FE files, lot 64 D 230

No. 301
Memorandum by Gerald Stryker of the Office of Chinese Affairs to the Deputy Director of That Office (Martin)1

top secret


  • United States Advice to GRC re Military Activity in Chinmen Area

As instructed, I called this morning on Colonel Francis J. McQuillen at the Pentagon to inquire about advice offered Chinese Nationalist military forces by CINCPAC with regard to Nationalist military activity against Chinese Communist targets in the Chinmen area. Colonel McQuillen let me see and take notes on what appeared to be a complete file of messages on this subject. He has promised, if his superiors agree, to send us copies of all pertinent messages in the files which I indicated we would like to have.

The following are direct quotes from messages of interest to us.2

CINCPAC to MAAG, August 15, 1953 (re Tachen area)3

“…Desire to emphasize [that] ChiNat air attack of surface activity must exclude vessels in port, foreign vessels and obvious nonmilitary targets such as civilian [passenger] ferries and sampans [Page 656] fishing. Evidence of ChiCom buildup on mainland or in ports should be reported CINCPAC and no attack made thereon without clearance [from] CINCPAC.…”

MAAG to CINCPAC, September 3, 19544

“…MND has indicated [they] will require U.S. concurrence for air attack of such mainland targets as are required to defeat [an] air attack or invasion attempt of Chinmen by ChiCom. May require concurrence for mainland air attacks to neutralize ChiCom artillery but no decision yet on latter. …I recommend [that] I be authorized to concur in air attack to include mainland targets to defeat ChiCom attack of Chinmen.…”

MAAG to CINCPAC, September 3, 19545

“…On being questioned as to United States policy, I informed Chief of Staff [there are] no restrictions on air, activity [artillery] or naval operations in defense of Chinmen except for air attack of mainland targets.…”

CINCPAC to CNO, September 3, 19546 (re the immediately preceding message)

“… Recommend ChiNats be authorized [to] take measures [of] self-defense to include attack targets mainland against forces assembling to attack.…”

CNO to COMNAVPHIL for Stump, September 4, 19547

“… We interpose no objection to ChiNat air attacks against such targets on mainland in immediate Amoy area destruction of which necessary to repel invasion attempt by ChiCommies on ChiNat held islands that area. Concurrence in counterattacks against mainland targets in any wider area should be accorded only in event major ChiCom air attacks develop.…”

MAAG to CINCPAC, September 5, 19548

“… In view of [CNO 041633Z] [immediately preceding message]9 I have concurred in use of air … MND requested authority for air attack of Mahang airfield 24°38’ N by 118°15’ E … now inactive … I have refused concurrence for such authorization [attack].…”

[Page 657]

COMNAVFE to MAAG, September 5, 1954 (Stump for Chase)10

Convey following to P’eng Meng-chi11—”… I interpose no objection to your attacking by air such enemy targets on mainland in immediate Amoy area which are supporting [the] Communist invasion attempts. I believe [that] you will agree, however, that counter air attacks against mainland targets in any wider area should at [for the] present be withheld until such time as [a] possible major Communist air attack develops.…”

COMNAVFE to MAAG, September 6, 195412 (replying to MAAGCINCPAC message of September 5, 1954)

“… Concur your action particularly reference restriction on Mahang airfield. Desire, however, no restriction be placed military targets supporting ChiCom hostile action immediate Amoy area and, in event actual attack [invasion] becomes imminent, desire no restrictions be placed on ChiNat attack on ChiCom bases actually supporting invasion effort.…”

CINCPAC to MAAG, September 10, 195413

“… Situation over next few days requires careful and deliberate consideration on both U.S. and ChiNat parts as to extent of continued aggressive defense [defensive] counteraction. At this time [it is] not believed in best U.S. interests that ChiNats should unnecessarily prolong this counteraction in view practical cessation of ChiCom offensive action. … Requested [that] you advise MND in your best judgment as to continuation their aggressive counteractions in the developing situation. My view is that, while ChiNats should hit ChiComs hard for their initial aggression, nevertheless a prolonged continuation might in turn lead ChiComs to own aggressive measures of self-defense, including retaliation against Formosa and possibly unnecessary U.S. involvement.…”

CNO to CINCPAC, September 11, 195414

Concur in your message of September 10.

MAAG to CINCPAC, September 12, 195415 (refers to CINCPACMAAG message of September 10)

MND planning for tomorrow—”… Attack missions will be limited to [direct] retaliation against ChiCom attacks. Based on recent pattern of ChiCom actions this will consist only of neutralization of enemy artillery firing at ChiNat targets.…”

[Page 658]

MAAG to CINCPAC, September 15, 195416

Reports ChiNats planning to conduct small intelligence gathering raids against mainland in Amoy area and requests CINCPAC approval.

CINCPAC to MAAG, September 15, 195417 (refers to immediately preceding message)

Approved. “… Raids exceeding company size against mainland [removed] from immediate Amoy area should continue to require prior notification by MND and concurrence from CINCPAC.…”

I asked Colonel McQuillen whether he felt that CINCPAC advice is being followed by the Nationalist forces. I referred to recent newspaper reports to the effect that Nationalist air bombardment of Amoy Island is continuing and made specific reference to the statement, as reported in the press, by the spokesman for the MND that Nationalist ships had shelled Wei-t’ou which is on the tip of the mainland peninsula to the east of Chinmen and Amoy. Colonel McQuillen said that his office is satisfied that the CINCPAC advice is being adhered to. He thought that any naval or air action taken by the Nationalists against Communist targets would be for the purpose of retaliation for Communist attacks or for the purpose of preventing a buildup of Communist forces in the area. He said that his office had sent no queries on this matter to CINCPAC.

  1. A similar memorandum, including some but not all of the extracts quoted here, was sent by Martin to Robertson, Sept. 24. (793.5/9–454)
  2. The messages quoted here are all in Department of Defense files. Certain minor changes have been made in the extracts after comparison with the texts of the original telegrams. These changes are in brackets: additions to the source text of the memorandum are in roman type; corrections are in italic.
  3. Telegram 150425Z from CINCPAC to Chief MAAG Formosa, Aug. 15, 1953.
  4. Telegram 031150Z (MG 8074) from Chief MAAG Formosa to CINCPAC, Sept. 3, 1954.
  5. Telegram 031400Z (MG 8076) from Chief MAAG Formosa to CINCPAC, Sept. 3, 1954.
  6. Telegram 031949Z from CINCPAC to Chief of Naval Operations, Sept. 3, 1954.
  7. Telegram 041633Z from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in the Philippines, Sept. 4, 1954.
  8. Telegram 050346Z (MG 9003) from Chief MAAG Formosa to CINCPAC, Sept. 5, 1954.
  9. Second set of brackets in the source text.
  10. Telegram 051358Z from Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in the Far East, to Chief MAAG Formosa, Sept. 5, 1954.
  11. Gen. P’eng Meng-chi, Acting Chief of General Staff, Republic of China.
  12. Telegram 060116Z from Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in the Far East, to Chief MAAG Formosa, Sept. 6, 1954.
  13. Telegram 102044Z from CINCPAC to Chief MAAG Formosa, Sept. 10, 1954.
  14. Telegram 111535Z from Chief of Naval Operations to CINCPAC, Sept. 11, 1954.
  15. Telegram 120812Z (MG 9171) from Chief MAAG Formosa to CINCPAC, Sept. 12, 1954.
  16. Telegram 150246Z (MG 9221) from Chief MAAG Formosa to CINCPAC, Sept. 15, 1954.
  17. Telegram 152131Z from CINCPAC to Chief MAAG Formosa, Sept. 15, 1954.