Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

341. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 17, 1955¹

Washington, October 17, 1955

SUBJECT

• Call of the Egyptian Ambassador on the Secretary

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
• Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Ambassador of Egypt
• Mr. George V. Allen, Asst. Secretary,NEA
• Mr. Fraser Wilkins, Director,NE

The Egyptian Ambassador, in calling on the Secretary this noon, said that he had a message from Colonel Nasser, the Egyptian Prime Minister, which covered the following points:

1. Egypt had been subject to many threats and provocations from Israel during recent years and Egypt itself had been in a weak position militarily. Egypt had endeavored without success to obtain arms; consequently when the Soviet Union had offered arms, Colonel Nasser had been unable to persuade his colleagues in the RCC not to accept them. Colonel Nasser had, in effect, been powerless to prevent the conclusion of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Agreement.

2. Colonel Nasser wished the Ambassador to say however that Egypt had no aggressive intentions against Israel whatsoever; Egypt wished merely to strengthen its armed forces.

3. The Czech-Egyptian Arms Agreement was a commercial transaction without any political provisions. It was a single transaction and did not require subsequent transactions.

4. Colonel Nasser wanted to maintain the long-standing relations between Egypt and the United States and hoped that he would be able to strengthen them in the future.

The Secretary responded by expressing appreciation for Colonel Nasser’s message conveyed by the Ambassador. The Secretary said that in all frankness he must state that he found it very disturbing the way developments were taking place. He pointed out that the Administration had tried very hard to conduct relations between Egypt and the United States in a fair and objective manner and pointed out a number of cooperative moves which the United States had made; among these he cited the following: The United States had worked to assist Egypt and Great Britain to reach a settlement regarding the Suez Base. These efforts had been made in spite of contrary views among Israelis and American Jews that a settlement of the Suez Base would increase difficulties between Egypt and Israel. The United States had extended substantial amounts of technical assistance and economic development aid to Egypt. The United States had taken steps with others to prevent Israel from diverting the Jordan River at Banat Yaq’ub. Grant military aid had been offered to Egypt within the provisions of American legislation on this subject which many other great nations had found acceptable but which Egypt had chosen to refuse. A reimbursable military assistance agreement had been concluded with Egypt under which in June we had offered to sell Egypt a substantial quantity of arms. The United States had made sincere efforts to handle its cotton sales in such a way as to reduce difficulties for Egyptian cotton exporters. We had always been ready to extend help with respect to the High Aswan Dam.

The Secretary continued that the present shift by Egypt in its policy could not be described as a simple arms purchase. The conclusion of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Agreement had been accompanied by press and radio attacks on the United States from high places in Egypt. In view of this shift and these attacks and in the light of the various constructive moves which the United States, for its part, had made, the question arose whether Egypt wanted a continuance of good relations with the United States.

The Egyptian Ambassador replied that Egypt appreciated the help and the assistance which the United States had given it and repeated, in concluding the Czech-Egyptian Arms Agreement, Egypt was merely acting to defend itself and that the Agreement was a single commercial transaction without political overtones.

The Secretary replied that he did not in any way question Colonel Nasser’s sincerity. He realized that Colonel Nasser was looking at it from an Egyptian point of view but he wanted to note at the same time that he, himself, had been studying the theory and practice of the Soviet Union all his life and he was convinced that the USSR was plotting and planning to gain control of the Middle East. The Soviet Union was not interested in what would happen to Egypt or any other single state in the Middle East as long as the Soviet Union itself was able to exert its influence. The Soviet Union would be satisfied to see the Arabs commit suicide if it was in line with Soviet policy. The Secretary added that if the Egyptians thought that they would be able to outsmart the Soviet Union, he was very dubious about their success in this respect. He believed the Egyptians would find themselves playing the Russian game to their disadvantage. The Soviet Union wished to dominate the Middle East. The United States, on the other hand, did not wish to dominate the Middle East and, in fact, had consistently endeavored to help it as the various moves which we had made indicated. The Secretary again stated that, as he had said repeatedly and as he had informed his colleagues from time to time, we regarded Colonel Nasser as the outstanding leader in the Arab world.

The Egyptian Ambassador said that Colonel Nasser and his colleagues were well aware of the dangers of international Communism in the Middle East. It was the Egyptian belief that they would be able to keep the situation under control and that they would be able to reduce the number of Soviet technicians to a minimum who would be needed under the Czech-Egyptian Agreement. The Czech-Egyptian Agreement was, as he had said before, a straight commercial transaction without political provisions.

The Egyptian Ambassador said he had a number of additional points which he wished to raise:

1. Colonel Nasser was extremely anxious to take a constructive line in the Middle East and, to this end, had endeavored during recent meetings of the Arab League to push actively present plans for the Jordan River developed by Ambassador Johnston.

2. Furthermore, Colonel Nasser would cooperate to stabilize Syria. The Egyptian Ambassador added that he hoped good relations between Egypt and the United States would continue and that the United States would be able to move forward on one or more of the following items: 1) he hoped the United States would be able to help with regard to the High Aswan Dam. He said that two months ago the Russians had offered help and recently they had specifically promised material and technicians over a number of years at a cost of only 2% in interest.²

2). A continuation of technical assistance and economic aid.

3). Agreement to supply Egypt with 360,000 tons of grain under P.L. 480.

4). A second visit by the Secretary to the Near East or, alternatively, a visit by Colonel Nasser to the United States.

5). Continuation of efforts by the United States to prevent Israel from engaging in preventive war against Egypt.

The Secretary replied that the United States wished to continue its long and friendly relations with Egypt as indicated by the many constructive steps which the United States had already taken. He felt it necessary to point out, however, that the conclusion of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Agreement enormously complicated his task. It complicated his task with the other Arab states; with Israel; and with many groups in the United States, including American Jewry, which strongly supported Israel. The United States had from time to time made efforts to calm the situation between Israel and the Arab states and had specifically cautioned Israel against aggressive moves. He had spoken in terms of broad principles in his statement of August 26. The Arabs had regarded his statement as being favorable to Israel. The Secretary did not understand why this should be the case because Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, when discussing the possibility of a statement of this general substance, had thought it a good idea. The Secretary and his colleagues in this Administration had persevered in an objective and even-handed policy, but that it seemed to have come to naught. Many Jewish leaders in the United States now claimed that this Administration’s policy had failed. Colonel Nasser had his own problems but, the Secretary said, he had equally heavy ones. Now it was difficult to convince many Americans that an objective policy was right and it was equally difficult to convince other Americans that Israel should be pressed not to take action or should be prevented from taking action. What, the Secretary concluded, should he say to such critics?

The Egyptian Ambassador repeated his previous statement that Egypt had no aggressive intentions of any type against Israel. The Secretary replied that he was convinced that this statement could be made at the present moment but in the future, following the receipt of arms, different attitudes might prevail. In any event, it would be difficult to say who began the attack. In the final analysis, Egypt and the United States should not be working at cross purposes but should be working together.

The Egyptian Ambassador asked if the Secretary had any suggestions for the future. The Secretary replied that he could tell Colonel Nasser that he did not question his sincerity in any way, but that he should realize that what Egypt had done made it extremely more difficult for the United States. The United States did not regard Egypt’s action in a vindictive spirit or with any animosity. The Secretary stated that he could not give any answer with respect to the various steps which the Ambassador had proposed other than to say that we were studying them. The U.S. still wished to be on the friendliest of relations with Egypt in the future as it had been in the past.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/10–1755. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins.
2. See footnote 6, Document 321.
3. On October 20, the Department transmitted a summary of this conversation in Circular 263 to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Damascus, Ankara, and Tripoli. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/10–2055)