Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

86. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, February 21, 1955—6 p.m.

1383. Reference: Deptel 1120.² In considering matters raised in reference telegram I have reviewed carefully the references cited therein on which Department’s telegram was based, including my analysis of these recent events as they occurred. Having looked at situation from all angles, I believe that views expressed my telegram 1161³ continue to be valid and that PNI political strategy outlined therein can be taken as I tried to make clear, as an accurate reflection of views of President Sukarno himself.

My interpretation of various recent moves by Sukarno is that they are part of overall strategy of supporting PNI and not an indication of genuine desire on his part for rapprochement between PNI and Masjumi. PNI was quick, both privately and publicly, to interpret recent US press articles as indicating that US Government now looking with more favor on Ali Government and I consider various approaches to me as an effort to capitalize on this development. Sukarno and PNI probably hope to obtain some more tangible evidence of US favor or at least to encourage further US comment which will counter charge that US Government considers Ali Government Communist dominated.

Commenting on specific question raised in sub-paragraph 1 of reference telegram, I would say that Sukarno probably is worried by extent present polarization domestic parties. I believe his greatest concern is that Masjumi is becoming more and more of potential threat to his personal position; he is also undoubtedly concerned that despite statements of moderate Masjumi leaders in support of Pantjisila,⁴ desire of strong elements in Masjumi for more specific Moslem orientation of Indonesian state in some form will prevail. Sukarno may also be worried by obvious growth of Communist strength. But rather than seeking solution in encouraging moderate PNI–Masjumi coalition government, he seems definitely decided on supporting coalition of PNI and all internationalistic [nationalist?] elements which owe strong allegiance to him personally and which he apparently expects can beat the Communists at their own game on a national united front.

In reference to sub-paragraph 2, my judgment is that Sukarno and PNI are presently more inclined to believe that US Government is resisting pressures of US press and “biased” observers to support Masjumi as western hope in Indonesia. They of course realize that we have close contacts with some opposition leaders and sympathize with their anti-Communist views, but Djuanda statements would indicate they may also hope we might encourage opposition to accept various unity appeals made by President.

In reference to sub-paragraph 3, I agree that we should continue to emphasize this theme but at same time make it clear our concern at the growing strength of Communism in Indonesia. We would not leave any possible thought in Sukarno’s mind that we approve of policy of present government of working closely with Communists or that we share their confidence that “it cannot happen here”.

In reference to sub-paragraph 4, it is my opinion that it would be unwise for US to go this far in expressing its views re Indonesian internal political situation, particularly to President Sukarno. In view of the extreme sensitivity of Indonesians in general and President in particular to anything that appears to be western interference in Asian affairs, Sukarno might well react explosively to such a suggestion. Furthermore, I think that opposition parties would be suspicious of such a move at this time since they are confident of victory in the elections; they would probably get word of such a suggestion by the US and might very well resent it.

In conclusion, it is my judgment that any initiative by US to try to bring the moderate PNI and Masjumi together at this time would not be wise or likely to be successful. The best time for such a rapprochement may well occur after the elections have taken place and each party knows more clearly than at present where it stands. If Masjumi wins a plurality or even majority, I think it quite possible that they will invite some of the moderate PNI elements to cooperate with them and that many of them, like Ruslan Abdulgani for instance, will accept. On other hand, [if?] PNI is reasonably successful in elections, I would hope that President and PNI would feel secure enough to invite some of the moderate Masjumi to join in a truly non-Communist Government. In either case it will be much easier for moderates in losing party to break away than it is now, when party discipline is tight in preparations for elections.

I do intend, however, to try to see President and Vice President⁵ prior to my departure for Manila meeting on 27 February,⁶ in order to get their latest views on Indonesian and regional problems. I will bring up the point in sub-paragraph 3 during the conversation.

Cumming

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/2–2155. Secret.

2. Telegram 1120 to Djakarta, February 10, requested Cumming’s comments and recommendations with respect to several questions:

   • “1. Does Sukarno appear have genuine worry about present extent polarization domestic parties toward Communism by PNI and toward fanatic Moslem by Masjumi and other Moslem parties and does he desire restore balance and cooperation moderates in coalition type Government through rapprochement PNI–Masjumi?
   • “2. Does Sukarno fear that US desire see Masjumi win elections may have prompted US support that party and prevent desired rapprochement?
   • “3. Should US seek reassure Sukarno US backs no particular political party or group but continues believe ‘Indonesian people and nation can work their way successfully through difficulties’ (your 1179 [Document 83])?
   • “4. Should US seek impress Sukarno that while US would welcome rapprochement between moderate groups PNI and Masjumi it is Sukarno’s own responsibility effect such rapprochement?” (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/2–0055)

3. Document 80.
4. The Pantja Sila, or Five Principles, were first set forth by Sukarno in a speech of June 1, 1945, as nationalism, internationalism or humanitarianism, representative government, social justice, and belief in God; they were endorsed in successive Indonesian constitutions.
5. Mohammad Hatta.
6. A conference of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in East Asia was held at Manila and Baguio March 2–5; a record of the meeting, including remarks by Secretary Dulles, who was present at the opening session, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 434.