Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 359
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State
priority
771. Limit distribution. Murphy, Dowling and I saw Chanc, Blankenhorn and Hallstein again this morning for nearly an hour. Chanc emphasized gravity of European situation, spoke again about his distrust Mendes-France and difficulties Chanc faced in Germany. He emphasized need for ending occupation status soon as possible.
In this connection we went over again some points yesterday’s discussion with Chanc1 and last night with Blankenhorn and Hallstein.2 Chanc wishes declaration three occupying powers ending occupation except for (a) Berlin, (b) responsibilities reunification Germany, (c) for time being status of troops, but desires this status be given another name. He agreed that his objective was to dissolve High Commission, have Embassies replace High Commissioners’ offices, eliminate veto on constitutional amendments and eliminate Military Security Board. In connection with this Board, he told story of French veto on expansion certain industry which was rescinded after negotiation between German and French concern. I had heard same story some months before and do not doubt there may be basis for his implied charge French were using MSB from time to time to further certain French commercial interests. In addition removing these occupation restraints, Chanc emphasized important psychological effect which could only occur if Allies declared occupation at an end.
Early in discussion Chanc raised frank question what was U.S. prepared do if Mendes-France refused NATO solution and ending occupying status. Discussion turned to Hallstein’s outline his third scheme, which he had given us last night as being unofficial. Murphy said without committing Secy or Govt, he could say some of thinking in State Dept had been along similar lines. He felt that this discussion and his knowledge Chanc’s views would help Secy reach decision which had not yet been possible because of his absence in Manila. In response to direct question, Chanc and Hallstein said discussion with British of what to do if French refused to accept second alternative, namely membership in NATO, had been very tentative and no details considered. (Preferred scheme, it must be remembered, is EDC, and Chanc repeated his preference for this and belief that after election [Page 1191] May 1956, France would be prepared for integration German Army into European army, but said France could not hold up defense of Europe that long.)
It was opinion all participants in conversation that significance of a third scheme such as outlined Hallstein last night was in first instance to put pressure on France to accept NATO solution as outlined Eden–Adenauer talks. Chanc seemed to be of opinion that time for U.S. to step in with its pressure would be immediately after Eden–Mendes–France conversation if Mendes-France were obdurate or if he proposed further conditions such as Saar settlement.
My personal opinion in comparing conversations yesterday and today with talks last week with Chanc and Hallstein is as follows:
Germans seem less inclined to hope NATO solution inacceptable Mendes-France would result overthrow his government followed by modified EDC solution, though Chanc still emphasizes importance European idea Schuman Plan and eventual formation European army. Chanc seems more urgent about some dramatic political gesture ending occupation. Clearly wishes this to be accomplished without Bundestag action such as would have been involved had London protocol route been followed. Chanc has retreated from his belief that mere declaration of intent to limit German armament would be sufficient basis of responsible plan to present to French and has come to view of modified NATO Treaty. To meet obvious objection this plan that long delay and much negotiation required, he proposes to get political benefits by end of occupation status in return for agreement on principle by French. It would be my view if Mendes-France at all moved to accept NATO solution prompt action his Assembly should be forced and at same time Chanc should be required to place a status of forces convention before his Bundestag, a modified Bonn convention but with a different name and with the most objectionable feature from his point view removed, namely reserved powers which created a special status for Ambassadors U.S., U.K., and France.