Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

611.84A/5–1354

No. 823
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Hart)

secret

[Washington,] May 13, 1954.

Subject:

• American-Israel Relations.

Participants:

• Ambassador Abba Eban of Israel
• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister of Israel
• Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
• Mr. Parker T. Hart, Director, NE

Ambassador Eban expressed his appreciation that the Secretary had spared time from very critical world problems such as Indochina to receive him. However, because the general international situation was so serious, it seemed particularly desirable that “unnecessary quarrels” be avoided. In this connection there was a cloud over United States-Israel relations which had resulted from two main developments: (1) certain policy statements by the U.S. Government and (2) the security situation in the Near East as it relates to Israel. The Ambassador did not wish to bring personalities into this question as he had already made known the views of his government to Mr. Byroade. First among the policy statements was that given at Dayton, Ohio [Mr. Byroade’s speech of April 9, 1954 before the Dayton World Affairs Council].¹ While this address achieved a certain balance in distributing blame for current Near Eastern tensions between the Arab states and Israel, certain phrases reverberated unfortunately in Israel, such as that which asked Israel to cease “behaving like a conqueror”. Diplomatic tradition, for good reason, had made the avoidance of such phrases desirable. At the same time, the address did not advise the Arabs to avoid raiding Israel. More important in this address was the first negative reference by the U.S. Government to relations between Israel and those people throughtout the rest of the world who shared her traditions. This reference wounded the feelings of millions outside Israel and hundreds of thousands within that country. A fabric of innumerable relationships has been woven by history between Jews around the world and the concept of Zion, now finally rendered tangible by the re-creation of Israel. The Ambassador felt therefore that this negative reference showed a certain lack of scholarship and of sensitivity. In any case, the Israel press had expressed a disquieting reaction using such phrases as: “U.S. Threatens Israel”. The Secretary might well reply that these were not mature interpretations of what had been said—that they were distortions. If he were to say this, the Ambassador would agree. Nevertheless, these distortions were a political fact which invited concern.

The second policy statement to which the Ambassador referred was the speech made at Philadelphia [by Byroade on May 1, 1954 before the American Council for Judaism] where the platform was certainly not one on which a discussion of American friendship for Israel was congenial. The same themes of the Dayton speech were pursued, but Israel’s objections to this address were more substantive:

(1) The speech, in making reference to the impossibility of early peace between Israel and her neighbors, would have the effect of convincing the Arabs that their vehement rejection of peace was now winning acceptance. Israel hoped that we would not abandon the peace slogan because of the obstacles which existed in the path of peace.

(2) The address referred to the matter of compensation and nonaggression pacts in a manner which gave a false impression of Israel’s intentions. Israel had long since made a known decision to offer compensation without calling for concessions from the Arab side and she had repeatedly offered non-aggression pacts which had been rejected.

(3) More important, this speech for the first time made a reference to Israel’s laws on immigration. This reference created an emotional outburst in Israel which can only be understood if one remembers the Jewish wartime experience with the British Mandate. When the Nazi holocaust against Jewry was in progress, the Jews had “no key to a door” which they could open for their people. This caused their break with the Mandate Government. Today, however, immigration was not an actual problem and it seemed entirely unnecessary to raise a theoretical issue. Israel had obtained 400,000 people from behind the Iron Curtain, a unique transfer of people from Communism to the free world and therefore a real achievement. If the Iron Curtain should open to permit the exit of the remainder of Eastern European Jewry, the movement of these people toward Israel would be greeted with messianic fervor. The Middle East would be better off as a result, for these people would be true anti-Communists. Such immigration would therefore be not a disaster but a blessing. However, it did not seem likely that it would take place.

In general, Israel was confronted by this situation: she cherished the United States as the sheet anchor of her very life, yet she had heard herself discussed publicly in such a critical vein on several occasions that it appeared that Israel could do nothing right in American eyes. The corrections which the Department furnished after the second policy address [Press Release No. 231 of May 5, 1954] had not been sufficient to overcome an unfortunate public impression in Israel.

The second main factor which cast a cloud over U.S.–Israel relations was the publication of a military aid agreement between the United States and Iraq which, coming at a time when Arab hostility to Israel was at its height, served to confirm the impression which the Ambassador had just discussed. Here was an agreement which created a more intimate relationship between Iraq and the United States than that which existed between Israel and the United States. The result of all of these factors was not healthy for U.S.–Israel relations and had generated a feeling within Israel of extreme isolation. This feeling of isolation tended to give strength to those who believed in measures of self-reliance rather than reliance on international friendships and rendered difficult the general acceptance of moderate counsels. As the Ambassador hoped and believed that Israeli public impressions of America’s attitude were distorted, he wished to pose the question whether anything could be done to correct them.

The Secretary replied that it was clear that the Israeli press, as the Ambassador had remarked, had drawn other interpretations than those which had been intended. He had himself experienced a similar occurrence yesterday when the French press misinterpreted a remark which he had made by headlines such as: “U.S. Abandons Indo-China”. The press always seemed to seek out the most disturbing elements of a public address and feature them. On the other hand, in our form of representative government, it was at times necessary to speak frankly in order to explain things to one’s own people. The Ambassador must know, and his Government must know, that there was no weakening in the historic friendship between Israel and the United States. There might be suitable occasions to again speak publicly on this matter. However, this was a sensitive topic and likely to be distorted, it might not lend itself well to further public discussion at this time. As in the case of American relations with many countries, it was frequently desirable that misapprehensions be removed regarding U.S. intentions and purposes. The necessity of removing such misapprehensions sometimes created a real problem in our relations. The present incident, which unfortunately touched Israel most closely, was part of the fabric of recent developments which made the conduct of the unruffled relations a difficult task.

With respect to the U.S. Military Agreement with Iraq, the Secretary could only say that it was his belief that when the final chapter to this topic was written, it would be found to be in the best interest of Israel. He would not undertake to explain why this was so, but requested the Government of Israel to accept it on faith. He did not, of course, criticize the Israel public for misinterpreting this important step. He wished to assure the Ambassador, however, that he had looked into this situation personally and closely and that he was satisfied that at the worst it would not hurt, and, at the best, it might help Israel’s relations with her neighbors.

Referring to the Ambassador’s comment regarding peace as an objective, the Secretary had not abandoned efforts to work out a formula for peace and agreed with the Ambassador that such efforts should continue. If, as the Ambassador said, sober counsels in Israel were to prevail and Israel had some thoughts along this line, he would be glad to receive them. He was considering “the Trieste method” as a means of making progress in this dispute. The “Trieste Method” consisted of independent exploration on each side of a controversy where emotion between the disputants seemed to rule out direct talks. The Secretary wished the Ambassador to be assured that his concern over Indo-China did not rule out his readiness to talk with him regarding any practical methods of relaxing tensions.

Ambassador Eban replied that he would report the Secretary’s comments to his Government. He wished to leave with the Secretary only one final thought, which was that since the unfortunate impressions to which he made reference were public impressions, it would be desirable to do something publicly to give a reassurance. The Secretary responded that he did not exclude that possibility.

Ambassador Eban referred to Israel’s efforts in the UN toward peace which had been frustrated most recently by Jordan’s refusal to give necessary assurances of willingness to settle matters by peaceful means. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador felt the Arab countries were being much encouraged by the Soviet veto. Ambassador Eban replied that they seemed to be encouraged in the belief that they could use the United Nations as a platform to abuse Israel. During the past year and a quarter the United States had been giving attention to greater friendship with the Arab states in the hope that they would prove more responsive to its views. The results were disappointing, as the Arab countries were not more responsive to U.S. views but less so, particularly as compared with their attitude in 1950 and 1951. Psychologically, they had retreated. Israel would exercise its ingenuity in procedures but feared that the Arabs would not agree to confer with her under any circumstances. Israel did not wish to obstruct the possibility of talks by being too formal, by insisting on a discussion of peace terms. It was prepared to undertake discussions on interim and partial settlement of specific problems. As regards arms aid to Iraq the Ambassador assured the Secretary that Israel never believed that the United States intended to increase hostility in the Near East by such a measure. “We believe”, he said, “in the good will of the donor but question the good will of the recipient.”

The Secretary replied that Iraq had received no arms as yet and that he was watching this situation very carefully.

Note: As Ambassador Eban, Minister Shiloah and Mr. Hart were approaching the Reception Room after leaving the Secretary’s Office, the Ambassador noted a few newsmen waiting for him. Turning to Mr. Hart, he said: “These fellows always create a problem for me; do you think it would in order if I were to state that it would be wrong to assume that there had been any diminution in friendship between Israel and the United States?” Mr. Hart replied that such a statement on its own was certainly true and would be quite proper to give out; it was possible, of course, that the reporters might seek to draw inferences of a more specific nature. The Ambassador rejoined that he would not elaborate on such a statement nor go into details.

1. Brackets throughout this document appear in the source text.