Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/6–1154: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

top secret

Paris, June 11, 1954—9 p.m.

4820. Repeated information Geneva 382, Saigon 599. Limited distribution. Saigon eyes only McClintock. I saw Maurice Schumann at his request this afternoon and he said that he wished to try to dispel some of the confusion regarding the US position in Indochina. He then gave me four or five telegrams to read, all of which had been sent on either the ninth or tenth of June. In two cases there were identical reports on conversations between Tyler and an unnamed counselor of the French Embassy, and between Radford and Valluy, both of which were reported as categorically stating that for political reasons (i.e., difficulty of obtaining congressional approval) US could not envisage use of marines in Indochina in any circumstance. Two other telegrams reported a conversation with the Under Secretary at Geneva and Bonnet’s conversation with the Secretary, in both of which the position regarding marines was confirmed to be as previously stated by me to Schumann in Embtel 4766.¹ I pointed out that the question of whether or not the US would intervene militarily was a political decision and that all I could say was the Secretary’s position on marines, which had always been consistent, must be assumed to be the US position.

Schumann then went on to agree with the US position that French had not as yet asked for US intervention to [in] accordance with the conditions laid down in Deptel 4023.² However, he said that French had thought they had made it clear, and if not, wished to make it very clear now that they had taken decision to request assistance in case of failure at Geneva. He referred to portions of Laniel’s and Bidault’s speeches to the Assembly in which they both said that in the event there was a failure at Geneva the government would bring the question back to the French Assembly for discussion as to what should be done. He said that was meant to be a clear indication that at that time they would request the Assembly to approve a request for US military assistance. He said that this was generally so understood in Parliament.

I told Schumann that the only difficulty with this position of the French Government was that it was completely indefinite as to time, as there was no clear indication as to when the Geneva Conference would end. Schumann answered that was correct but that the conference could not go on very much longer, and he referred to Eden’s recent speech at Geneva.

Schumann then said that the worst thing that could happen would be for the French Parliament to request US aid and then to have it refused. He said this would have a catastrophic effect on Franco–American relations. (I agree with his views on this.) I then told him that I assumed that once French had made the decision to request intervention they would indicate it to me with a detailed statement as to how they intended to carry out the various conditions listed in Deptel 4023, and that I would then refer such a request to Washington to see if the US was still prepared to go ahead.

I told Schumann that only if there was an affirmative answer did I see the necessity arising of the French Government going to the Parliament. In other words I am in agreement with the French position that they should have advance indication of a favorable response from US before asking their Parliament to formally approve a request for US assistance.

I then said that I thought it would clear his mind if he read the advance draft of section IV of the Secretary’s Los Angeles speech.³ Schumann read this section with great interest and said it was an excellent speech and he only regretted that it had not been made much sooner. He felt it would be helpful in clarifying the US position. (Bonnet had not reported anything about the speech.)

He then referred to the President’s Thursday press conference.⁴ He said that in the form in which it was reported here in Paris it certainly gave a different impression from the Secretary’s speech and that it was being generally interpreted as a final decision by the US to write off Indochina.

In this connection he read me the lead editorial in tonight’s issue of Le Monde which, he said, unfortunately and probably for the first time, accurately reflected general public opinion here at the moment (translation of editorial which has been called to our attention from other sources follows in later telegram).

I then told Schumann of Ely’s request to Radford as contained in Deptel 4508,⁵ and Schumann fully agreed that it would be confusing to have another set of conversations on US intentions. When I left he said he now clearly understood US position.

Dillon

1. Dated June 9, p. 1670.
2. Dated May 11, p. 1534.
3. Regarding the speech by Secretary Dulles at Los Angeles, June 11, the fourth section of which dealt with Indochina, see footnote 4, p. 1676.
4. At his news conference of June 10, President Eisenhower indicated that he did not intend to request special authority to take action in Indochina from Congress before it recessed for the summer. For the record of the news conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, pp. 545–554.
5. Dated June 10, p. 1678.