Office of the Historian

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Indochina”

Memorandum by the Counselor (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State

top secret
[Paris,] April 23, 1954.

Subject:

  • Situation in Indochina

This memorandum is a consensus resulting from discussions among Messrs. MacArthur, Robertson, Sullivan1 and Bowie, and Admiral Davis.2 Our estimate of the situation is as follows:

1.
As matters now stand, according to M. Bidault, France will probably seek at Geneva to end the Indochina hostilities on almost any terms, if Dien Bien Phu falls, as now appears likely within ten days or so. Under those conditions, there appears little hope that the French will continue the war for any length of time, unless the Communists make such extreme demands that the French cannot take the humiliation of accepting them, even in their present mood.
2.
Judging by their propaganda, the Communists may well propose a “cease-fire”, probably with each side retaining its present positions. The conditions proposed by Laniel for a cease-fire are likely to be eroded away under pressure. Such a solution would leave the Viet Minh in de facto control of areas throughout Viet-Nam where they could consolidate their position and from which they could penetrate other parts of Viet-Nam. Thus it would probably be even more damaging to retention of any part of Viet-Nam than a partition.
3.
The British can be expected to support French efforts to end the hostilities. Apparently they would prefer some form of partition, but seem to be most anxious—
a)
To avoid any commitment to enter the hostilities, and
b)
To deter our intervention for fear of the Chinese reaction and its consequences.
4.
The Colombo meeting of the South Asian states will almost surely make proposals for an armistice or some other ending of the war and will probably express disapproval of any intervention.
5.
Under present conditions, the U.S. appears to have only two real choices with respect to Indochina:
a)
To accept as almost certain the loss of Vietnam and to seek to minimize the consequences of such a disaster; or
b)
To provide military forces for Indochina (with any others ready to do so) in the hope of deterring the French from settling at Geneva on unacceptable terms.
6.
U.S. intervention will involve the following risks:
a)
Even if it should begin with air and naval forces, the U.S. would have to be prepared to commit all necessary forces, which might ultimately include ground forces.
b)
The political steps in Indochina necessary for success (real independence and strong Vietnamese forces) would tend to reduce the French support for the action over time. Thus, the U.S. would probably have to carry a greater share of the load as time went on.
c)
If the Chinese reacted in force, the hostilities would probably expand into general war with China and possibly into a war involving the Soviet Union.
7.
If the U.S. should decide not to intervene but to seek to minimize the consequences of the loss of Vietnam:
a)
It should seek to shape the Indochinese settlement so as to salvage as much of Vietnam as possible from Communist control and to make Laos and Cambodia as defensible as feasible.
b)
It should attempt to create as rapidly as possible some regional grouping with definite commitments to secure the remainder of Southeast Asia from further loss to the Communists. This would have to include military obligations to defend the area in order to attract local support and overcome the effects of the Communist success in Vietnam.
8.
The U.S. has only a very limited time in which to make its decision:
a)
When the French begin to negotiate seriously to end the war, it will probably be too late to deter them by an offer of aid. According to Bidault and Pleven, if Dien Bien Phu falls, France will not be interested in a joint effort even if we are prepared to make it.
b)
If France decides to settle, then even if Vietnam invited us to intervene, it would be extremely difficult to do so in view of the colossal technical problems posed by French withdrawal and the probable attitude of the French, British and South Asian States.

  1. Charles A. Sullivan, Deputy for American, South Asian, and Far Eastern Affairs, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense; Adviser, U.S. Delegation to the Geneva Conference.↩
  2. Vice Adm. Arthur C. Davis, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense; Special Adviser, U.S. Delegation to the Geneva Conference.↩