607. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1
Delga 179. Re Palestine—Suez. Fawzi, Loutfi and Riad (Egypt) dined with me last night in my apartment. Fawzi seemed very relaxed, moderate, and not in any sense recriminatory.
Fawzi being ready talk business from start, I began by assuring him of US clear determination all non-Egyptian forces must withdraw from Egypt. At same time I reiterated our belief every effort must be made achieve long-range settlements of basic problems which led to present crisis.
From what Fawzi said in direct response my opening remarks, as well as everything he said throughout course of evening, it is perfectly clear, beyond any doubt, that until every British, French and Israel soldier has left Egyptian soil, it will be impossible for Egypt to go along with steps looking toward long-range settlement. It is equally clear that unless Egypt is ready to agree, no resolution of type we have in mind in GA can come close to ⅔ majority, and might well not get simple majority. But Fawzi gave every indication of being ready at appropriate time to deal in realistic way with basic causes of present difficulties and to agree to measures looking toward ultimate solution.
As timetable for tackling various issues in months to come, Fawzi set out following, which he described as admittedly “perfectionist”: (1) withdrawal of all Anglo-French-Israeli forces; (2) clearance of Canal; (3) arrangements for settling status of Canal; (4) [Page 1186] Palestine settlement; and (5) perhaps contribution towards settlement of Algeria. When I indicated disapproval of holding up clearance until every last soldier was out, he smiled and said he stressed that with respect all these elements this was “perfectionist” timetable and he could accept something less than perfect. Even “two steps” away from perfect. At another stage in conversation, he said complete withdrawal Anglo-French forces must come before clearing began.
In connection with withdrawal, Fawzi referred to Asian-African draft resolution tabled last evening.2 He regarded it principally as psychological lever. He said they and other Asian-Africans recognized it would be unrealistic to put any precise deadline in it, although Asian-African group was of a strong opinion it should take Anglo-French and Israeli forces no longer to withdraw than it had taken them to enter.
Fawzi knew of draft resolution Hammarskjold asked us and India to sponsor, endorsing Secretary General’s reports concerning establishment of UNEF and arrangements for clearing Canal.3 He appeared have no objection to it.
Fawzi expressed great interest in our ideas regarding methods achieving agreement on future status of Canal. He said there was no disagreement between us on substance, but he felt we must be extremely careful as to method to be adopted. He would not wish us to crystallize our views and foreclose others from expressing their opinions on it and perhaps contributing constructively to solution.
I assured Fawzi we had open mind as to precise method for reaching final agreement on status of Canal.
Fawzi felt use of “mediator” might be unrealistic since in difficult cases of this kind, mediator tends to get “squeezed out”. At same time, he felt committee of negotiators might not be so effective if they served in their individual capacity, rather than as representatives of governments with full governmental backing. To return it to FonMins meetings would be to go backward. He pointed out there were numerous proposals extant concerning solution for Canal, mentioning Spanish suggestions, 18-power proposals, Egyptian and Indian proposals, among others. He made particular point of useful work done by Hammarskjold which had been designed culminate in meeting of three FonMins in Geneva on October 29. He referred to 6 points re Suez and SYG’s paper elaborating these points. They provided real basis for further progress. Fawzi said Hammarskjold’s work on this “might pop up again”. He urged us adopt as motto “determination without impetuosity”. He did not dissent to my rephrasing it as “making haste slowly”.
[Page 1187]In connection with settlement Palestine question, Fawzi gave every impression of being reasonable. He stressed necessity preparing public opinion in such a step, pointing out that with Anglo-French-Israeli attack against Egypt most vividly in minds of Egyptians at this moment, time would have to elapse before this could be brought about. Phrasing it another way, Fawzi urged, in this case particularly, but as general rule as well, importance of “not doing the right thing at the wrong time”. Fawzi said there must be a period of tranquility but that period need not be very long. He said that even in present period “responsible” men should and would take advantage of this time discuss confidentially ways and means proceeding to next public steps re settlement.
As Fawzi prepared to leave, he volunteered to give close thought to our two resolutions and to give us his preliminary comments on them within the next few days—as he put it—“as soon as tomorrow has become yesterday”. He apparently attached considerable importance to anticipated activities of GA today on resolution renewing demands for withdrawal non-Egyptian forces.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2356. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received at 10:02 p.m.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 604.↩
- See footnote 2, ibid.↩