5. Memorandum of Discussion at the 230th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 5, 19551
[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]
1. Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5440/1; NSC 162/2; NSC 5422/2; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Summary Statement of Existing Basic National Security Policy”, dated October 11, 1954;2 Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 20, 1954 and January 3, 1955;3 NSC Actions Nos. 1286–b–(2) and 1290;4 NIE 11–4–54; NIE 11–6–545)
Mr. Cutler briefed the Council at some length on the reference report, stressing once again the comments and criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had reemphasized their earlier views with respect to this proposed basic policy. He then called attention to the various differences of view, and indicated that since this would constitute final [Page 10] Council consideration of the paper, these differences of view would have to be decided. (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s notes is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)
The first difference of opinion occurred in the introductory paragraph of Section A (Estimate of the Situation).6 As presently written, this paragraph indicated the majority opinion of the NSC Planning Board that the present Soviet challenge constituted “a peril greater than any the United States has ever before faced.” The President indicated sympathy with the minority point of view represented by the Director, Bureau of the Budget,7 and said that he could see no use in setting forth this peril in comparative terms. It was sufficient to say that this challenge constituted a grave peril to the United States.
Mr. Cutler then pointed out the various remaining differences of view with respect to the intelligence estimate, indicating that while the Council should take note of these differences in judgment, it was not necessary that the Council should resolve such differences. They would remain indicated in the footnotes, as was the case normally with national intelligence estimates.
Turning to the body of the paper (Section B, “Outline of U.S. National Strategy”), Mr. Cutler pointed out that the first split view occurred in paragraph 21, which read as follows:
“21. The basic objective of U.S. national security policy is to preserve the security of the United States, and its fundamental values and institutions [without seriously weakening the U.S. economy.]”8
The President indicated his belief that the bracketed phrase, which had been proposed by the Treasury member and the Budget adviser of the Planning Board, was superfluous, inasmuch as the U.S. free economy was obviously one of the fundamental values and institutions referred to earlier in this paragraph. Accordingly, the bracketed phrase was deleted.
Mr. Cutler then moved on to paragraph 24, which read as follows:
“24. The Soviet bloc-free world conflict can be resolved in accordance with U.S. security interests only through either (a) overthrow of the Soviet regime and its replacement by a government with no expansionist or other objectives inconsistent with U.S. security; or (b) modification of the Soviet system so that its leaders for practical purposes abandon expansionist policies and accept either formal or de facto arrangements consistent with U.S. security interests.”
He explained that the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to insert, after the term “Soviet regime”, the phrase “including the destruction of its international Communist apparatus”. The Planning Board members other than the JCS adviser, however, felt that such destruction was included in both policy (a) and policy (b). The idea was thought to be implicit. Secretary Dulles said that while indeed the thought might be implicit in the paragraph as written, he felt that it was sufficiently important to be made explicit. Accordingly, he had made a redraft of paragraph 24 which took account of the proposal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.9
The President inquired what was meant by the term “international Communist apparatus”. Did this refer merely to the local Communist parties in the various countries, or did it include the mechanics by which the Kremlin controlled these parties? It seemed to the President a terrific undertaking for the United States to try to destroy the local Communist parties throughout the world. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that these local Communist parties would wither on the vine if the directing regime in the Kremlin were destroyed. The President, however, doubted the accuracy of this statement, as did Secretary Dulles, who believed that at least some of the local Communist parties would manage to survive the destruction of the Soviet regime.
Returning to his earlier thought, the President said that while it might be possible for the United States to “neutralize” the Communist apparatus in the free world, it would be next to impossible to destroy it completely. In accordance with the President’s view, Secretary Dulles suggested the substitution of the term “disrupt” for the term “destroy” in his new draft of paragraph 24, which he proceeded to hand to Mr. Cutler, who read it to the meeting. With this change, Secretary Dulles’ redraft of paragraph 24 was accepted.10
Mr. Cutler then turned to paragraph 25, reading as follows:
“25. The U.S. and its allies have no foreseeable prospect of stopping the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities and of reducing Soviet armed strength—the core of Communist power—[or of significantly reducing other basic Communist military strength,]11 except by mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviets or by large-scale military action. The initiation by the U.S. of such action for this purpose is not an acceptable course either to the U.S. or its major allies.”
The bracketed phrase, he said, had been proposed by the State, Treasury,CIA and Budget members of the Planning Board, and referred primarily to the military strength of Communist China and the European satellites.
The President said that he was inclined to agree with the sense of the bracketed phrase, since he saw little possibility that other basic Communist military strength could be reduced over the period of the next five years. Accordingly, it was agreed to include the bracketed phrase.
The next split occurred in paragraph 27, which read as follows:
“27. To carry out effectively this general strategy will require a flexible combination of military, political, economic, propaganda, and covert actions which enables the full exercise of U.S. initiative. These actions must be so coordinated as to reinforce one another. [The concrete goals of general strategy between now and the time when the USSR has greatly increased nuclear power should be developed as a matter of urgency.]”12
The bracketed sentence, said Mr. Cutler, had been proposed by the Defense, ODM and JCS members of the Planning board. The other members of the Planning Board believed that this language might seem to indicate the desirability of resorting to armed force between now and the time when the USSR had greatly increased nuclear power, and these members therefore believed that the sentence was inconsistent with the basic strategy outlined in NSC 5440/1.
Dr. Flemming said that apropos of this paragraph it had seemed to him as he had read through the report that there was inadequate recognition of the necessity of developing concrete programs to meet the Soviet threat with some kind of time-table in mind. The President indicated his belief that there must be a lot of people in the Executive Branch working in the field of formulating programs. Governor Stassen pointed out that it was the responsibility of the Operations Coordinating Board13 to develop concrete programs to carry out agreed U.S. policy.
Mr. Cutler indicated that if NSC 5440/1 were approved by the President, Mr. Cutler proposed to suggest to the President the appointment of a high-level committee made up of members of the OCB, with Mr. Nelson Rockefeller as chairman, whose responsibility it would be to work out programs to put this new policy into effect. The President [Page 13] said that in that case the present report amounted simply to being a directive to this OCB committee. Governor Stassen was of the opinion that the work of the committee amounted to drawing up courses of action to carry out the strategy outlined in NSC 5440/1.
Secretary Humphrey felt that if the term “goals” in the bracketed sentence were changed to read “programs”, the issue could be settled without any misunderstanding that the sentence suggested a resort to armed force. The President said it seemed to him that the Council was now getting into the realm of semantics, but he had no objection to Secretary Humphrey’s proposed change, which was subsequently adopted by the Council.
Mr. Cutler then said that he had overlooked a change which the Secretary of State desired to make in paragraph 26–c, which read:
“c. Fostering changes in the character and policies of the Communist regimes by making clear to them available alternatives which are in their basic interests and do not conflict with those of the U.S. and by exploiting differences between such regimes, and their other vulnerabilities, in ways consistent with this strategy.”
Secretary Dulles said that this, too, might appear to be a matter of semantics, but that he felt that subparagraph c should be rewritten to read as follows:
“c. Supplementing a and b above by other actions designed to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet–Communist bloc regimes:
- “(1) By influencing them toward the choice of those alternative lines of action which, while in their national interests, do not conflict with the security interests of the U.S.; and
- “(2) By exploiting differences between such regimes, and their other vulnerabilities, in ways consistent with this general strategy.”
Mr. Allen Dulles said that Secretary Dulles’ redraft would be improved if our influence was not confined solely to the Communist regime, but was also exerted on the peoples of the Soviet bloc. Secretary Dulles expressed skepticism as to whether popular pressure would succeed in making many significant changes in the Communist regimes. He admitted, however, that we might be able to bring influence to bear to break the captive peoples away from their regimes. The President said that this was also his view, and after further discussion the draft proposed by Secretary Dulles was adopted by the Council subject to language which would indicate that our influence was to be directed not only at the regimes but also at the peoples of the Communist states. Even in dictatorships, said the President, some attention had to be given to public opinion.[Page 14]
The next important split, continued Mr. Cutler, occurred in paragraph 32, which read as follows:
“32. The United States must also have other ready forces, which, together with those of its allies, must be sufficient (a) to help deter any resort to local aggression, or (b) to punish swiftly and severely any such local aggression, in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening into total nuclear war. Such ready forces will be in addition to those assigned to NATO; [they must be in properly proportioned relationship with the versatility to meet aggression in all its forms;]14 must be suitably deployed, highly mobile, and equipped as appropriate with atomic capability; and must also, along with those assigned to NATO, be capable of discharging initial tasks in the event of general war.”
After explaining his understanding of why the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to include the bracketed phrase, Mr. Cutler asked General Twining if he wished to add anything to this explanation. General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs had suggested this language in order to ensure a proper balance of forces in our deployments so that these forces would be able to carry out whatever jobs they had to do.
The President indicated that he did not care one way or another, and that it was all right to include the bracketed phrase if the Joint Chiefs so desired.
Secretary Dulles inquired about the last sentence of the paragraph, dealing with initial tasks in the event of general war. Secretary Dulles wondered whether this implied that the United States must have forces in being capable of carrying out all subsequent as well as all initial tasks in the event of general war.
Mr. Cutler indicated that this was not the intention of the authors of the paragraph, but Secretary Humphrey likewise expressed concern lest this phraseology appear to open the door to the return of the concept of balanced forces “for all purposes everywhere”. Up to now this Administration had made clear its belief in the idea of selectivity in the composition of its armed forces, and it would be a bad mistake to abandon the principle of selectivity for that of balance. Along the same lines, Secretary Dulles pointed out that the President had only recently informed the Congressional leaders that the Administration’s military program would ensure forces adequate for the initial tasks of general war, but that it would not be necessary for the United States to have ready and in being at the outset of general war all the military forces it might need subsequently in the course of prosecuting such a war.[Page 15]
The President said that he did not understand the connection of the problem being discussed with the disputed language in the bracketed phrase. Mr. Cutler pointed out to the President that it was not to the term “versatility” that Secretary Humphrey objected, but to the idea of forces “to meet aggression in all its forms”. Secretary Humphrey said that Mr. Cutler was quite correct, and that what he feared was that complete coverage to meet every kind of future military contingency was creeping back into our thinking. He most strenuously objected to the concept of forces in being to meet every possible kind of emergency. If we accepted such an idea we would be “all over the lot again”.
As Mr. Cutler was suggesting a revision to meet Secretary Humphrey’s point, the President turned to Secretary Humphrey and said what you mean is that we should continue to adhere to our basic doctrine of the so-called “new look”. When Secretary Humphrey agreed, the President said that he still did not see any suggestion of changing the new look concept of the bracketed phrase.
Mr. Cutler said that perhaps the Chiefs of Staff desired to comment on this issue. Admiral Carney and General Ridgway both expressed a desire to speak. General Ridgway spoke first, [7 lines of source text not declassified]. To recapture and hold such large areas would require the deployment of considerable ground forces. That is what versatility meant to him, said General Ridgway—“ground forces ready to do this kind of job.”
Expressing a measure of agreement with General Ridgway’s reasoning, the President nevertheless argued that the kind of situation described by General Ridgway as possible [2 words not declassified] would almost certainly call for partial mobilization by the United States. The job [7 words not declassified] couldn’t be done by a regimental combat team and three or four Marine battalions. On the other hand, it was impossible to have sufficient ground forces in being to meet every kind of military contingency everywhere in the world. Partial mobilization would have to be the answer. General Ridgway replied by pointing out that speed of deployment would be of the essence in many such contingencies. Accordingly, we must have at least certain forces in being to meet such situations. Our ground forces, at least, were growing very small in number. He was not, insisted General Ridgway, arguing, as Secretary Humphrey said, that it was necessary for us to have every variety of military force in being all the time.
Secretary Wilson said that he certainly was not in favor of earmarking this division or that division for future use in each of the various places in the world where divisions might some time be [Page 16] needed. What he did favor was having mobile forces at hand and ready to go to different parts of the world as the situation might require.
Admiral Carney said that, speaking from the point of view of the Navy, he felt that if we tailored all our military forces to a single concept of warfare, it would be unsound. The U.S. forces should have sufficient versatility to enable them to meet various circumstances short of general war, as well as general war itself.
Mr. Cutler then suggested a further revision of this paragraph to take account of the discussion. This was adopted, with a comment by the President that he had always imagined that military forces were by their very nature presumed to be versatile.
Mr. Cutler then indicated that the next split occurred in paragraph 35, which read as follows:
“35. The United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war. [The United States and its allies will also have to forego actions regarded as provocative, if such actions would foreclose the requisite support for the use of force should this become necessary. Moreover, it the Communist rulers should conclude that the United States is bent on aggressive war, they may feel that they have no choice but to initiate war themselves at their own time. Hence, the United States should attempt to make clear, by word and conduct, that it is not our intention to provoke war.]15 At the same time the United States and its major allies must make clear their determination to oppose aggression despite risk of general war, and the United States must make clear its determination to prevail if general war eventuates.”
As soon as Mr. Cutler had finished reading paragraph 35, Mr. Allen Dulles indicated his desire to withdraw the support given by the CIA member of the Planning Board to the bracketed sentences in this paragraph.
The President said that he found it very difficult to understand the contents in the bracketed phrase apart from specific situations which might arise. He felt that the wording was much too speculative. Secretary Dulles said that he was quite prepared to see both the first and the second sentence in the bracketed portion of the paragraph deleted. The other members of the Council promptly agreed.
Apropos of paragraphs 39, 40, 41 and 42, dealing with economic assistance, particularly to less developed areas, Mr. Cutler noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired to include somewhere in these paragraphs reference to the desirability of ensuring a better supply of food to such areas. He indicated that the Planning Board had been [Page 17] reluctant to adopt the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because it singled out only one of many items of economic assistance, although they had no objection to the proposal in itself.
The President, disagreeing with the Planning Board, said he thought that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had “got something” on this point. Adequate food, he said, was more conducive to good morale than almost anything else he knew, citing as an illustration the powerful effect of the 10-pound food packages which Governor Stassen had distributed at Christmas. In accordance with the President’s view, the Council agreed to include a specific reference to providing adequate dietary conditions.
Mr. Cutler went on to point out that at the end of paragraph 42, which dealt with economic assistance to underdeveloped areas, there was a division in the Planning Board. The Treasury and Budget members of the Planning Board desired to add a final sentence which read: “The total level of U.S. economic assistance worldwide should, however, be progressively reduced.” Although, said Mr. Cutler, this language was taken from the “Guidelines Under NSC 162/2”,16 the other members of the Planning Board had been disinclined to include it in the present paper.
Secretary Humphrey said that he thought it most desirable from every point of view to include the sentence in question. The President, turning to Secretary Humphrey, said that the real criterion with respect to the level of U.S. economic assistance was the security advantage which the United States obtained. He pointed out that U.S. economic assistance to Turkey was the best possible way to buttress our security interests in the Near Eastern area. Moreover, it was much better and cheaper to assist the Turks to build up their own armed forces than to create additional U.S. divisions.
The Director of the Budget also believed that the sentence in question should be included, if for no other reason than if it were left out, those who were not familiar with the point of view of the Administration might misinterpret the omission.
Secretary Dulles suggested a revision of the disputed sentence which would read that the total level of U.S. economic assistance “should be reduced as rapidly as is consistent with U.S. security interests.” Mr. Hughes indicated that this revision was satisfactory to him. Our policy has been going in the direction of reducing the level of our economic assistance, and we certainly did not wish to change directions now. The President, however, reiterated that the first criterion with respect to the level of U.S. assistance was the vital interests and the security of the United States.[Page 18]
Secretary Dulles then said he wished to raise another point contained in paragraph 42. He referred to the sentence which read: “Specifically, the U.S. should support a new initiative, in which industrialized free world nations and underdeveloped nations of Asia would both participate, aimed at significant economic improvement in South and Southeast Asia, where the Communist threat is especially dangerous.” Apropos of this sentence, Secretary Dulles said that he sometimes worried over the great emphasis we were putting on economic assistance to South and Southeast Asia. There was almost as much danger from Communism in the Americas. Accordingly, should we single out the areas of South and Southeast Asia for special mention? To the United States itself, the situation in the Americas was more dangerous than the situation in Southeast Asia, although, of course, this was not the case with the people of Southeast Asia.
Mr. Cutler suggested deletion of this sentence, but Governor Stassen expressed some reluctance at this proposal. He pointed out that we can effect changes in any situation in the Americas without being obliged to resort to general war. If, on the other hand, we were to lose Burma to Communism, we could only regain it by resorting to war.
Mr. Rockefeller inquired, with respect to paragraph 42, whether it was the intent of this paragraph to suggest that money and money alone could develop sounder economic conditions in the backward areas. If so, the argument was erroneous, for there were a variety of other means for improving economic conditions.
Mr. Cutler explained that the point raised by Mr. Rockefeller was covered in paragraph 41, and again suggested the omission of the sentence to which Secretary Dulles had taken exception. Governor Stassen then inquired whether omission of this sentence would constitute a change in the recently adopted U.S. policy toward the Far East (NSC 5429/5).17 Mr. Cutler assured Governor Stassen that this was not the case, whereupon Governor Stassen indicated his approval for deletion of this sentence.
Dr. Flemming then observed that by and large the present report nowhere gave sufficient emphasis to the information, cultural, education and exchange programs. The President agreed that these programs had not been mentioned, but said that he presumed that they would be included in the programs subsequently formulated to carry out the policy and strategy in the present paper.
Secretary Dulles said that he wished to express his complete agreement with Mr. Rockefeller that there had been in the past too great emphasis on financial and economic assistance to friendly nations. Mr. Allen Dulles expressed agreement with Secretary Dulles, [Page 19] and cited the case of Italy to prove his point. Very large sums in the shape of U.S. assistance had been poured into Italy without any notable effect on the level of Communist strength and membership. Economic aid, said Mr. Dulles, was obviously important; but it was not the whole answer to our problems. Both Secretary Humphrey and the President expressed agreement with these views. Dr. Flemming suggested that this idea deserved a new paragraph, and Secretary Dulles agreed that it would be desirable to include a new paragraph dealing with cultural and ideological matters. Mr. Cutler said that such a paragraph would be inserted.
Mr. Cutler then asked the Council to look at paragraph 49–b, dealing with a sound U.S. economy and reading as follows:
“The Federal Government should continue to make a determined effort to bring its total annual expenditures into balance, or into substantial balance, with its total annual revenues, and should maintain overall credit and fiscal policies designed to assist in stabilizing the economy.”
He then went on to explain that Dr. Burns 18 had been unable to be present, and wished him to convey Dr. Burns’ views as to this paragraph. Dr. Burns said that from a technical point of view it would be more correct to delete the word “annual” before “expenditures” and “revenues”. On the other hand, he would not recommend deletion at this time, since if we were now to tinker with the language people would put the wrong construction on the change.
Secretary Dulles said that he wished to suggest a further revision of this paragraph, designed to make clear that revenues alone were not the absolute criterion. Obviously we would like revenues and expenditures to be in balance, but sometimes, said Secretary Dulles, it was every bit as important to find revenues to meet expenses as it was to cut expenditures in order to meet revenues. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles believed that the language should read “to bring its total annual expenditures and its total annual revenues into balance, or substantial balance”.
Secretary Humphrey indicated that he would not object to the proposed language unless it meant that we were now contemplating going before Congress and asking an increase in taxes. Of course, under different world conditions, it might be necessary to do this. Secretary Dulles then asked Secretary Humphrey just what he proposed to do if he failed to prevent Congress from slashing the excise taxes in the next session. Did Secretary Humphrey propose to cut national defense expenditures if the excise taxes were thrown out by the Congress? As the President was expressing his agreement with the [Page 20] position taken by the Secretary of State, Secretary Humphrey answered by saying that if in the next session of Congress we got a big cut in our revenues, we would have to take a good hard look both at our revenues and at our expenditures.
Secretary Wilson indicated that he also would go along with Secretary Dulles’ view, adding that under certain conditions he would vote for a deficit. Secretary Humphrey replied that so would he, but certainly not under present conditions. Secretary Dulles again proposed the phraseology “bring its total annual revenues and expenditures into balance”. The President said isn’t that what the present paragraph means substantially? Mr. Hughes said that as far as he could see, it didn’t mean anything really different but, once again, new language may give rise to misunderstandings. Mr. Cutler thought that it was rather a question of difference of implication than a matter of exact meaning. Secretary Humphrey counselled against changing the phraseology if we really didn’t mean to change our concrete objective. The President said that in any case we must never fail to emphasize that the United States will do what it has to do to protect its security. Whatever language is adopted should leave no doubt on this point. The Council thereupon adopted the language suggested by Secretary Dulles, with respect to paragraph 49–d, reading as follows:
“d. [The aggregate of Federal expenditures, not essential to the national security, should be minimized.] [Federal expenditures, especially those not essential for the national security, should be held to a necessary minimum].”19 Every effort should be made to eliminate waste, duplication, and unnecessary overhead in the Federal Government.”
The Council after some discussion adopted a revision suggested by Dr. Burns, to the effect that all Federal expenditures, especially those not essential for the national security, should be held to the necessary minimum.
As the Council was concluding its discussion of the report, Secretary Dulles noted that at the end of the report there were paragraphs dealing with the importance of an adequate intelligence system, manpower, research and development, etc.. Pointing out that he had mentioned at earlier meetings of the Council the lack of an adequate U.S. organization to deal with the Communist tactics of subversion in free world nations, Secretary Dulles inquired whether there should not be specific mention at this point of the necessity of strong governmental backing to solve this problem. Mr. Allen Dulles, in response, referred to a paper on the subject which he was about to present to Mr. Rockefeller.20 Secretary Dulles, however, was still of the opinion that [Page 21] this problem deserved mention in this report. Mr. Allen Dulles said that he would in that case be glad to prepare such a paragraph, which could then be considered by the other Council members. The President expressed approval of this proposal.
At the conclusion of the discussion of NSC 5440/1, Mr. Cutler indicated that the President had a related matter which he wished to bring up for Council discussion and advice. The President then held up a manuscript which he said was the draft of a letter to Secretary Wilson in reply to a note from Secretary Wilson asking for a Presidential statement for public release relative to the military program for the next fiscal year.21
The President then explained that what he had been trying to do was to put in language that could be clearly understood the position which the NSC had recommended and on which he had decided, as to what our security required from the military point of view. This would be most valuable for future discussions with the Congress, and he wanted to be sure that he had a convincing and succinct statement of the Administration’s position on this subject, and one which could be published without injuring the national security. The President then read his draft letter, after which various members of the Council, including Secretary Wilson, Secretary Humphrey, Secretary Stevens, and Secretary Dulles, all made suggestions for the President’s consideration in revising the present draft of the letter. Much of this discussion centered about the level to which the armed forces of the United States should be reduced, as a goal for the end of the Fiscal Year 1956. The President, on this subject, told Secretary Wilson to be prepared to defend a figure of 2,850,000.22
The National Security Council: 23
- Discussed the subject on the basis of the reference report (NSC 5440/1) in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 3, 1955.
- Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5440/1, subject to the following
- The introductory paragraph on page 1: Change “a peril greater than any the United States has ever before faced.” to “a grave peril to the United States.”; and delete the footnote relating thereto.
- Paragraph 21: Delete the bracketed phrase and the footnote relating thereto.
Paragraph 24: Reword to read as follows: [Page 22]
“24. In meeting this threat, the U.S. must choose between two main lines of policy, aimed respectively at:
- “a. Destroying the power of the Soviet-Communist bloc; or
- “b. Modifying the policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc along lines more compatible with U.S. security interests.
“Either policy would include action to disrupt or neutralize the international Communist apparatus in the free world.”
and delete the footnote relating thereto.
- Paragraph 25: Include the bracketed phrase and delete the footnote relating thereto.
Paragraph 26–c: Reword to read as follows:
“c. Supplementing a and b above by other actions designed to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc regime:
- “(1) By influencing them and their peoples toward the choice of those alternative lines of action which, while in their national interests, do not conflict with the security interests of the U.S.; and
- “(2) By exploiting differences between such regimes, and their other vulnerabilities, in ways consistent with this general strategy.”
and delete the footnote relating thereto.
- Paragraph 27: Include the bracketed sentence, substituting “programs for the” for “concrete goals of”; and delete the footnote relating thereto.
Paragraph 32: Revise the second
sentence to read as follows:
“Such ready forces will be in addition to those assigned to NATO; they must be properly balanced, sufficiently versatile, suitably deployed, highly mobile, and equipped as appropriate with atomic capability, to perform these tasks; and must also, along with those assigned to NATO, be capable of discharging initial tasks in the event of general war.”
- Paragraph 35: Delete the first two sentences within the brackets; include the last sentence within the brackets; and delete the footnote relating thereto.
Insert a new paragraph following paragraph 37, to read as follows:
“Recognizing that the Soviet bloc is at present stressing and effectively utilizing subsersive forces and techniques, the U.S. should strengthen its effort against such forces and techniques by developing and employing in a well-coordinated manner all means at its disposal appropriate to this purpose; specifically including covert operations and other pertinent political, information, economic and military programs and activities. [1 sentence (21 words) not declassified]
and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.
- Paragraph 41: In the second sentence, after the words “economic growth”, insert “, providing adequate dietary conditions,”; and delete the last sentence of this paragraph and the footnote at the bottom of page 14.
Paragraph 42: End the first sentence after the words “effectively used”; delete the second sentence; include the sentence in brackets, revised to read as follows:
“The total level of U.S. economic assistance worldwide should, however, be reduced as rapidly as is consistent with U.S. security interests.”
and delete the footnote relating thereto.
Insert a new paragraph following paragraph 42, to read as follows:
“U.S. financial assistance alone cannot produce satisfactory economic growth in less developed areas, and external assistance should be used in a way to promote and not decrease local incentives and self-help. In addition to the provision of financial assistance, the United States should train indigenous leaders, develop skills, and provide competent advisers. U.S. information, cultural, education and exchange programs should also be strengthened.”
and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.
- Throughout the paper, substitute “less developed areas” for “underdeveloped areas” wherever these words appear.
Paragraph 49–b: Reword to read as follows:
“b. The Federal Government should continue to make a determined effort to bring its total annual expenditures and its total annual revenues into balance, or into substantial balance; and should maintain over-all credit and fiscal policies designed to assist in stabilizing the economy.”
and delete the footnotes relating to this subparagraph and subparagraph 49–c.
- Paragraph 49–d: Substitute for the bracketed sentence the following: “All Federal expenditures, especially those not essential for the national security, should be held to a necessary minimum.”; and delete the footnote relating thereto.
- Paragraph 53–b: Include the bracketed phrase, substituting “feasible” for “possible”; and delete the footnote relating thereto.
- Noted and discussed a proposed statement by the President, as read at the meeting, with relation to the purpose, composition, and size of the active armed forces of the United States.
- Noted that the President had revised his decision, stated in
NSC Action No. 1286–b–(2), to
read as follows:
“(2) towards a general target for personnel strengths at June 30, 1956 of approximately 2,850,000 (including therein an Air Force personnel strength of 975,000); force and manning levels to be determined after further study.”
Note: NSC 5440/1, as amended, approved by the President and subsequently circulated as NSC 5501. The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense; and a revised page covering NSC Action No. 1286–b–(2) subsequently circulated, to include a footnote referring to the subsequent action in d above.
[Here follow agenda items 2–6.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on January 6.↩
- For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 738.↩
- These memoranda transmitted the JCS memoranda of December 17 and 30, cited in footnotes 5 and 6, supra .↩
- NSC Action No. 1286–b–(2), taken at the 228th meeting of the National Security Council on December 14, 1954, noted the President’s decision that the Department of Defense should begin to move toward a general target for personnel strengths of the armed forces of 2,815,000 by June 30, 1956, with an Air Force strength of 975,000 included therein. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) For text of NSC Action No. 1290, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 844, footnote 10.↩
- Excerpts from NIE 11–4–54 are printed ibid., vol. VIII, p. 1248. NIE 11–6–54, “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field,” October 5, 1954, is not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)↩
- References in this document to paragraphs of NSC 5440/1 correspond to paragraphs of NSC 5440, printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, p. 806 and of NSC 5501, infra .↩
- Rowland R. Hughes.↩
- Brackets in the source text.↩
- This redraft, dated January 4, was prepared for the Secretary by John C. Campbell of the Policy Planning Staff. (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, S/P Chronological)↩
- For the full text, see paragraph b (3) in the NSC Action below.↩
- Bracket in the source text.↩
- Brackets in the source text.↩
- Established by President Eisenhower in Executive Order 10483 of September 2, 1953 (18 Federal Register 5379), the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) was designed to provide a mechanism for coordinated interdepartmental implementation of national security policies adopted by the National Security Council and approved by the President. OCB documents are in Department of State, OCB Files: Lots 62 D 430 and 61 D 385.↩
- Brackets in the source text.↩
- Brackets in the source text.↩
- See footnote 9, supra .↩
- “Current U.S. Policy in the Far East,” December 22, 1954; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 1, p. 1062.↩
- Arthur F. Burns, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers.↩
- All brackets in this paragraph are in the source text.↩
- Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 3.↩
- An increase of 35,000 from the personnel target set in NSC Action No. 1286–b–(2).↩
- Paragraphs a–d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1293. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)↩