Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 355

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Public Affairs Adviser in the Office of European Regional Affairs (Nunley)

secret

[Washington,] July 29, 1954.

Subject:

• Southeast Asia Pact

Participants:

• Mr. Robert Scott, British Minister
• Mr. MacArthur, Counselor
• Mr. Galloway, C
• Mr. Nunley, RA

Mr. Scott called on Mr. MacArthur at 3:00 o’clock July 29 to inform him of a message received July 28 from Foreign Secretary Eden concerning US proposals for moving ahead with a Southeast Asia security treaty. Mr. Scott said the UK is unable to commit itself at this time to the schedule proposed by the US (declaration of intention on August 7, followed by a ministerial conference about September 6). Nor can it commit itself on the device of a simultaneous identical announcement of intention by the founding governments. Mr. Scott explained that Mr. Eden is still very keen on sounding out the Colombo Powers on associating themselves with the Geneva settlement, and is apparently giving this matter first priority. He said Mr. Eden is also anxious that the Colombo Powers be given an opportunity fully to discuss the proposed Asian security arrangement. The UK believes it would be premature at this time for the US to discuss the terms of a joint announcement of intention with other countries.

Mr. Scott reported that there appears some possibility that both Pakistan and Ceylon may be willing to join in the proposed SEA security arrangement, and Mr. Scott said such a development might easily pave the way for Burmese accession. Both Mr. Scott and Mr. MacArthur expressed the view that such participation would be a very interesting development.

Mr. MacArthur inquired about the meaning of the message as related to the original agreement between Foreign Secretary Eden and Under Secretary Smith. Mr. Scott expressed the view that the UK Government does not intend any change in this agreement. He feels that the program of completing consultations with the Colombo powers by August 7 and the holding of a meeting about September 1 still stands. However, Mr. Scott was unable to estimate when the US might expect a definitive position from the British Government on the question of issuing an identical announcement of intention by August 7. Mr. MacArthur stressed the advantages of the simultaneous announcement procedure as opposed to a procedure of issuing invitations from the US and UK to other countries, and Mr. Scott expressed a personal preference for the simultaneous announcement procedure.¹ Mr. MacArthur also emphasized the fact that considerable work will have to be done before an announcement can be issued and that it is extremely urgent to obtain a definite British decision on the announcement procedure and time-table as soon as possible.

Mr. Scott pointed out that Mr. Eden also has very definite views about the relation of Cambodia to the defense arrangement. Regardless of Cambodia’s legal capacity to join a pact, Mr. Eden feels the entire Geneva settlement was based upon the presumption that Cambodia would not become a member of a collective security arrangement in that area. Mr. Scott made it clear that this refers to membership only and that any treaty agreed upon can still extend protection to Cambodia and perhaps provide means for concrete military assistance to Cambodia.

Mr. MacArthur said he is committed to keep the representatives of France, Thailand, and the Philippines informed of developments and also to give them a working draft of a declaration of intention. He said he would stress the fact that it has no official status and is a working paper only. He again referred to the need for agreement on the terms of a simultaneous announcement, the establishment of an informal working group, and an agreement on a place and date for a September meeting before the announcement can be issued, and urged Mr. Scott to seek further advice from London as soon as possible.

Mr. Scott agreed to pursue this matter, but pointed out that the pressure of other work (such as the Suez issue), the many problems which have arisen during the past week connected with the Parliament’s adjournment tomorrow, etc., have undoubtedly affected the UK’s attention to this problem. This may make it difficult to clean up all the outstanding questions in time to meet the August 7 deadline for a simultaneous announcement proposed by the US.

With respect to the proposed working group which would prepare for the ministerial meeting, Mr. Scott asked whether its functions would be limited to drafting provisions of the Treaty or whether it might perform other functions. Mr. MacArthur said the US has conceived of the working group primarily as a drafting group, but it might also afford an opportunity for a general exchange of views on an interim organizational arrangement. He said the US would appreciate any ideas which the UK may wish to contribute on this subject.

1. In Galloway’s memorandum of a conversation held between himself, Merchant, and Stelle, and Sir Robert Scott on Aug. 3, the U.S. position on this issue is set forth in more detail:

   “From the U.S. standpoint, the issuance by the U.K. of formal invitations to the Colombo Powers would create difficulties for the U.S. which had agreed that countries such as Nationalist China, Japan, and the ROK would not be invited to participate as initial members in a Collective Security Arrangement. Also, it was most desirable that the formation of such a Collective Security Arrangement should, as far as possible, bear the stamp of initiative of Asian countries, and invitations extended by the U.S. and the U.K. would conflict with this Objective” (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 355)