269. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany1
104. Eyes only O’Shaughnessy. Please have following message from Secretary delivered urgently to Chancellor:
“My Dear Mr. Chancellor:
I came over to participate in the disarmament talks at this stage. I remember well the degree of trust in US that you expressed in relation to this matter, and wanted personally to be sure that nothing might occur here which could be embarrassing to you.
You will have received by now the test of the paper on which the Western Four (Canada ad referendum) found agreement today with respect to safeguards against surprise attack.2
There would be three possible zones.
One would be the large area which would include in effect all of Europe, all of the Soviet Union and all of North America.
The Soviet Union has made it abundantly clear that they would not now accept any system of inspection which would cover all of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless we feel it important from a public relations standpoint to make it evident that so far as the West is concerned we have nothing to hide, and will be willing to subject everything to scrutiny if only the Soviets will do the same.
[Page 673]On the assumption that the Soviets will reject the broad combined areas of Europe, North America and Siberia, we proposed two alternatives, one of which is precise, i.e., the northern area comprehending the area north of the Arctic circle plus Alaska, Eastern Siberia, etc. We also suggest a possibility of a smaller European zone but we are not now precise in this matter beyond stipulating that it must cover significant portions of the Soviet Union and the statellites. This is in line with the NATO “fall-back” position.3
We do not believe that the Soviet Union in connection with a partial European zone will accept inspection of a significant part of the Soviet Union.
One of the problems has been to express our views about the nature of inspection.
It is the considered and firm view of our military people that an aerial inspection of the Soviet areas is not worth much unless there is a possibility of investigating in situ suspiciously dangerous circumstances as revealed from the air. Therefore, so far as we are concerned, we must insist upon a measure of mobility covering the Soviet areas which are subjected to inspection in reciprocity to US areas subjected to inspection. We feel that there is great danger that the American people will regard any form of aerial inspection as providing insurance against surprise attack and that our defense efforts and appropriations might lag in reliance on a kind of inspection which would not be dependable unless there was a ground complement with a measure of mobility.
On the other hand we agree that uncontrolled mobility granted anywhere to Soviet inspection teams could become a danger. Therefore in this draft we provide for mobile ground teams with specifically defined authority. No one will have authority to roam about at will. We further provide that the degree of mobility would require in all cases concurrence of the countries directly concerned.
I would point out that the suggestion of a European zone is dependent upon Soviet commitment either to an all-Soviet inspection or an Arctic circle inspection and that this in turn is dependent upon agreement on the details of the installation, maintenance and operation of the system of inspection. Therefore there is in effect a built-in deferral of the European zone. While I hope that the Soviets will accept a system of inspection acceptable to us, I have great doubts and I am confident that they will be even more sensitive than you are to mobility. Therefore their attitude on this subject will presumably have to be developed before you are faced by the problem.
[Page 674]In the second place I would point out that any mobility within the Federal Republic is made subject to your agreement, and you can be confident that you would not in this respect be isolated but that the US would fully support your reasonable views on this matter.
I have in all these respects had very much in mind our Washington talks.4 I believe that your position is protected and I hope you can agree with the paper which we hope to put to the Russians tomorrow afternoon.
Faithfully yours, Foster Dulles”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7–3157. Secret; Niact. Repeated to the Department of State as Dulte 6 which is the source text.↩
- Text of the Western powers’ paper transmitted to Bonn as telegram 103 was repeated to the Department of State as Secto 9 from London, July 31. (Ibid.) This text, which was submitted with only a few changes as a Western working paper to the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on August 2 (U.N. doc. DC/ SC.1/62/Rev. 1), is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 837–839.↩
- Text of the NAC position on inspection zones is contained in Polto 233 from Paris, July 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7–2457)↩
- Regarding Adenauer’s visit to the United States, May 24–29, see Document 204.↩