Office of the Historian

279. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State1

Tunis, November 11, 1957—2 p.m.

460. Mokkadem has just informed me as follows (paragraph 1 Embtel 457)2 on direct instructions from Bourguiba:

1.
In light all factors Bourguiba does not feel able agree additional delay (paragraph 1 Deptel 316) for variety reasons (see also paragraph 2 Embassy’s reference telegram):
(a)
On basis November 12 date fixed by US and UK, GOT has agreed arrival Egyptian arms “several days” after November 12. GOT not sure exact date but has given green light GOE.
(b)
GOT does not believe GOF would or could provide GOT with arms on acceptable terms; its past experience with GOF re arms most unsatisfactory: for example, GOF withheld ammunition even for Tunisian Army training.
(c)
Psychological point for GOT is that Tunisian Army is expression Tunisian sovereignty and French arms would reinforce impression GOT still under French tutelage.
(d)
Final point was that of national dignity: GOT has been negotiating directly with USA and UK re arms. GOT does not particularly welcome addition France as factor these negotiations.
2.
I asked whether GOT would refuse French arms if offered. Mokkadem replied: “We will study carefully any propositions which GOF may make to us”.
3.
I asked whether Bourguiba still contemplated maintaining secrecy until his speech November 14. Mokkadem said it was his [Page 740] understanding that after arrival arms November 12 timing publicity up to Bourguiba.
4.
In sum, Bourguiba is holding US to its promise deliver arms November 12. Embtel 4553 gives Tunisian view 5 a.m. November 12 as suitable arrival time.
5.
Comment: So far as our relations with Bourguiba are concerned, only delivery as planned will mitigate adverse impression made upon him by US–UK démarche at last minute.

Jones
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/11–1157. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Paris, London, and Tripoli. Received at 10:20 a.m.↩
  2. Telegram 457, November 11, stated that the French démarches seemed proof to the Tunisians that France wished to maintain control over arms supplies so as to retain its leverage; that the new government had done nothing to demonstrate its good will toward Tunisia; and that Tunisia insisted that the question of arms was unrelated to its negotiations with France. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Telegram 455, November 9, reported that Ambassador Jones informed Mokkadem on November 8 that the arms would come in by air. (Ibid., 772.56/11–957)↩