Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
priority
CX 62406. 1. As I have already reported in my HNC 1678,1 I met with Rhee yesterday afternoon and had a thoroughly frank discussion [Page 1011] of the problems which confront us. Those relating to the armistice were discussed in msg cited above.
2. In my conference with Rhee I also raised the question of his ltr to me of 30 Apr2 dealing with various ROK problems. I indicated to him that I had not replied because the principal issue involved—that of a Korean-American mutual defense pact—is a problem to be resolved by my govt, which realizes its importance and is giving it sympathetic study. I told him the other points he had made in his ltr hinged upon the principal issue of a defense pact and are ones which obviously would be included in subjects to be considered by the political conference folg a military armistice. I made it clear to Rhee that the armistice probably would not contain a provision which requires the simultaneous withdrawal of UN and Chinese Communist trps from Korea, and that this subj too will probably be discussed by the political conference. I pointed out to him that I infer from his ltr of 30 Apr that he is not willing to risk the withdrawal of UN trps upon the signing of an armistice.
3. Rhee also brought up the question of an increase in ROK Forces. I emphasized my support of a ROK ground establishment of 20 divs and Rhee spoke earnestly regarding need of ROK Naval establishment if future security is to be maintained. It is clear that ROK economy will be in no psn to support such substantial military forces. I feel that there is much in ROK attitude which calls for our sympathetic consideration.
4. Rhee made it clear to me that what he strongly desires is a mutual security pact. He does not understand how we can make security agreements with Japan or with New Zealand and Australia and at the same time cannot make a similar agreement with Korea which is doing most of the fighting and is our principal ally in battle. If a mutual security pact cannot be arranged, I feel that as a minimum Rhee will insist upon an assurance from the US Govt that it would come to his immediate assistance should the terms of the armistice be violated. Although I made no commitments to Rhee on this point, I personally see no reason why such a guarantee should not be given as soon as possible. I feel that if this were done, many of the problems which confront us now would probably fall into line. In this connection, if such assurances are to be made they should be associated with the statements I have requested in para 2 of my msg C 62351.3
5. I have told Rhee repeatedly and did so again yesterday that my mission is to negotiate an armistice under honorable conditions as set forth by my govt and that I would pursue that course of action relentlessly. I told him again I hoped he would not confront us with unilateral [Page 1012] decisions such as relief of trps from UN Comd, failure to obey the terms of the armistice, or outright provocative, hostile actions by ROK trps after the armistice; that to do so would produce a critical situation which would give aid and comfort to the enemy, seriously injure the fine US-ROK relations, and probably result in disaster to the ROK. Whereas he gave me no assurance he might not ultimately take one of these actions we fear, I again received the distinct impression that he considers them only as last resorts and that he felt he might be forced into such actions only if my govt should fail completely to take into consideration the various views of the ROK Govt.
6. I feel Rhee realizes that, in spite of some of his stated objections, we will go ahead and obtain an armistice if we can get one that does not sacrifice the principle of no forced repatriation. He is bargaining now to get a security pact, to obtain more economic aid, and to make his people feel he is having a voice in the armistice negotiations. He realizes there may be an armistice, and I feel that if it provides for the simultaneous release of the Korean non-repatriate prisoners of war, we will be able to handle the Chinese non-repatriates at Cheju-Do or another island and the minimum custodial personnel which will be required.
7. Rhee had already asked me the day before (11 May) for my permission to increase the Korean participation in the armistice negotiations. I told him the number of delegates on both sides is fixed by agreement and could not be increased. I told him, however, that if it would help him I would be willing to give Gen Choi one or two administrative assistants similar to the other UN administrative assistants who go to make up the delegation. He told me this would be very helpful for it would improve his psn with the Korean people if he could tell them that the ROKs participation is being increased.
8. Murphy is sending a related msg to the Dept supporting the views expressed above.4
- Supra.↩
- Ante, p. 955.↩
- In this telegram, May 11, 1953, Clark suggested immediate announcement of the joint policy declaration by those UN members with troops in Korea after an armistice was signed. (Department of Defense files)↩
- The reference was to telegram 3594 from Tokyo, May 14, 1953, not printed. In telegram 1331 from Pusan, May 14, 1953, Briggs stated that Clark’s talk with Rhee confirmed his view that unless Korea received a bilateral security pact, Rhee would make trouble in connection with the armistice and the subsequent political conference. (795.00/5–1453)↩