Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, “Eisenhower Correspondence with Churchill”
No. 1258
President Eisenhower to
Prime Minister Churchill
My Dear Winston: You are so well aware of my convictions as to the necessity for sound and friendly Anglo-American relations that you must keenly realize the concern I feel over the somber tone of your cabled message.1
Because it is a personal communication, I am answering in the same fashion, without waiting to call together the State Department staffs which will be, of course, deeply interested in what you have to say. I shall hope to get this cable off to you the first thing Monday morning so that I may have your further observations on certain delicate phases of this matter.
In considering our common interests in various areas, I am, of course, anxious to take into consideration your particular political problems and to adjust our activities so as best to accommodate your position so long as this leads toward a satisfactory solution. We likewise have our political problems. For example, our aid program for the Mid-East was drawn up and was approved by the Congress on the basis that there would be a reasonable division of aid between Israel and Arab countries.
Since we have already made allocations to Israel, we have little excuse to avoid moving in the case of the Arab countries, but as you know, at your request we have not only withheld military aid from Egypt, but have likewise postponed several times the initiation of economic aid.
You state that the Socialist Opposition would be bitterly resentful of American economic aid to Egypt because of the American objection to trade with Communist China. It has been my understanding that Britain has continued to carry on trade in economic non-strategic items with Red China, and we do not now propose more with respect to Egypt than beginning to help develop its economy. Consequently, I am at a loss to understand the basis on which the Socialists could make a logical attack. You likewise mention that the Opposition would resent any economic aid to Egypt so bitterly [Page 2179] that they would urge you to press for inclusion of Red China in the UN. By implication this would seem to mean that if we do not extend economic aid to Egypt, you are prepared to stand firm with us in opposing the inclusion of the bloody Chinese aggressor into the councils of peaceful nations, at least until Red China withdraws her invading armies, ceases supporting the Indo-China war and begin to act like a civilized government. Could you confirm this to me?
I assume, of course, that you are genuinely anxious to arrange a truce with Egypt and that the only remaining obstacles are the two points you mentioned to me at Bermuda, namely availability and uniforms. Now if we continue to press Egypt to accept your conditions on these two points, can we do so with the assurance that they can count on a settlement if they accept your position? You can well understand my anxiety to avoid asking our people to do everything in their power to bring about a settlement of this situation, including another postponement of economic aid, and then discover that we have been operating on a complete misunderstanding.
As I told you at Bermuda, I am most deeply sympathetic with your whole problem in the area, even though at times I have believed that different methods might have been more effective. I repeat that in our actual dealings with Egypt, we have gone to great lengths to meet your convictions and opinions. We certainly want to continue to do so. We think we proved that in Persia, and I hope we shall together make that effort seem worthwhile.
I know that you realize that there are in this country many people who believe that the United States has treated the Arab countries shabbily and, because parts of the Arab holdings are vital to the Western world, this segment of our citizenry asserts that we should work to improve our relationships with the Arab countries. But this government has always refused to do this at the cost of anything we believe detrimental to Anglo-American best interests. In spite of outrageous and irresponsible criticism of each other on both sides of the Atlantic, American governmental policy and popular sentiment recognize the great value to the free world of keeping Anglo-American relationships coordinated with respect to the rest of the world and friendly as between themselves.
[Here follows discussion of the European Defense Community concept.]
I hope that you can find it possible to answer this personal cable promptly so that I can assemble the necessary staffs and go over this whole matter in detail. I assure you that I am prepared to meet locally any political difficulty in carrying out whatever arrangements [Page 2180] we may make between ourselves for the common good of our two countries.
I realize that this is a long and possibly a tedious cablegram. But it is quite necessary that there be the clearest kind of understanding between us if we are at one and the same time to operate together in some of these critical situations abroad and still be able to withstand any kind of political problem and criticism that can arise in our respective countries.
I shall look forward to early receipt of your comments.
With warm personal regard,
As ever,