future relations with Japan but also in terms of our entire posture throughout free Asia. We know for example that the Philippine Govt is following this case closely and in detail and that its outcome will affect successful conclusion of our base negotiations with the Philippines (Embtel 2716).2 The recent Reynolds case in Taipei,3 which is carried in the Japanese press today comes at most unfortunate time in terms of Asian opinion.
The above relates only to my present estimate of the situation out here and does not cover the other highly important considerations which must be weighed and evaluated in Washington.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.551/5–2457. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:37 a.m. Another copy of this telegram bears a notation by Goodpaster that the President saw the telegram on May 24. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)↩
- Dated May 23, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.551/5–2357)↩
- See footnote 2, infra.↩