780.5/11–552
No. 105
The Department of
State to the British
Embassy1
Aide-Mémoire
The Secretary of State is most grateful to His Excellency the Ambassador of the United Kingdom for the information transmitted through the British Embassy in Washington on October 27 with respect to the results of the Anglo-Turkish conversations on the [Page 312] Middle East Defense Organization which took place in London from October 16 to 18.2
The United States Government has given most careful consideration to the views of the United Kingdom and Turkey on the desirability of the first approach on the Middle East Defense Organization being made to Iraq by Turkey.
The United States Government after full reflection on the views set forth by the United Kingdom and Turkey, still believes that Egypt, not Iraq, is the key to this question and that no other Arab state would be willing to consider participation in the Middle East Defense Organization until the present difficulties between Egypt and the United Kingdom are settled. The United States Government shares the desire of the United Kingdom and Turkey for the early establishment of the Middle East Defense Organization. Therefore if Egypt is the key to its establishment, as the United States Government believes, our efforts at this time should be concentrated on the principal objective.
It is the firm belief of the United States Government that an approach to Egypt at this time regarding the Middle East Defense Organization will not succeed unless it is accompanied by a clear and precise offer to Egypt with respect to a prompt settlement of the Suez Canal Base question.
It is also the belief of the United States Government that material assistance to Egypt by the United States and the United Kingdom which will give the Naguib Government tangible evidence of support to his regime is an indispensable element to the achievement of the objectives which are sought. Material assistance would include such arms as might be considered necessary to raise the level of the Egyptian Armed Forces to the point where they could play a useful role in Middle East defense.
The United States Government therefore proposes that the United Kingdom urgently formulate the precise lines of a Base settlement which would be strategically acceptable to the Western powers, but which would, at the same time, stand a chance of acceptance by the Naguib Government. Such a settlement would probably have to include the principle of evacuation of British troops on a phased basis. In this connection it is noted that certain proposals regarding a settlement are now being considered by the British Government.
At such time as the elements of a Base settlement have been formulated, which we believe could be accepted by Egypt, it is proposed that the United States would approach General Naguib and [Page 313] suggest that the United States, United Kingdom and Egypt work out in secret both the Suez Canal Base settlement and Egyptian adherence to common defense planning. It is also proposed that at some appropriate stage after the agreement had been worked out secretly, the United Kingdom would announce its plans regarding evacuation. Egypt would at the same time undertake to work as rapidly as possible towards public announcement of its adherence to the Middle East Defense Organization.
Prior to or concurrent with the approach to General Naguib suggested in the above paragraph, it might be possible to work out a program of assistance to Egypt, both in the military and economic fields, which would make more possible an agreement concerning the Base and the Middle East Defense Organization.
The United States Government also proposes that the initial secret approach to Egypt should be followed without undue delay by an exploratory approach to the other Arab states on the Middle East Defense Organization. It is believed that a favorable course of United States-United Kingdom-Egyptian negotiations would improve the climate of discussions with the other Arab states. The timing of the approach to the other Arab states would depend to some degree on the reception which would be accorded by General Naguib to the initial approach to Egypt.
It is apparent that it will not be possible to obtain Egyptian participation in common defense planning without a settlement of the Canal Zone Base problem. Since it is generally desired to establish the Middle East Defense Organization as soon as possible and since this can best be done with Egyptian adherence, the United States considers that the United States and the United Kingdom should press forward with all possible speed in working out the various elements of the Base settlement and an approach to Egypt. The United States is encouraged by the improved atmosphere with respect to the Anglo-Egyptian situation and by the progress which is apparently being made on the Sudan, compensation and other matters. The United States believes that it would be desirable to take advantage of the present opportunities to initiate negotiation of a settlement with Egypt.
The United States for its part would be willing to take an active part in the negotiations with Egypt with a view to facilitating an agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom.3
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Handed to the British Ambassador by Matthews on Nov. 5, with a request that the Ambassador transmit it to London. Drafted by Stabler, and cleared by Acheson, Bonbright, Matthews, Ferguson, and Byroade.
A memorandum of the Nov. 5 conversation at the Department of State, not printed, stated that Matthews told the British Ambassador the United States did not intend to inform the Turks of the message until it had received the British reaction, and hoped the British would not discuss it with them either, but the United States did want to discuss the matter with the Turks as soon as possible because they had informed us of the meetings in London in October. (780.5/11–552)
This aide-mémoire was transmitted to London in telegram 3155, to Cairo in telegram 952, and to the Embassies in Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv on Nov. 5. (780.5/11–552)
↩ - A copy of the British document of Oct. 27 has not been found in Department of State files; but see telegram 911 to Cairo, repeated to London as 3072, Oct. 31, supra.↩
- For the interim British reaction, see the memorandum of conversation by Ortiz, Nov. 10, infra.↩