S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 118 Series
Report by the Special
Committee to the National Security
Council1
top secret
Washington, July 17, 1953.
Additional UN Forces for
Korea
References:
- A.
- NSC Action No. 759–b, dated April 8, 19532
- B.
- NSC Action No. 835, dated July 2,
19533
- C.
- NSC 118/2, pars. 2–a(3) and 2–b(7), dated
December 20, 19514
- D.
- NSC 147, pars. 168–180, dated
April 2, 19535
- E.
- Memo for NSC, dated June 1, 1953,
enclosing letter from Ambassador Lodge to the President, dated May 19, 19536
- F.
- Memo for NSC, dated June 15, 1953,
enclosing memo from Assistant Secretary Frank C. Nash to the Secretary of Defense, dated
June 11, 1953, and memo from Bureau of Budget to Mr. Cutler, dated June 8, 19537
- G.
- Estimate of “Approximate Costs of Equipping and Maintaining U.S.
and Foreign Infantry Division (Division Slice)”8
- H.
- Memo from Bureau of the Budget to Mr. Cutler, dated June 18, 19539
- I.
- Position of Department of State on Additional UN Forces for Korea,
dated June 30, 195310
- 1.
- On July 2, 1953, the National Security Council (NSC Action No. 835):
- b.
- “Agreed in principle that the present practice regarding
reimbursement of the United States for logistic support of
other UN Forces in Korea (NSC Action No. 759–b)
should be modified in the direction of Ambassador Lodge’s proposals.”
- c.
- “Directed that a committee composed of representatives of
the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury and of the
Director, Bureau of the Budget, with Ambassador Lodge’s assistance, should
prepare a new formula in accordance with b above …”
- 2.
- The Committee referred to in Action No. 835–c considered the following:
- a.
- The current policy of the United States with reference to
additional United Nations forces for Korea, as stated in
NSC 118/2:
2–a(3). In
the event an armistice is achieved: “Exert
vigorous efforts to continue the contribution by UN
members of forces to the UN Command in Korea so long
as UN forces are required in Korea.”
2–b(7). In
the event that armistice negotiations clearly
fail: “Exert vigorous efforts to obtain
increased military forces from those countries
already participating, as well as to obtain
contributions from UN countries which have not yet
contributed military forces.”
- b.
-
The existing directive of the Department of Defense,
September 1, 1950, relative to reimbursement to the
United States for logistical support furnished to
foreign nations participating in the Korean hostilities.
This directive provides that:
“the military departments of the United States
will make available necessary supplies or services
on a basis of immediate reimbursement in United
States dollars. To the extent that the foreign
government cannot make prompt reimbursement in
United States dollars, the United States
Government and the foreign government will
negotiate the terms of
settlement.”
Under this directive, memorandum
receipts are obtained from the foreign nations (except
the Republic of Korea and India) to which logistical
support is furnished by the U.S. Where foreign
governments have not signed agreements to reimburse, it
is not current U.S. practice to insist on payment. This
practice was confirmed by NSC Action No. 759–b.
- c.
- The reasons advanced by Ambassador Lodge in his letter of May
19, 1953 for now undertaking a renewed effort to secure
additional forces from UN members for service in Korea and
for modifying the above-mentioned directive of the
Department of Defense.
- d.
- The other documents and actions referenced above;
especially the doubt raised by the Bureau of the Budget as
to whether, after the conclusion of a treaty of peace in
Korea (and perhaps even in the period between an armistice
and the conclusion of such a treaty of peace), a legal
justification would exist for continuing the existing policy
referred to in 2–b above or for
carrying into effect the new formula outlined below.
- 3.
-
a. The Committee recommends to the
National Security Council the approval of a new formula, as set
forth in the attachment, for obtaining additional United Nations
forces for Korea and for financing their logistical support.
This new formula would replace the Defense directive stated in
2–b above.
b. The Committee, being in doubt as to the
legal situation, believes the President should request from the
Attorney General an expedited opinion as to:
- (1)
- Whether there now exists any legal basis which would
support the above-mentioned new formula after the
conclusion of a treaty of peace in Korea, and also in
the period between an armistice and the conclusion of
such a treaty of peace.
- (2)
- What new legislation, if any, should be enacted to
provide a legal basis for support of the above-mentioned
new formula during the periods indicated.
c. If new legislation must be sought in
support of such new formula, the Committee suggests the
advisability of a Joint Resolution broader in terms than the
Korean action; for example:
“The President may transfer United States military
equipment, supplies, and services to any government
allied with the United States in any effort by the
United Nations to enforce measures to repel aggression,
in proportion to the effective manpower furnished by any
such nation and upon such terms and conditions, if any,
as he may determine.”
- 4.
- When approved, the new formula should be carried into effect as
follows:
- a.
- The Department of State should undertake discussions on a
selective basis with the governments of United Nations
members, excepting the Communist bloc, to make clear (1)
that the United States desires the maximum contribution from
each member state in the Korean undertaking; and (2) that
the prestige of the United Nations and the fundamental idea
of collective security are bound up in effective
contributions by member states to support decisions of the
United Nations.
- b.
- The United States Representative to the United Nations,
through his personal contacts with the Chiefs of Missions to
the United Nations should do everything practicable to
encourage member states to make contributions of military
forces.
- c.
- When a nation has signified the contribution of military
forces which it considers itself capable of making, the
Department of State would determine the desirability of such
troop contribution from a political and psychological
standpoint and the Department of Defense would determine the
effectiveness of the troop contribution from a military
standpoint. As a practical policy, the Department of Defense
will normally give favorable consideration to units of
battalion size or larger provided that they meet other
existing criteria as regards homogeneity and training and,
in cases where special circumstances exist, will give
sympathetic consideration to smaller offers.
Concurring:
Department of State—Mr. Robert R.
Bowie
Department of the Treasury—Mr. Elbert P.
Tuttle
Bureau of the Budget—Mr. Paul L.
Morrison
The Department of Defense representative on the Special Committee, Mr.
Frank Nash, did not join in
the report since the views of the Secretary of Defense are attached.
Attachment
Revised Formula for Reimbursement
for Logistical Support
- 1.
- The United States desires to obtain and retain the maximum
contributions of effective manpower from the nations allied with
it in the effort of the United Nations to repel aggression in
Korea.
- 2.
- To that end, the Department of Defense will furnish United
States military equipment, supplies, and services to any such
nation, in proportion to the effective manpower furnished by
such nation, at such cost, if any, as the Department of State,
in consultation with the Departments of the Treasury and
Defense, may determine such nation is willing and able to
pay.
- 3.
- A nation deemed capable of contributing money as well as
manpower should be encouraged to pay for the military equipment,
supplies, and services furnished to its own troops and also to
contribute toward the logistical support of the troops of other
nations.
- 4.
- Except when the manpower furnished by any such nation is
additional to forces already furnished by it, the contribution
should be in effective military units as determined by the
Department of Defense.
Annex
Additional United Nations Forces
in Korea
views of the department of defense
on the report of the committee appointed by nsc action 835–c
- 1.
- The Secretary of Defense is unable to concur in the proposed
recommendation to the National Security Council for a new policy
for reimbursement
[Page 1398]
for logistic support furnished to foreign governments engaged in
a common undertaking such as the action in Korea. NSC Action No. 835–b reported the Council’s agreement “in
principle that the present practice
regarding reimbursement of the United States for logistic
support of other United Nations forces in Korea (NSC Action No. 759–b) should be modified in the direction of
Ambassador Lodge’s
proposals.” NSC Action No.
835–c directed that the Committee
“prepare a new formula in accordance with b above with respect to the practice regarding reimbursement.” In discussions
concerning this subject, it has been strongly implied that the
present policy insists, to the exclusion of all other
considerations, on immediate payment in full for logistic
support furnished, whereas, actually this has not been the case
either in policy or practice. It is not the understanding of the
Secretary of Defense that the National Security Council intended
to reverse completely the present policy regarding reimbursement
or to direct the drafting of a new policy, but rather that it
was the Council’s will that the Committee explore existing
procedures regarding reimbursement and recommend such
modifications to them which might, insofar as possible,
accommodate the views of Ambassador Lodge advocating greater leniency and
flexibility in excusing nations which cannot pay from so doing.
The Department of Defense considers that the present policy,
when modified as proposed below, supported by enabling
legislation if necessary, and properly applied, can achieve the
desired result, and that the drafting of a wholly new policy is
neither necessary nor desirable.
- 2.
- The proposed new policy contains language originally intended
as a draft of possible enabling legislation, and was not
intended as a statement of policy. Taken as a statement of new
policy, its provisions are so broad as to make it undesirable
for a number of reasons:
- a.
- It would establish an undesirable precedent for the
present and all future United Nations actions in its
implications that the United States would be willing to
support all costs of logistic support furnished. Any
practical attempt to carry out such a policy would
certainly spread such a connotation throughout the
world.
- b.
- Such action would have an undesirable effect on the
settlement of obligations previously undertaken by other
nations to reimburse the United States. Countries
previously paying would probably stop making payments
and countries that have recognized an obligation to be
settled at a later date would refuse to negotiate the
terms of such settlement.
- c.
- If the United Nations is eventually to grow into an
effective mechanism for collective action and be in a
position to deal with future situations involving
collective action, it must do so through the spirit of
participation in, and assumption of, responsibility by
each of its members. Application of the proposed policy
would negate this principle.
- d.
- If the United States were generally to make available
logistic support without insistence on obligation to
reimburse, it would give credence to possible charges of
employing mercenary forces in the
[Page 1399]
interest of the United
States, thereby erasing in practice the principles
underlying the concept of United Nations collective
action.
- 3.
- The scope of the present policy, as contrasted with the
proposed policy, has not been fully taken into consideration in
previous discussions. The policy is presently broad enough to
accommodate the objectives which motivate the proposed change.
The present policy contains the following essential elements:
- a.
- “The several Services should seek arrangements under
which the Foreign Governments will completely equip and
supply their forces.”
- b.
- “To the extent that such complete support is not
practicable, but the offer is otherwise desirable, the
military departments of the United States will make
available necessary supplies or services on a basis of
immediate reimbursement in United States
dollars.”
- c.
- “To the extent that the Foreign Government cannot make
prompt reimbursement in United States dollars, the
United States Government and the Foreign Government will
negotiate the terms of settlement.” (This policy has not
acted to delay provision of logistic support, since only
agreement by the foreign country to recognize an
obligation to the United States has been initially
required.)
- d.
- We believe that the phrase “the terms of settlement”
is sufficiently broad to comprehend any negotiated basis
of settlement in terms of time, kinds of currency,
commodities, rights, etc.
- e.
- In properly justifiable cases, the President can
exercise his emergency powers to eliminate the
requirement of that country to reimburse the United
States, in whole or part.
- 4.
- It is the opinion of the Secretary of Defense that in order to
avoid a disastrous weakening of the United Nations as a
mechanism for collective action and the prestige of the United
States participation in such action, the principle of
recognition of obligation to reimburse must be understood in all
cases. Such an understanding would enable the United States and
the United Nations to prove to the world that the action was
truly a collective effort involving equitable relationships
among all the parties. In order that the varying ability of
nations to provide financially for the logistic support
furnished may be appropriately recognized, the United States
should, as a separate though related matter, provide for
appropriate economic, financial, or other assistance to foreign
countries on an individual basis in order to assist them in
discharging their obligations.
- 5.
- The Department of Defense believes it imperative that all
manpower be furnished in effective units. Rotation of forces in
the field would, of course, not necessarily involve effective
units, but in any event, forces provided on a rotation basis
would not involve a contribution of additional manpower.
Consideration of the military effectiveness of the units offered
involves two and distinct problems; first, the effectiveness of
the unit per se and secondly, a point of major importance in the
light of a probable armistice, the effect of the acceptance of
such a
[Page 1400]
unit in terms
of the over-all efficiency of the Unified Command. It must be
borne in mind that the provisions of the armistice provide an
overall ceiling on the size of the Unified Command. Any
forthcoming offers of assistance generated would, in a
post-armistice situation, have to replace existing forces
already in the field. To the extent that these new forces were
inferior to those relieved, the operational capability of the
United Nations Command would suffer. The wisdom of maintaining a
combat-ready force in the post-armistice period cannot be
questioned. As a practical policy, the Department of Defense
will normally give favorable consideration to units of battalion
size or larger provided that they meet other existing criteria
as regards homogeneity and training and, in cases where special
circumstances exist, will give sympathetic consideration to
smaller offers. In the light of these considerations, the
Department of Defense must reserve the right to pass on the
acceptability of the contribution from a military standpoint in
each and every case in order that the various factors existing
and anticipated at the time of each individual offer may be
properly weighed.
- 6.
- In view of the considerations enumerated above, and the fact
that the present policy is not fully and completely stated in
any one document, it is recommended that, in lieu of the
statement of new policy contained in the Committee’s report, the
formula requested by the National Security Council be drafted as
follows:
- a.
- The United States should seek arrangements under which
the Foreign Government offering forces in support of
United Nations collective action will completely equip
and supply these forces.
- b.
- To the extent that such complete support is not
practicable, but the offer is otherwise desirable, the
military departments of the United States will make
available necessary supplies or services on a basis of
immediate reimbursement in United States dollars.
- c.
- To the extent that the Foreign Government cannot make
prompt reimbursement in United States dollars, the
United States Government will furnish necessary support
provided the Foreign Government will recognize at once
an obligation to the United States, settlement of which
would later become the subject of negotiation.
- d.
- In cases where individual foreign countries assisting
in United Nations action are determined to be
financially unable to provide for logistic support,
arrangements may be made, under appropriate legislation,
for the United States to separately provide essential
economic, financial, or other aid as required to enable
that nation to discharge its obligation.
- e.
- The contribution of military forces should be in
effective military units as determined by the Department
of Defense.
- 7.
- The Department of Defense position with regard to legislation
to implement the policy set out above is as follows: To the
extent that any negotiations looking toward deferred settlement
by a foreign country, as described in paragraph 6–c above, do not fall within the terms of
Section 408(e) of the Mutual Security Act, these negotiations
would
[Page 1401]
have to be
based on the exercise of the President’s emergency powers. It
seems clear that legislation should be obtained to eliminate the
necessity for reliance on these powers. The need for legislation
is particularly urgent in view of the fact that it is hoped that
most future offers by foreign countries of military units for
use in Korea will be made after a truce or armistice. It is
recommended that this legislation be developed by the
Departments of State and Defense, and by the Foreign Operations
Administration.
- 8.
- The Department of Defense position contained in paragraph
6–d above may also require
legislation “to permit the provision of economic, financial or
other assistance to enable foreign countries participating in
United Nations actions to settle their obligations.
- 9.
-
With regard to the portion of the Committee’s draft report
concerning the carrying into effect of the policy, the
Department of Defense has made certain changes and additions
of non-substantive nature and recommends the following
language to be substituted for this portion of the
report:
When approved by the National Security Council, and supported
by appropriate legislation, this policy should be carried
into effect in the following manner:
- a.
- The Department of State will undertake bilateral
negotiations with the government of each United
Nations member state, excepting the Communist bloc,
from which effective contributions would be
desirable from a political standpoint. These
negotiations should make clear (1) that the United
States desires the maximum participation from each
member state in the Korean undertaking; and (2) that
the prestige of the United Nations and the
fundamental idea of collective security are bound up
in effective contributions by member states to
support decisions of the United Nations.
- b.
- The United States Representative to the United
Nations, through his personal contacts with the
Chiefs of Missions to the United Nations, will do
everything in his power to encourage member states
to make contributions.
- c.
- When a nation has signified the contribution which
it is willing to make, the Department of Defense
will determine the acceptability of the contribution
from a military standpoint.
- d.
- The bilateral agreements for military
contributions should continue to provide for
recognition of an obligation for logistic support
furnished by the United States. In appropriate cases
separate agreements might be negotiated covering
arrangements under which the United States may
provide essential economic, financial or other aid
required to enable a nation to discharge its
obligation.
