52. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State1

1191. British Ambassador saw Molotov early this afternoon to carry out instructions received re reference SC (Deptel 589).2

Molotov said he would refer matter to his Government but had some preliminary comments to make on subject. After stating Soviet Government was interested in reduction tension anywhere and was interested in any proposals to that end, in this case he felt causes of tension in area of Formosa had been neglected and that these were important. He then proceeded to elaborate standard Communist line that tension was due to US aggressive action, seizure of Formosa in violation Cairo and Potsdam agreements3 thereby interfering in internal [Page 159] Chinese affairs, but did not specifically state that UN had no competence. He repeated he would refer matter to his Government and said he would inform British Ambassador of reply.

Several hours after interview Troyanovsky called up British Embassy to state that Soviets planned to report in press tomorrow Ambassador’s visit.4 Accordingly British embassy here this afternoon informed foreign press of fact of démarche and general outline. It is not clear whether Soviet decision to give publicity in this matter was on own initiative or based on Foreign Office statement in London exact time of which is unknown. According to Kingsbury Smith5 here who received call from London it was issued sometime this afternoon in London. It apparently gave out not only fact of démarche here, but also its general purpose, to enlist Soviet support in persuading Chinese Communists to accept Security Council invitation.

British Ambassador has repeated to Washington his report and it presumably will be available in full detail to Department.6 British Ambassador also showed me report of Chargé in Peking of very disagreeable and unproductive interview with Chou En-lai which will also be presumably available to Department. Chou En-lai was absolutely adamant and maintained intact all elements of his January 24 statement.

Bohlen
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 032/1–2855. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received with extensive omissions at 2:10 p.m.; the complete text was received at 9:45 a.m. on January 29.
  2. Telegram 589 to Moscow, January 27, informed the Embassy that Hayter had been instructed to inform the Soviet Foreign Ministry on January 28 of Trevelyan’s approach to the Chinese Government in Peking that day and to express the hope that the Soviet Government would cooperate in the Security Council and urge the Chinese Communists to cooperate by exercising restraint and accepting the invitation to be represented at the Security Council debate. (Ibid., 793.00/1–2755)
  3. The reference is to the communiqué issued at Cairo on December 1, 1943, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, President Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, and the proclamation by President Truman, President Chiang, and Prime Minister Churchill issued at Potsdam on July 26, 1945. For texts, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448, and ibid., The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 1474.
  4. Telegram 1193 from Moscow, January 29, summarized a communiqué issued by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs describing the interview. Telegram 1194 from Moscow, January 29, reported that the account of the conversation in the Soviet press closely followed the report which Hayter had shown to Bohlen the previous day. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1–2955)
  5. Of the International News Service.
  6. See footnote 2, supra.