Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

683.84A/11–652: Telegram

No. 509
The Ambassador in Syria (Moose) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Damascus, November 6, 1952—6 p.m.

345. Pass Defense. Deptel 265, Oct 24. During five hour session evening Nov 3, Shishikli furnished further details his views on division demil zone (Legdes 185, Sept 25). His aim is establishment of durable frontier line and elimination demil zone with its concomitant incidents and irritations not settlement of all issues with Israel. He envisions frontier line from Tel al-Qadi in southerly direction to “east branch Jordan” (presumably Banias River), thence via most easterly regular water course to Lake Huleh thence down middle Huleh and Jordan through middle Lake Tiberias. Any reclaimed areas east this line shld become Syrian. Shishikli indicated willingness frontier north Huleh be delimited by three-party commission including neutral whose vote wld be decisive but said he thought geography wld dictate line. Frontier thus formed wld be “closed” to normal intercourse. Population wld be exchanged between central demil zone and southern zone, Arabs emigrating to Syria, Jews to Israel. The two govts wld exercise undisputed control each on its own side of frontier. Subordinate questions such as water rights need be no obstacle. Whether foregoing represents Shishikli’s minimum demands or merely his starting point for negot can be determined only by engaging in discussion.

Re initiation bilateral talks on foregoing, Shishikli stated he had communicated some time ago to Gen Riley Syrian desire replace demil zone with definite frontier and move was taken by Syrians in MAC to seek solution (Legtel 649, May 5 and Tel Aviv Embtel 1191, May 13). This Syrian initiative was frustrated at Oct 9 mtg by Israeli insistence on discussion of wider issues. Shishikli is still ready to discuss frontier settlement beginning with MAC mtg. If warranted by MAC contacts “formal mtgs” including reps FonOffs cld be held after an endeavor reach agreement. He suggested I discuss foregoing with Gen Riley or with Col Taxis who more easily available here.

I said it was opinion our Amb Tel Aviv that Israel better disposed than formerly to endeavor such agreement with Arabs, to which he replied all wld be well if Israelis motivated by good will.

Foregoing supplements info Legdes 185 re GOS position division demil zone which not entirely unknown Israeli auths (cf. Jaddid’s statement reported in Jerusalem tel 40, Oct 11, para 4,² Ramati’s remarks in Jerusalem tel 43, Oct 19³ and other previous correspondence). Since Shishikli showed preference for continued direct negot with Israelis through MAC, I did not ask specifically whether his statements cld be made known Israel by Dept.⁴

The unsatisfactory outcome of the Syro–Israeli mtg of Oct. 9 (pattern accurately forecast by Legdes 317, Dec 5, 1951, para C)⁵ is liable to be repeated in further mtgs unless both parties agree in advance what subjects are to be discussed. There is every reason to believe (despite Tel Aviv Embtel 68, Oct. 23⁶ containing reference inconsistent with text Tel Aviv Embtel 105, July 20) that Syria is ready to reach an agreement for the elimination of friction along the Syro–Israeli frontier. Israelis aware of this fact and have shown disposition to criticize rather than to negot. Israel on the other hand, has indicated an interest in peace treaty and trade relations. The Syrian Govt is not prepared to go so far. It is doubtful that the Syrian people would accept peace treaty, though they wld like more peaceful relationship along the frontier. Only boycott of Israel is important feature of Syrian policy.

There is thus no present prospect of agreement between Israel and Syria on peace and commercial relations, and the interval between the current “cold war” and peace is too great to be traversed in one leap (or closed by one agreement). It might, however, be traversed in several successive steps over period of years, if both Syria and Israel wld concentrate on reaching agreement where agreement is possible, leaving ultimate and final solutions to day when more favorable. Dif points of friction and irritation are eliminated progressively and mutual confidence established, peaceful relations, including trade, will inevitably follow.

The Syrian auths appear to be ready to embark on such course, though references to “peace” and “final settlement” should at this stage be employed with caution. In the hope of reaching eventual peace by successive steps, the Emb urges Department and Emb Tel Aviv to encourage Israel to give practical demonstration of its desire to become integrated in NE by discussing and, if possible reaching an agreement with Syria to divide the demil zone. Shishikli has indicated his willingness to begin discussion through MAC mtgs. Shld the Dept or Israel have reason for suggesting another channel of communication Shishikli wld probably agree.

Moose

1. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, Rome (for Unger), London, Moscow, and Tripoli.
2. In telegram 40 from Jerusalem, Oct. 11, Consul Tyler related General Dayan’s account of the Syria-Israel “high-level talks” of Oct 9. Dayan reportedly asked Jaddid, the Syrian Delegate, if he would divulge the basis of Syria’s proposals; Dayan was reportedly greatly pleased by Jaddid’s frank reply indicating that Syria desired division of the demilitarized zones, the establishment of a single boundary, and fishing rights on Lake Tiberias. (784A.00/10–1152)
3. Not printed, but see footnote 3, Document 505.
4. A memorandum detailing that portion of the conversation of Nov. 3 between Moose and Shishikli relating to a possible division of the Syria-Israel demilitarized zone between the two countries was sent to the Department as enclosure 1 to despatch 279 from Damascus, Nov. 6. (683.84A/11–652)
5. Paragraph C of despatch 317 from Damascus, Dec. 5 (357.AC/12–551) referred to the proposed Armistice Conference mentioned in telegram 137 to Damascus, Oct. 4 (printed in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. V, p. 1243), stating that the Syrians certainly hope and intend that the aim of such a conference would be “the definitive settlement of the status of the Demilitarized Zone. They are prepared to give Israel carte blanche in its share of the Zone and would claim the same rights in their share. The boundary of Israel would be just as final as the others, all of which are of course established by Armistice Agreements, not by peace treaties. However, Syria is unwilling to call a formal conference at which the Israelis would first raise questions like economic relations and would then, following the inevitable Syrian response, break off negotiations with the familiar charge that the Syrians are blocking progress toward peace. This was the only outcome of the informal Syrian proposal last summer when the Israelis replied that they would have to discuss ‘all outstanding problems’, not merely the Zone. The Legation concurs that such a sequence of events could serve no useful purpose.”
6. A repeat of telegram 665 from Tel Aviv, Document 505.