287. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1

509. For Hoover. Advice suggested for GOE your niact 5332 has been communicated to them sufficient different occasions and forms in last few months so as to make further repetition ineffective.

[Page 484]

Irrespective of what I may be allowed tell Nasser, I find it impossible understand why I have not been informed of Department’s reasoning in turning down repeated and increasingly urgent recommendations that we make financial arrangement which would permit Egypt take advantage our offer (in response its request) sell arms. Follow-up comments referred Deptel not yet received but to this Embassy it is crystal clear that by our unwillingness manipulate a few million dollars we are permitting situation deteriorate to point where chain reaction of nature that will constitute a major defeat for US policy in Middle East, as contrasted to that of Soviet bloc, is highly probable. Either we have been unable to adequately communicate this conviction or Department and other interested agencies are operating on an assessment or premises which are radically different from ours and which have not been communicated to us here.

While Department must decide over-all policy it seems to me that due weight should be given recommendations Embassy as to best tactics to obtain atmosphere under which these policies may succeed. If we are wincing under what may appear to be blackmail, I would remind Department again that this situation did not arise from Nasser’s initiative but by Russian initiative capitalizing upon Nasser’s need for continued support of his army in situation that has followed events since initial February 28 attack by Israel at Gaza. If on other hand our inability meet requirements of present situation is due to belief that quid pro quo can be increased by continued delay, we are making very great mistake.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–2055. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 4:02 p.m.
  2. Repeated in Document 284.