Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/6–2452: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark)¹

top secret
priority

Washington, June 5, 1952—12:55 p.m.

JCS 910484. From JCS.

Part I.

1. Your analysis in C 69351² most helpful re consideration here of next steps to be taken in armistice negots. As situation viewed here, folg factors must be included among those to be considered in determining future course of action:

A. We continue to have strong domestic and internatl support, notably including India, for principle of non-forcible repatriation POWs.

B. However, recent events on Koje have tended to undermine previous confidence Allied Govts as well as public in validity results of screening. Allied Govts have expressed particular concern that pressure factors may have operated on individual POWs within anti-Communist camps so that number non-repatriates too high.

C. Prior to recent events on Koje all our principal allies strongly urged that our offer of impartial rescreening after armistice be modified to permit such rescreening prior to armistice subj to agreement in advance by each side to abide by results. United States Govt replied that this proposal would probably not be any more acceptable to Communists than screening after armistice, and that it would have disadvantages for UNC compared to screening after armistice, but that if negots indicated timing of screening was major point at issue we would at that time consider pre-armistice screening, and could present such modification as in no way substantive change in UNC package proposal of 28 Apr.

D. Subsequently allies have strongly urged some type rescreening, principally UNC offer of impartial rescreening prior to armistice with Communist observation and commitment by both sides to abide by results.

E. Regardless of logic and reasonableness of our posn on impartial rescreening folg armistice, our principal allies would not now support unilateral indefinite suspension of negots, and probably not in any case until after an offer of rescreening prior to armistice has been made in some way and rejected by Communists, or until some other new elm had been introduced into situation.

F. Unilateral indefinite suspension of negots by UNC would give Soviets basis for exploiting subsequent situation as “breaking off of negotiations” by UNC in face of Communist willingness and desire to continue talks and UNC unwillingness to face alleged facts “exposed” by incidents on Koje. Such attacks could at this time do much to exploit wavering opinions among our friends and allies.

G. Unilateral indefinite suspension of negots by UNC, particularly without solid support from our principal allies, would give Soviets basis for moving negots to Security Council (which Soviets Chair during June) on grounds of deadlock at Panmunjom, and would provide them opportunity in Security Council to link other questions with Korean settlement, thereby beclouding Korean issues and confusing and dividing general support we now have on fundamental posns re Korea.

H. Additionally, there have been some indications, still entirely inconclusive, through dipl channels that Chinese might seek resolution of POW question, that principal difficulty for Chinese may be lowness of UNC figure on repatriates, that figure of 100,000 may possibly be basis for resolution of this issue. It is clear that question of Chi POWs is more important to Communists than that of NK POWs. This known to several Govts and may be expected eventually to become generally known. Separate msg fols on other developments in this regard.

Part II.

2. View here is that modification of 70,000 figure based on original screening opn would not be more acceptable to Communists than present figure. In addn such modification would tend to increase public confusion over validity of original screening.

3. Accordingly, addl measures, if any are taken, should:

A. Contribute whatever may be possible toward achievement of armistice, and, if negots suspended or Communists break off, make unmistakably clear that issue was principle of non-forcible repatriation rather than entirely subsidiary question of validity of results of UNC screening or method of confirming results.

B. Restore allies confidence in validity of results of UNC screening so that if armistice is not achieved allies support for United States policy will not be jeopardized by any feeling that screening results could have been significantly more favorable to Communists.

4. To achieve foregoing results suggestion has been made here that impartial interrogation prior to armistice of all or a reptv sample of non-repatriates be made by or under observation of group of countries not participating in hostilities in Korea (such as Switzerland, Sweden, and India). Interrogation would apply to all non-repatriates including those who would develop from screening in compounds hitherto unscreened. If such interrogation determined that any individual POWs would not in fact forcibly oppose repatriation, such POWs would be transferred to group available for repatriation. This impartial interrogation might develop from one of two alternative courses of action:

A. Proposal could be made that Communist reptvs observe interrogation along with reptvs from UNC, that both sides agree in advance to abide by results, and that immediately upon conclusion of interrogation both sides conclude armistice on basis of results and on agreements thus far achieved on other issues; or,

B. Impartial interrogation could be carried out at unilateral initiative of UNC and without any invitation for Communist observation. After results of interrogation were determined, as suggested in subparas 6B and 6C ur C 69351, it would be feasible to propose recess for reasonable period (approx 1 week) and, if Communists acceptance then was not forthcoming, unilaterally to recess until Communists accepted or broke negots.

5. Course of action 4A above would particularly contribute to objective set forth Para 3A, while course of action 4B would particularly contribute to objective in Para 3B. The two courses of action are not mutually exclusive since if Communists reject proposal to observe interrogation it might still be desirable for UNC to proceed unilaterally with impartial interrogation. If it were decided to adopt course of action involving both Para 4A and Para 4B above, one of two procedures might be followed:

A. First would be to tell Communists at Panmunjom that we propose neutral interrogation; that, if Communists are prepared to accept results and conclude armistice on basis of these results, we are prepared to invite Communist observers; and that, if Communists reject this offer, we will proceed unilaterally.

B. Other alternative would be to offer proposal 4A to Communists at Panmunjom. If Communists reject proposal, we would proceed unilaterally with procedure outlined in Para 4B without further discussion at Panmunjom on subj.

6. In order to minimize any erroneous implications that UNC was willing to compromise its basic principles on non-forcible repatriation, and to maximize possibilities of Communist acceptance, offer mentioned in Para 4A above could originate as mediation proposal from some third country which could test Chi Communist reactions to it. If rejected by Communists, fact of offer, Chinese rejection and United States acceptance could be made public to great advantage of United States. If accepted in principle by Chinese it would, of course, be necessary that it subsequently be introduced into negots at Panmunjom for confirmation and agreement on details. It would also be necessary that agreement of non-combatant countries selected to serve in such capacity be obtained through dipl channels. Alternatively or subsequently, offer could be introduced by UNC Del at Panmunjom within context of UNC refutation of Communist allegations of coercion and forceful retention of non-repatriates. In this connection we note with approval that in several recent restatements of UNC posn on POWs UNC Del has omitted ref to timing of impartial rescreening.

7. While there are disadvantages to any interrogation to be carried out before armistice as compared with present offer of rescreening after an armistice, disadvantages do not appear so serious as to outweigh advantage of achieving armistice. Additionally, if, as would be absolutely essential, both sides would agree to abide by results and conclude armistice on basis thereof, essential difference from post-armistice screening should not be great. In event of Communist refusal to abide by results United States Govt would be in favorable polit and propaganda posn to cope with resulting situation.

8. Request your comments on Part II.

Part III.

9. Re Para 7 ur C 69351. Until receipt your comments requested above, decision on course of action proposed ur Para 6 will be withheld, and you should continue to be guided by JCS 908998.³ However, as stated in JCS 909747⁴ there is no objection to holding mtgs only every 3 or 4 days if both sides agree. Additionally, even if Communists do not agree, we suggest UNC Del occasionally indicate without explanation its inability to meet for 2 or 3 days so that UNC Del is not placed in posn of being continuously responsive to Communist urging for mtgs.

1. Marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this telegram. This telegram included the substance of the Department of State draft, May 26, p. 244 and changes resulting from the views expressed at the State–JCS meeting, June 4; see the memorandum of discussion, p. 295.
2. Dated May 31, p. 270.
3. Dated May 16, p. 203.
4. Not printed (795.00/5–3152).