Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

300. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Quarles) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, September 30, 1957.

Dear Mr. Secretary: This is in reply to your letter dated September 27, 1957² in which you requested the views of the Department of Defense and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the courses of action proposed by Mr. Stassen in the memorandum³ accompanying your letter. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with which the Department of Defense is in agreement, are inclosed herewith.

Mr. Stassen’s proposal for a two-year nuclear weapons test suspension in its essentials is similar to the proposal advanced by the Soviet Delegate in the Disarmament Sub-Committee in July 1957, which the United States, United Kingdom, France and Canada have consistently opposed as an isolated measure for adoption outside the context of a disarmament agreement.

The Department of Defense considers that the United States position regarding a first phase of disarmament, as developed from the decisions taken by the President on June 11, 1957 and subsequently, provides a reasonable basis for negotiation assuming that the USSR is, in fact, intent upon achieving a limited disarmament arrangement. This position was adopted only after prolonged study and deliberation. The interrelation of its several elements was designed to assure that in the approach to a disarmament agreement no single element could be exploited by one side or the other, to meet its own interests, to the exclusion of the other elements which are requisites to a balanced program. The USSR has seized upon the suspension of nuclear weapons testing as a prime vehicle for propaganda purposes, while it has cynically rejected the Western Four lower proposals for a first phase disarmament agreement. This, taken in conjunction with the unreasonable conditions which render the Soviet proposals obviously unacceptable to the West casts grave doubts upon the sincerity of the USSR with regard to a disarmament arrangement as a whole. The Department of Defense therefore strongly indorses the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States not adopt Mr. Stassen’s proposal for the suspension of nuclear testing without an agreement for the cessation of nuclear production and the other elements of our first phase disarmament proposals.

Although Mr. Stassen’s proposal provides that signatory states undertake to make a sustained effort during the twenty-four months to reach agreement upon, and begin to implement, additional steps of disarmament, it is considered that there is little likelihood that such an undertaking would be more fruitful of results than past negotiations. The Soviets have not hesitated to ignore the previous directives of the United Nations to this same effect, and it is doubtful that they would attach any greater significance to the proposed undertaking. The agreement for an unconditional test suspension would constitute a propaganda victory for them and would avoid their commitment for other measures less favorable to their interests. Further, their success in this effort would doubtless be looked upon as a precedent setting the stage for singling out other elements of their proposals for exploitation, notably the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

While the Department of Defense would not advocate or sponsor a spreading of nuclear weapons production, it is not convinced that a net disadvantage to the security interests of the United States would result if France, for example, were to embark upon such a program. In this connection, it should be noted that France has until now insisted that in the Western proposals there be a link between the suspension of nuclear testing and the cessation of production.

On balance, the Department of Defense considers that the security interests of the United States would best be served by adhering to the present position for a first phase disarmament arrangement. It is therefore recommended that this proposal not be adopted as United States policy regarding disarmament.

Sincerely yours,

Donald A. Quarles

[Enclosure]

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)⁴

Washington, September 30, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Disarmament (U)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 30 September 1957, subject: “Disarmament Planning.”⁵

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that Mr. Stassen’s latest disarmament proposal, as outlined in his informal memorandum to the Secretary of State, dated 23 September 1957, is inconsistent with the security interests of the United States.

3. In proposing to extract the nuclear testing provision of the Four Power Joint Proposals of 29 August 1957 for separate consideration, Mr. Stassen abandons the requirement for prior agreement by the USSR to all of the other provisions of the 29 August 1957 proposal. From a security viewpoint, no discernible change has taken place since 29 August 1957 in the international situation, or in the intransigent attitude of the Soviet Union, to warrant separation of the Four Power Joint Proposals. One of the requirements of the 29 August 1957 proposals, which resulted from protracted negotiation with our NATO Allies, was that all their provisions were “inseparable”. This inseparability made the proposals barely acceptable for meeting the minimum requirements for national security and security of the Western Powers.

4. In extracting the nuclear testing provision from the Four Power Joint Proposals, Mr. Stassen has postponed consideration of the corollary provision for the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, to include the installation of a satisfactory inspection system to insure compliance. Mr. Stassen now feels that such an inspection system is not attainable in the first move, despite the fact that the Western Powers have agreed that it must be attained in the first twenty-four months of a first phase disarmament agreement in order for the agreement to be effective. Only this corollary provision assists in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear warfare; the cessation of nuclear testing per se need not contribute at all to the effective control of nuclear weapons.

5. Another aspect of this proposal is that, except for the starting date, it is in consonance with the Soviet Resolutions on Suspension of Nuclear Tests which was introduced into the UN General Assembly on 20 September 1957.⁶ In completely acceding to the Soviet position of considering separately the suspension of nuclear testing as a prerequisite to any disarmament agreement, the United States would be placed in a weakened bargaining position in any future negotiations.

6. In stating that his proposal is in the best interest of the United States, Mr. Stassen indicates that France could develop a capability to test nuclear weapons by late 1958, or early 1959, if she chooses to do so, and once this point were reached, the wide spreading of nuclear weapons would then be beyond control. The Joint Chiefs of Staff question that France has the monetary or technical capability to develop a nuclear program with such speed. Further, assuming that she did obtain this capability, it might well be in the best interest of the United States and NATO.

7. Mr. Stassen further asserts that this proposal would check on the intentions of the USSR with a minimum of risk by the United States. Eight or ten fixed ground inspection posts in the USSR for verifying the suspension of nuclear tests would provide only minor improvement in the Western intelligence capability to determine Soviet intentions. This slight intelligence gain is more than offset in risk to the United States by the possibility that the Soviets might claim that fixed ground inspection posts, because of their success in supervising the suspension of nuclear tests, would be adequate for inspection in a first phase disarmament agreement. This would jeopardize the Western position that the inspection system in a first phase disarmament agreement must consist of coterminous aerial and ground components, with freedom of access to all objects of control.

8. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend:

a. Against the adoption of Mr. Stassen’s proposal,

b. Continued adherence to the Four Power Joint Proposals of 29 August 1957, as the U.S. position in any negotiations on disarmament, and

c. That the above comments form the basis of your reply to the Secretary of State.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining⁷
Chairman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9–3057. Secret. In an October 1 letter to Eisenhower, Dulles enclosed copies of this letter and attached memorandum. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9–2357)
4. Secret.
5. Not found in Department of State files.
6. A Soviet memorandum on partial disarmament measures, including the suspension of atomic and hydrogen weapons testing, submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on September 20 (U.N. doc. A/C.1/793), is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 874–884.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Twining became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 15.