Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/9–1654

Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in France (Herz)¹

secret

Paris, September 16, 1954.

Post-Mortem on the Rejection of the EDC Treaty

1. Introduction.

The defeat of the EDC treaty in the French National Assembly was preceded and followed by such a large number of conflicting statements and accusations of bad faith that it appears desirable to review, in the light of the information available to this Embassy, the principal disagreements concerning this most important and tragic event in the post-war history of Western Europe. While it is always futile in politics to speculate on what might have been, the Embassy’s answers to some of these questions should be of interest not only to future researchers who may find themselves insufficiently illuminated by the record of the debate itself: The following discussion should also shed some light on the personality of Mendès-France and to that extent represents a contribution to the current reporting on his attitudes, intentions and capabilities.

It has been said, for instance, that there never was a majority for the treaty in the National Assembly; that there would have been a majority only if the Brussels proposals of Mendès-France had been accepted; that, on the contrary, there would have been a majority only if the Brussels proposals had never been put forward; that the National Assembly would have approved the treaty if the government had accepted the Spaak counter-proposals at Brussels; and that the treaty could have been ratified at any time if the government had thrown its prestige behind it.

It has also been said that Mendès-France must have gone to Brussels with the deliberate intention of torpedoing the treaty; that whether or not this is so, he returned from Brussels with such a deliberate intention; that even before Brussels, he had received British encouragement for his conduct there and for his conduct afterwards during the debate; that the U.S. position, on the other hand, contributed to the failure of the Brussels conference; that EDC was defeated by a procedural device which beclouded the real issue; that if it had not been for that procedural device, the debate would have been suspended, negotiations resumed and the treaty passed; that, on the contrary, if the battle of procedure had not taken place the treaty would have been defeated by an even larger margin. As will be recognized, most of these statements are matters of opinion. Nevertheless, a fair amount of evidence is available for a judgment to be given in each case.

The Embassy has submitted three basic despatches² on the French ratification situation which analyzed in considerable detail the various factors which were involved and which will not be discussed here: no. 3283 of June 16, 1952, entitled “The Prospects for French Ratification of the EDC Treaty”; no. 685 of September 1, 1953,³ entitled “The Opposition to EDC in the French Parliament”; and no. 1680 of December 31, 1953, entitled “The Salient Psychological Factors in the EDC Ratification Situation in France”.⁴ These despatches discussed the various political conditions required to bring on the ratification debate, the attitudes of the political parties, the shifting psychological climate, the strategy of the treaty’s opponents, and the policy elements involved in influencing the French decision. While the present memorandum deals principally with the events leading directly to the failure of the treaty, some of the more basic political and psychological factors accounting for its defeat are recalled in a separate section toward the close of the discussion.

2. Was there ever a majority for EDC?

The fortunes of the EDC treaty have fluctuated during the years. Whereas at any one time the opinions of political observers and analysts have of course differed, there is general agreement among qualified observers in Paris that the prospects of ratification were worse in 1954 than in 1953 and that there was no chance at all of bringing the treaty to a vote in 1952. (On the latter point, see reference despatch no. 3283.) Leaving completely aside the opinions of the leading proponents of EDC who may justly be suspected of bias, there is available sufficient evidence from opponents to substantiate the belief that in the fall of 1953, after the reelection of Chancellor Adenauer, there existed a strong, genuine trend in favor of ratification. (At that time the Saar settlement was still outstanding and was held to be an essential precondition. Moreover, the impending French presidential elections prevented Laniel from pushing for a showdown.) Thus, a leading rightist opponent of the treaty, Senator Michel Debré, who now claims there was never a majority for the treaty, conceded to the Embassy on November 9, 1953 that the treaty could be ratified; and even after the disastrous November foreign affairs debate when Laniel failed to prevent a split in the pro-EDC forces, a leading left-wing opponent, Daniel Mayer, indicated privately his belief that the treaty could still pass, though by a close margin.

It is thus important to differentiate post-defeat comment from comment made by the same persons at an earlier time: Jacques Fauvet, the moderately anti-EDC political commentator of the newspaper Le Monde, and Georges Altschuler, internal political editor of the anti-EDC newspaper Combat, both indicated immediately after the vote that they had never believed the treaty to have a chance. But in the Embassy’s files there are detailed breakdowns of the likely vote which were furnished by those two commentators on a confidential basis in November, 1953, before the foreign affairs debate: At that time—and always assuming a Saar settlement and the prior holding of the presidential elections—Fauvet estimated the treaty would pass by 337 to 206 votes with 88 abstentions, and Altschuler that the treaty would pass by 321 to 190 with 115 abstentions. Both of these journalists have excellent parliamentary contacts, possibly the best of anyone in the Assembly. The pro-EDC trend at the time was such that Fauvet estimated 70 Socialist, 20 URAS and 20 ARS votes in favor, and Altschuler even 75 Socialist, 30 URAS and 24 ARS votes.

After the November 1953 debate, the chances of ratification declined. Moreover, the prospect of the Berlin Conference once more precluded an early decision. But on December 10, Guèrin de Beaumont (who later had an important role in the attempts to dilute the supra national character of the treaty) envisaged a compromise between the pro- and anti-EDC forces on the ground that at that time ratification could be obtained only by a majority of 20 votes which he deemed insufficient. (Mendès-France, during the November debate, advocated such a compromise solely on the ground that a narrow decision was undesirable.) After the Berlin Conference, there was another brief flurry of optimism among the treaty’s supporters and of corresponding pessimism among its opponents: On April 28, Debré indicated to the Embassy that the principal purpose of the opponents was to put off the debate and to see to it that when it took place neither Bidault nor Pleven would hold key cabinet positions, because under the latter circumstances— given patronage and political “pressure”—he thought the treaty would pass.

The foregoing does not take into account the many extravagant statements about the chances of ratification which were made by politicians such as Bidault who on March 11, 1953 assured the Ambassador that (if only Guy Mollet would compromise on his demand for “democratic control” of the Commissariat) EDC would be passed with “350 to 370 votes.” (Embtel 3319)⁵ No serious analyst has even foreseen such a majority. In fact, all observers are in agreement that if EDC was to be ratified at all in 1954, it could only be done by a narrow majority; which is precisely what Prime Minister Mendes-France did not wish to see.

3. What were Mendès-France’s intentions before Brussels?

The Prime Minister’s statement to the Secretary of State on July 13⁶ that there was no majority in the Assembly for EDC at that time was probably correct as far as it goes. Mendès-France has subsequently declared (Embtel 892) that his personal cabinet had information that there were no more than 295 votes in favor of the treaty at the time when he talked with the Secretary. All the more striking was his statement to the Secretary that if he could detach “60 to 80 votes” from the anti-EDC camp he would “have a majority.” 295 plus 60 or 80 yields again the kind of fanciful majority which Bidault had ventilated before the Ambassador. As regards the Council of the Republic, Mendès-France declared to the Secretary that even if EDC should pass in the Assembly by a small majority, it was certain to be defeated in the upper house by a “tremendous majority.” On August 12, however, he told the Ambassador (Embtel 603)⁷ only that the Council of the Republic would “possibly” vote against EDC and “might even do so by a constitutional majority.” It is worth recalling that the telegram calling attention to this important nuance was shown to the Prime Minister who suggested a correction of another point (Embtel 614)⁸ but otherwise confirmed the rendition of his remarks as accurate.

If Mendès-France desired ratification at all, it is thus clear that he was still, immediately before the Brussels conference, in search of a compromise yielding that “large national agreement” which he had termed essential in his investiture declaration; which is something entirely different from seeking to obtain a working majority to put through the ratification bill. It should be added, however, that it is quite likely that the pro-EDC contingent in the Assembly had shrunk further between July 13 and the Brussels conference, as Mendès-France pointed out to journalists after the defeat of the treaty. In its August 7 issue, the magazine L’Express, which often reflected information and opinions furnished the Prime Minister by his personal cabinet, estimated that there were 287 votes for the treaty and 301 against at that time. On August 13 (Embtel 614), Mendès-France used the latter estimate (300 to 310) when he spoke to the Ambassador. (That estimate, incidentally, assumed that there would be 40 Socialists voting against the treaty.) If he desired a majority, he thus needed to switch about 20 votes or otherwise add about 30 to the pro-EDC side.

Not too much importance should probably be attached to the statements which Mendès-France made, or failed to make, about EDC prior and immediately after his investiture. It is now known that he gave private assurances both to the pro- and anti-EDC elements in the Assembly, but in this he did not differ significantly from the earlier behavior of Pinay, Bidault, Mayer and Laniel on similar occasions when those leaders (who now protest a readiness to have gone down fighting for the treaty) had to contend with the same problem that confronted Mendès-France: to secure a majority which of necessity had to include both proponents and opponents of EDC. What is more, Mendès-France established a working program—Indochina, North Africa, economic projects—which required the votes of anti-EDC elements but which, when implemented, could have furnished him with powerful arguments in favor of ratification of the EDC treaty. Why, then, did he not use those arguments when he could safely use them, or why did he not at least adjust his behavior to take into account those potential trumps in the debate?

If the ratification prospects deteriorated during the two months of Mendès-France’s government prior to the debate, as indeed appears to have been the case, this was surely due in large measure to the behavior of his government, for the manner in which it dealt with the preceding problems was vigorous and Mendès-France himself was highly effective in marshaling public support for his policies. Thus the “confrontation” exercise in which proponents and opponents of EDC failed to meet on common ground could have been presented by him as proof that any compromise will have to be favorable to the proponents, all the more so since at the time of his investiture he had declared that the government’s own proposals would “take into account the international situation, the position of our allies and the requirements of Western defense.” (Embassy despatch no. 3268). But Mendès-France appears to have clung until the end to his view that ratification of the treaty by a narrow margin would be worse for France than failure to ratify. This position, of course, was found only among the opponents of EDC and among a handful of right-wing pro-EDC deputies like De Beaumont and de Moustier. Certainly it can be said that Mendès-France, during the pre-Brussels period, did not consider non-ratification to be a disaster.

But did he hope for and seek rejection of the treaty by the instrumentality of his Brussels proposals? It has been suggested that this might even have been his deliberate objective as a result of an understanding with Molotov at the Geneva conference. (Rome’s 652 and 653.) What evidence is available does not point in that direction: There is, first of all, the consistency of his position ever since his investiture attempt in 1953 when he also spoke of the need for a compromise and a “large national majority.” There is, next, the official Foreign Office record of his conversation with Molotov (which may of course be worth little) from which it appears that Mendès-France sought but failed to obtain any indication of a possible Russian quid-pro-quo for EDC. There is, furthermore, the evidence given to the Embassy by Daniel Mayer, the anti-EDC chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee who despite his anti-American sentiments has in the past proved a reliable informant and who admitted having proposed to Mendès-France that he offer to trade defeat of the EDC for a neutralization of Germany. The Prime Minister is supposed to have replied to Mayer that he had received no indication whatever that any such deal would be possible. There are, of course, finally, the protestations of the Prime Minister himself but these need not be accepted as evidence of his innermost thoughts.

To assume that Mendès-France did not go to Brussels with the deliberate intent of killing EDC does not imply that he went there with a desire to win and to put the treaty quickly into effect. The significant exchanges with the U.S. and U.K. which took place just before the conference, when Mendès-France ventilated the idea of another attempt at a four-power conference prior to action in the Council of the Republic, indicated two things: First, that he envisaged the possibility of favorable action in the Assembly on first reading which would, after all, have been a precondition for any overtures to the Soviets. Secondly, however, he was prepared to go to considerable lengths to prevent an early definitive decision on Germany: witness his amazing statement to the Ambassador on August 13 (Embtel 614) that “the changes which he would propose (at Brussels) would not be sufficient to assure passage” unless there remained the chance of another four-power meeting prior to actual ratification. On August 13 his new protocol, presumably designed to obtain the “large majority” he was seeking, was just being finalized. It incorporated after all the very changes which later, at Brussels on August 19, he claimed would obtain him 80 additional votes for EDC. (Brussels’ 140.)

The Embassy has, during the “confrontation” phase when Mendès-France was himself still concentrating on Indochina, North Africa and his economic program, reported various opinions of pro-EDC leaders that the Prime Minister might in the end come out with mere “face-saving” proposals at Brussels and that, with his newly increased prestige and political power, he could succeed in making those changes palatable to a sufficient number of opponents of the treaty. It should be emphasized that reports and press speculations along such lines were never based on first-hand information. If the disappointment was so great, it was in part because of wishful thinking on the part of some pro-EDC leaders, including some (like Bourgès-Maunoury) who were in Mendès-France’s own entourage. It was only on August 20 (Brussels’ 158)⁹ that it was learned that even before his departure from Paris, Mendès-France had made arrangements to stop off at London on his way back—arrangements, as he put it, “made at a time when he did not even envisage the possibility of failure.” There seems little doubt that he did envisage that possibility, that he contemplated it with relative equanimity and that, in fact, he already laid plans before Brussels to minimize the damage from failure of the conference.

4. Mendès-France’s Brussels performance analyzed.

Having contended that Mendès-France went to Brussels neither with the precise purpose of torpedoing EDC nor, however, with a real desire to succeed, the hypothesis must first be examined that he may have nevertheless deceived himself as to the possibilities of success. Here there are three elements: (a) the positions of the other EDC partners; (b) the U.S. and British positions; (c) Mendès-France’s appreciation of the acceptability of his proposals to his own parliament. After these elements have been discussed, the performance of France’s partners at Brussels will have to be reviewed to see to what extent his violently nationalistic reaction to the conference was understandable or justified.

It has been contended that the French Prime Minister must have known that his proposals would prove to be totally unacceptable at Brussels. However, there is countervailing evidence: On August 5 (Embtel 504)¹⁰ it was reported by Bourgès-Maunoury that Mendès-France had the impression that Spaak might be brought to accept the unanimous voting provisions and that, moreover, the fear of French rejection of the treaty would lead the five powers to accept “almost any”, changes proposed by France. That Spaak’s position might be misinterpreted by Mendès-France possibly as the result of a misinterpretation by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, was also feared at Brussels (Brussels’ 96). On August 9, there was still evidence of divergences between the Belgian and Dutch positions (The Hague 219). It is thus not completely unreasonable to suppose that Mendès-France may have hoped to find soft spots in the phalanx confronting him, which he might exploit. His almost neurotic disappointment at finding himself faced with complete unanimity on every point might thus be explained.

As regards the U.S. and British positions, the considerable divergence between them has not escaped the attention of observers and may well have led Mendès-France to believe that the Benelux countries would yet show themselves conciliatory on some points. The British aide-mémoire of August 17¹¹ was in fact a veiled encouragement to the five powers to be conciliatory with regard to Mendès-France’s proposals. (“Her Majesty’s Government recognize that the Protocol will be a severe disappointment to many protagonists of closer European union and will raise serious problems for those Governments which have already ratified the EDC Treaty. But they hope that these Governments will not overlook the vital need for obtaining an early solution to the problem of German association with the West. The most hopeful course still remains that of getting quick agreement on the EDC even with the limitations now proposed by the French Government so long as it is not rendered unworkable.”) The contrast between this position and that of the U.S. Government as expressed in Coled 18,¹² approved in Deptel 600, is indeed telling. The U.S. condemnation of the Mendès-France proposals was conveyed to the Belgians and the Dutch in separate meetings on August 18, the day the conference opened.

At the opening of the conference, Mendès-France showed himself relatively conciliatory. He said he was not asking “judicial” assurances but only “psychological” assurances that EDC would not mean the abandonment of national forms all at once (Brussels’ 140). He claimed that he was not seeking a veto but only assurances that prudence and understanding would prevail in not applying the treaty over the protests of an individual participant, etc. He told France’s five partners what he had told the U.S. on earlier occasions, that he was trying to obtain “80” additional votes for EDC. He claimed that there were 49 Socialist votes lined up irrevocably against the treaty. He said that if the treaty were defeated, this might lead to a Popular Front type of government in France. Immediately, however, he ran into unanimous opposition and even the figures he had given were questioned. In fact, it was questioned that the protocol he proposed would yield the desired additional votes in the French National Assembly.

Whether the Mendès-France protocol, if accepted, would have yielded the large majority for EDC which he was seeking, will of course never be known. There is an arithmetical as well as a psychological factor. If the Prime Minister had defended the treaty as amended by the protocol with the same vigor with which he disparaged the unamended treaty and extolled the rejected protocol, he might have succeeded but he would certainly have had a most difficult time in retaining the support of the pro-EDC Socialists and perhaps even of the MRP. The evidence was certainly not conclusive on whether he could have held the pro-EDC forces together: As far as the Socialists are concerned,^* there was the negative reaction of Guy Mollet and André Philip but some countervailing evidence from Albert Gazier (Embtel 679). Regarding the MRP, there was the negative reaction of Robert Schuman (Embtel 702) but some countervailing evidence from Maurice Schumann (Embtel 657).

In any event, though Mendès-France’s comment was justly termed cynical when he said that the French pro-EDC elements would have to swallow anything which the five would accept because they could not be more royalist than the King, one may suppose that he actually held that opinion, which he gave in his off-the-record press briefing in Brussels on August 18. Moreover, that it was not entirely unjustified appeared during the ratification debate when the pro-EDC forces, faced with the likelihood of defeat, were prepared to endorse Mendès-France’s position at Brussels if only the negotiations were resumed. It is a moot point, of course, whether all the original pro-EDC deputies would also have voted for a treaty amended by the Mendès-France protocol. In the case of the Socialists, it would seem most likely that they would have split along different lines and without voting discipline being applied; and it is of course possible, as Guy Mollet subsequently said, that they would all have been united against the amended treaty. (On balance, however, this does not seem likely in the light of the position taken by Pineau during the ratification debate.)

The early apparent conciliatoriness of Mendès-France subsequently evaporated and there resulted the fiasco which has been reported. The Prime Minister himself attributed the failure to “distrust of France and of himself” and to the mistaken belief of the other five that he was only bargaining. He protested (Embtel 747)¹³ that he had never been critical of U.S. actions directed to stiffening the attitudes of his partners. However, it seems there were at least four elements which produced a reaction on his part which made it distasteful for him, if he had ever intended it, to defend the treaty after the conference: First, Adenauer’s failure to see Mendès-France for four days. (This has been remarked upon by two cabinet contacts of the Embassy as a matter which greatly distressed and annoyed the Prime Minister, as also reported Embtel 747. Once publicized, it also had a highly adverse effect in the Assembly.) Secondly, the doubts expressed by Adenauer that the treaty would pass if the protocol were accepted, and his citing of Schuman, Philip, Mollet, etc., pitting this information derived from newspaper statements against the French Prime Minister’s analysis. Thirdly, the lecturing to which he was subjected by Spaak (who told him at one point, according to Brussels’ 168, that not only the five powers would find it difficult to go back on the May 4 declaration on democratic control, but that Mendès-France “would look even more ridiculous because he would lose the remaining Socialist votes.”). Fourth, there is little doubt that the U.S. position and activities at Brussels also greatly upset and annoyed Mendès-France. When Spaak showed him the Secretary’s message¹⁴ after the last meeting, he indicated that “no representative of France had suffered humiliation such as he had suffered today, and reading this message (during the conference) would have been too much” (Brussels’ 171).

It is the Embassy’s belief that the substantive position taken by Mendès-France at Brussels was in no way justified by the exigencies of the ratification situation if it is assumed that he only needed an effective majority and not the “large national” one which he was apparently seeking. It is the Embassy’s opinion, moreover, which was given in Embtel 729 after the failure of Brussels, that the Spaak declaration, if properly presented to the French National Assembly, could have been of considerable help to Mendès-France in influencing undecided deputies. When the increased credit which he enjoyed after Geneva is taken into account, as well as his impressive forensic ability and the leverage he could have exercised with the question of confidence, there seems little reason to doubt that he could have turned “defeat” at Brussels into victory for EDC in Paris if he had desired to, all the more so since the Brussels conference could have been used as evidence with which to disarm opponents of the treaty who claimed that an alternative solution might be acceptable to France’s partners.

That he did not accept the Spaak proposals, that he in fact rejected them as “useless”, seems best explained by the fact that he has consistently advocated, and sought, a compromise between the friends and enemies of EDC and that elusive “large majority” which occasionally also seems to have tempted Bidault. It is explained, furthermore, by a fatal psychological reaction of wounded pride and a further loss of faith in the supranational principle because he wrongly deduced that France would find herself as isolated in the Defense Community as he found himself at Brussels. This almost pathological reaction, which is well-authenticated by pro-EDC officials who were with him in Brussels (Embtel 788), was also evident in all his contacts when he returned to Paris. He did not merely return to Paris a disappointed man—indeed, his disappointment cannot have been very large, given his advance preparations for defeat—but above all an angry man who did not see in Brussels the vitality of the European idea when an attempt is made to pervert or debilitate it, but rather a humiliating defeat for France whose spokesman and leader had been lectured, doubted, snubbed and utterly rebuffed. But the animus which Mendès-France displayed after Brussels testifies to a certain extent to his honesty at least in the sense that it shows he could hardly have anticipated the reaction which he encountered there.

5. The anti-EDC campaign after Brussels.

The Prime Minister’s position after the Brussels conference requires little analysis since it was now overtly hostile to the treaty. Even before he left Brussels, he emphatically and threateningly remarked to newspaper correspondents at an off-the-record conference that there was no majority for EDC in the National Assembly but that there would be an early clear-cut decision (Brussels’ 185). It deserves to be stressed, however, that after Mendès-France decided to return to Paris empty-handed (he reminded the Assembly that the Spaak declaration would become operative if it ratified EDC but that statement was of no value after he had publicly depreciated the declaration), the chances of ratification did indeed drop precipitously: After Mendès-France had undertaken to obtain new concessions from France’s partners and then rejected as worthless those that were offered, the undecided or doubtful deputies who might have been won over were obviously disappointed. A public opinion poll taken during this period shows a sharp drop also in public support for EDC after Brussels.

The first official decision which was made upon his return to Paris was that the government would not put the question of confidence on passage of the treaty. “Leaks” quickly appeared in the press making it seem that Mendès-France had received important encouragements at Chartwell, in his talk with Sir Winston Churchill, regarding possible alternative solutions to EDC. Hints also found their way into the press that the American Ambassador was more understanding of Mendès-France’s position than other representatives—an obvious attempt to depreciate the activities of the Bruce Mission. At the joint meeting of the three key committees involved in the forthcoming Assembly debate, the Prime Minister dwelled heavily on the slights he had suffered from Adenauer, Beyen and Spaak, mentioned the contentions of certain American observers at Brussels regarding the ratification situation, and gave a detailed defense of his position at Brussels, apparently much the same which he subsequently put forward with telling effect in the plenary debate. With the stage thus set, he was strong enough to counter the pro-EDC move for adjournment of the debate which was gradually getting organized. He wanted a showdown, and he wanted it now.

When the three most strongly pro-EDC ministers threatened to leave the cabinet, on August 27, Mendès-France finally agreed not to oppose a motion calling upon the government to resume the negotiations “on the basis of (his) Brussels proposals.” (Embtel 832.) But that this was no more than a tactical maneuver, rolling as it were with the punch, became obvious when in his speech he did not even mention the possibility of resuming the negotiations. The government, moreover, practically denied the existence of the new Spaak proposal (Brussels’ 214) which it claimed contained nothing new, and it moved to suppress the British press “guidance” which tended to contradict Mendès-France’s hints that the British government saw eye-to-eye with him in the matter of alternatives to EDC (Embtel 830). On August 28, Mendès-France seemed still relatively neutral on the matter of resuming the negotiations. On August 29, he prevailed upon the pro-EDC leaders to withdraw their postponement motion in return for action on the part of the anti-EDC camp withdrawing its own motion to kill the debate. (Only during the night from August 29 to August 30 did the pro-EDC leaders recognize that this action, far from helping them, drove a major nail into the coffin of EDC.) On August 30, after René Mayer’s speech attacking his conduct in Brussels, the Prime Minister rejected the Chupin motion for postponement of the debate.

Since it is not the purpose of this memorandum to make a substantive analysis of the Brussels proposals, only that part of the Prime Minister’s speech will be discussed here which dealt with the worthlessness of a declaration as compared to a protocol: It is significant because what he said in Paris on August 29 may be usefully compared with what he said at Brussels on August 18 and what he said, about another declaration, in the Indochina debate on July 23.¹⁵ During the EDC debate, Mendès-France contended that a declaration of the six foreign ministers at Brussels, while it would have had “a certain political value,” would hardly have stood up over the years in the light of subsequent changes in the situation. France’s partners, he complained, had not even been able to agree to sign the declaration “which would have given it, to a certain extent, the appearence of a contract.” But no declaration, he explained, could be binding to the extent that a treaty, or a convention or a contractual agreement is binding upon its signatories.

It is interesting to compare this statement with Mendès-France’s initial statement at the Brussels conference (Brussels’ 140) that he was not asking “judicial” assurances but only “psychological” assurances from his partners. The whole weight of his argument in the relevant portion of his speech during the EDC debate was directed to demolish the value of any “psychological” assurances. It is even more interesting to compare his depreciation of an “unsigned” declaration offered at Brussels with the remarkable description he gave of Under Secretary Smith’s unilateral and “unsigned” declaration at Geneva at the time of the Indochina settlement,¹⁶ which merely took note of the agreement, indicated that the U.S. would refrain from threats or use of force to disturb it, and would “view with grave concern” any violation of those agreements. At that time, Mendès-France did hot hesitate to describe the U.S. declaration as a “guarantee” and he surrounded it with so much verbiage that his listeners were doubtless led to believe that a signed international guarantee of the Geneva agreement existed.^†

The most telling blow to the fast-dwindling chances of EDC, however, was struck in the passages of Mendès-France’s speech which dealt with the question of alternatives to EDC. (Embtels 860¹⁷ and 862.)¹⁸ In that part of his speech he rejected the choice of “EDC versus Wehrmacht” as an oversimplification, as a false choice, and as unrealistic. (“Reality is always moving and fluctuating. There are always intermediary formulas and possibilities of understanding … German rearmament … could take different forms. It has been said that only one alternative would exist for there is no other solution than EDC. Actually there are several … During the last days of Brussels when it appeared that we would not reach agreement, in subsequent conversations, in messages and various diplomatic contacts, various hypotheses have been formulated …”) The main object of the debate was thus to come to a decision, and one unfavorable to EDC was not necessarily undesirable. Presented in this light, it is surprising that the EDC treaty did not lose more adherents than it appeared to have lost since Mendès-France’s advent to power.

6. Was EDC defeated or “smothered” by procedure?

The claim that EDC was defeated by a procedural maneuver before its principal proponents could be heard is true as far as it goes, but it is misleading: The majority that voted in favor of the Aumeran-Herriot “question préalable” was perfectly aware that it was defeating the ratification bill, and the minority which refused to withdraw its postponement motion was perfectly aware that it was taking a terrible risk in refusing to do so. (Embtel 949). The procedural background of these moves (Embtel 846) seems complicated at first but is actually very simple: Under French Assembly regulations, any motion to postpone or interrupt a debate has a lower priority than a move to defeat a bill without debate. Consequently, the pro-EDC forces were never able, and could never have been able, to obtain discussion of their proposal for postponement prior to action on the “question préalable” to end the debate and defeat the treaty.

The first time the motion for postponement came up (see the preceding section), it was immediately overtaken by the “question préalable” and Mendès-France prevailed upon the sponsors of both motions to withdraw them. The circumstances in which this took place are significant. Paul Reynaud had given an impassioned speech objecting to the “strangling” of the debate, and he called upon the Assembly to reject the Aumeran move as a matter of decency, orderliness and republican respectability. Daniel Mayer, speaking for the Foreign Affairs Committee, had explained that the supporters of Aumeran did not so much wish to cut off the debate as they wished to block any postponement. He then explained that Mendès-France had come to a room next to the Foreign Affairs Committee and had met with Mayer during the recess period and that they had decided that it would be best to ask both the proponents and the opponents of EDC to withdraw their motions.

It soon became clear that the opponents had stolen a march on the pro-EDC forces, for if the “question préalable” had a fairly good chance of being beaten at the beginning of the debate, those chances would naturally decrease as the debate unfolded, and Mendès-France’s assurance that the motions “could be reintroduced when it seemed convenient, after a certain number of deputies had expressed themselves” were really less than worthless: The backers of the “question préalable” wished precisely to prevent a vote on postponement of the discussion, and the more of the discussion had actually taken place by the time the guillotine was hoisted again, the less plausible would be the arguments of those who, like Reynaud, appealed for continuance of the debate in the name of republican respectability; also, the fewer would be those who might vote against cutting off the debate because they themselves had not yet spoken.

The pro-EDC forces therefore took a calculated risk in reintroducing their motion on August 30. By that time, however, Bene Mayer had already attacked Mendès-France’s conduct at Brussels. Moreover, the author of the new postponement motion, Alfred Chupin, could not bring himself to approve the Prime Minister’s speech even if he refrained from criticizing his actions at Brussels. (The motion only “acknowledged” the government declaration and proposed to send Mendès-France back to negotiate “on the basis of the draft French protocol of Brussels.”) One can imagine how deeply humiliating it must have been for the pro-EDC forces to vote even such a motion, but Mendès-France declared himself dissatisfied with Chupin’s declaration because it lacked a clear endorsement of his position. The Prime Minister made it perfectly clear that the vote on the “question préalable” was not a procedural matter but involved the actual decision on the EDC treaty. So did Herriot when he spoke in favor of that move, which he had co-sponsored. So did the anti-EDC deputy Jacques Isorni who disagreed with Herriot on a number of other points.

The pro-EDC forces, under these circumstances, made one last effort to press their contention that the battle was a procedural one, but they were convincing only in one respect: They contended, through their spokesman Christian Pineau, that whereas voting of the “question préalable” would irrevocably end the debate, its defeat would leave the final decision completely open and that even if the postponement motion were voted, that would still in no way prejudice the final decision. Pineau’s appeal to Mendès-France was in fact heart-rending. He did everything he could without losing all dignity, to salve the Prime Minister’s pride and to convince him that if he returned to Brussels he would “not represent only those who would have voted for his return there, but France itself.” He alluded to “certain psychological misapprehensions” at Brussels which might yet be corrected, particularly if France’s partners after the debate were to “better understand the need to make another effort.” Mendès-France did not respond, and immediately after Pineau’s speech the vote was taken and the treaty defeated.¹⁹

After the vote, the specialists started to analyze the results and each came up with a different conclusion. The newspaper Figaro contended that the “question préalable” received a majority only because many deputies did not wish to be confronted with a vote for postponement, which to that newspaper proved that the postponement motion would have carried if it had come to a vote. The newspaper Le Monde, on the other hand, calculated that no less than 29 deputies who voted against the “question préalable” would nevertheless have voted against the treaty if the showdown had come at the very end of the debate, because those deputies had on earlier occasions expressed themselves or voted against the treaty. The paper thus contended that if the vote had not been a procedural one the treaty would have been defeated by 348 to 239. This, however, is pure sophistry because under the conditions which accompanied the debate an important shift had taken place: Some opponents of Mendès-France on the right who had also been opponents of EDC, switched to support of EDC as soon as he attacked the treaty, because they wished to be separated from him on as many issues as possible (Embtel 809). This is the same phenomenon in reverse which the proponents of EDC had counted upon in the event Mendès-France had defended the treaty: There were deputies who had hitherto been committed against EDC, particularly among the Graullists and Socialists, who could have been brought to vote for EDC for the government’s sake if the government had been for the treaty and had staked its existence on ratification. In actual fact, considering the tremendous handicaps of the EDC proponents, it is surprising that 264 votes could be marshaled, at least by implication, in its favor.

7. The questions and answers recapitulated.

By way of a partial summary and conclusion, the questions cited in the introductory portion may thus be recapitulated and the answers once more brought out: Was there ever a majority in favor of EDC in the French Parliament? Those who would deny it have short memories, for some of them gave the treaty a substantial majority less than a year ago. On the other hand, Mendès-France may quite possibly have been right in Brussels when he said that most of the pro-EDC elements in the Assembly would have to accept any agreement reached by the six powers—for the performance of those elements when the treaty was teetering on the brink of defeat seemed to show that they preferred a watered-down EDC to no EDC at all. But the true answer, particularly as regards the Socialists, will never be known. It is doubtful whether even with maximum effort Mendès-France could have obtained a satisfactory majority for EDC if he had not at least gone through the motions of seeking new concessions at the Brussels conference. Could the treaty have been passed on the basis of the Spaak declaration?²⁰ It is fairly certain that, considering Mendès-France’s prestige, forensic talents and political leverage, he could have sold the French Parliament the Spaak declaration if he had desired to do so; but he apparently never intended to push the treaty through by a simple majority—he always sought a compromise that would yield a “large, national” majority and that was unobtainable through the Spaak proposals. It was probably unobtainable, moreover, even if Mendès-France’s own protocol had been accepted.

Did Mendès-France go to Brussels with the deliberate intention of torpedoing the treaty? It does not seem so, but he appears to have gone there with no keen desire to succeed, with some advance preparations against possible failure, and with surprising misconceptions about the likely position of his negotiating partners. His poisonous reaction to the conference must be attributed to a psychological mechanism of wounded pride and a loss of what faith he may have had in the supranational principle. Did he return from Brussels with the deliberate intention of torpedoing the treaty? Whether the intention was conscious or not, there is little doubt that it existed, for all the actions of Mendès-France after Brussels were effectively directed to defeat of the treaty. The British and U.S. positions, possibly both misunderstood by Mendès-France, quite likely contributed, each in its way, to his negative attitude.

Was EDC defeated by a procedural device which beclouded the real issue? No, for the real issue was not beclouded when the showdown occurred, as a majority was not only against the treaty but also against any discussion of the motion for postponement. Under these circumstances, the question what would have happened if the postponement motion had been allowed to come up is a theological one. Is it true that if the battle of procedure had not taken place, the treaty would have been defeated by an even larger margin? Not necessarily, for in any vote of such momentous importance there are elements which transcend the immediate issue at hand. Just as Mendès-France, by putting the confidence question and vigorously defending the treaty, would have been able to marshal some pro-Mendès-France anti-EDC votes, so a trend of anti-Mendès-France votes was discernible in favor of the treaty as it became obvious that the Prime Minister sought its defeat. But that trend could never have yielded a majority as long as Mendès-France opposed EDC. As of August, 1954, he was so strong that his position was decisive.

8. Other, more basic factors of long standing.

The view is expressed in the foregoing discussion, and to a large extent documented, that Prime Minister Mendès-France played a decisive role in the defeat of the EDC treaty in the French National Assembly, that he thus in a sense stood at the switch of history and pulled it in a direction away from European federation. But it must be recognized that he bears that responsibility only in the limited sense that he, with his peculiar talents and accomplishments in the particular constellation of August, 1954, would have been capable of setting the switch with considerable effort in the right direction—but considerable effort would have been required; and it is entirely fair and appropriate for the anti-EDC forces and for Mendès-France himself to have pointed out that none of his predecessors had been willing to put forward such an effort. Everybody, opponents and proponents of EDC alike, is in agreement that the Laniel government in the fall of 1953 would have required much less effort to obtain a favorable vote. If the Pinay government, which signed the treaty, can be less blamed for not bringing it to a vote, the responsibilities of the Mayer and Laniel governments are considerably larger. And those two governments have two important things in common: They were the first governments with the support or participation of the Gaullists (URAS) and they had Georges Bidault as foreign minister.

The role of Bidault in the procrastination and compromising over EDC was much less a personal one than that of Mendès-France in the treaty’s defeat because Bidault never stood at a turning point where the direction in which he threw his own weight could have been decisive. Rather, Bidault typified the political necessity of broadening the coalition on the right which existed for any politician who desired to stay in office at the time. The replacement of Schuman by Bidault in January, 1953, as a matter of fact, was precisely part of the price exacted by the Gaullists for support of the Mayer government. His arrival at the Quai d’Orsay and his activities there can thus now be recognized as the product of a trend unfavorable to EDC. Outwardly a proponent of EDC, Bidault as foreign minister actually tried to reconcile European unity with French great-power politics and thereby sapped the vitality of the European idea: It was Bidault who coined the phrases that France must not go down (sombrer) in the new Europe and that one must “faire l’Europe sans défaire la France.” Thus Bidault’s objection to using the words integration and unification in the communiqué after the Dulles–Stassen visit in Paris in February, 1953, was already symptomatic. He preferred, and insisted upon, the ambiguous formulation “faire l’Europe” which was meant to be less objectionable to the opponents of federation. Shortly afterwards, the project of a European Political Community was in effect buried at the Rome Conference.

Only a small fraction of the proponents of EDC ever advocated its ratification as a step toward outright European federation. The European ideal, as a matter of fact, was virtually absent from the ratification debate and its sequel on August 31. The arguments of the proponents centered on the reasonableness of ratification as involving a lesser evil, as warding off or minimizing certain dangers—the danger of German dynamism and irredentism, the danger of American withdrawal or lessened support, and in the last place the danger of Soviet aggression. The dynamics and the propaganda initiative, as was pointed out in the Embassy’s despatch no. 685 of 1953, were always on the side of the opposition: While the opposition attacked the proponents of the treaty as visionaries, amateurs, fools or even as traitors and grave-diggers of France, the proponents themselves for the most part considered the non-Communist opponents of EDC as honorable men, moved by considerations of high patriotism albeit perhaps mistaken in some of their reasoning. No French government ever dared to challenge the opponents of EDC and carry the battle to them. Indeed, they could not have done so without breaking up the governing coalition. Many were the times when the Gaullists could have been split by confronting them with the choice of opposing EDC or remaining in the coalition. But the operation could only have succeeded by risking a crisis. In the case of Mendès-France, who had the Socialists in his majority, the risk was smaller than for his predecessors. But the point to recall is that, for whatever reason, the EDC forces never possessed the tactical initiative. Under those circumstances, again, one may marvel at their large number when it came to the showdown.

It has been said above that the danger of Soviet aggression, i.e., the need for a German defense contribution, figured among the last arguments adduced in favor of EDC. This is true partly because perhaps one-half of the opponents of EDC favored a German defense contribution in some other form. But it is also true because of the basic fact that in 1954 the fear of Russia was less than in 1953, when it was less than in 1952 and much less than in 1951 and 1950. Correspondingly, there existed, perhaps not only in France, a greater fear of some future action or reaction on the part of the U.S. which might lead to world war; and in the specific case of EDC a greater fear that the U.S. might in some way back the irredentist aspirations of Germany in a manner detrimental to French security interests. The French Communists doubtless deserve credit for having exploited fear of German and American intentions and pictured Soviet intentions as intrinsically peaceful. But the spontaneous reactions of non-Communists to events in Germany (e.g., Adenauer’s repeated statements that EDC was the best way of restoring unity), in America (e.g., 1952 campaign statements implying an objective of rolling back the Soviets) and in Russia (e.g., Stalin’s death and the “peace offensive” under Malenkov) probably played a larger role than the Communist propaganda machine, whose importance must nevertheless not be minimized.

Many other factors could be cited as operative in the defeat of the EDC treaty, such as economic pressures, anti-clericalism, many appeals to chauvinism and incredible intimidation (many deputies received letters informing them that in the event of “internal disturbances” they would be “shot upon simple identification” if they voted for EDC). But only two more points deserve to be stressed: First, when it came to the showdown the various “préalables”, notably the unfulfilled precondition of a Saar settlement, played a surprisingly small role in the discussion—none at all in the case of the Saar, which had paled into insignificance compared to the unfulfilled French demands at Brussels. Secondly, and far more importantly, the whole debate took place in an atmosphere of a tremendous national inferiority feeling of which the reaction to Brussels was only a symptom among many. One of the most important, though usually unspoken, arguments against EDC had long been the belief that in any community including France and Germany the latter would inevitably gain the upper hand because the Germans are more capable soldiers, organizers, businessmen and politicians. This deep pessimism, it must be recognized, is perhaps justified at least in part.

The great tragedy of the defeat of EDC, in terms of the political development of France, is that it came precisely at a time when the country might have rid itself of this inferiority feeling and when European integration might have been plausibly presented to it as the road into a safer and better future for most Frenchmen. For the incipient disengagement in Indochina, the moves to settle the smouldering conflicts in North Africa, the voting of powers for what seemed to be a bold program of economic reform, the “new style” of Mendes-France himself, were giving the country a new optimism about the future that might have greatly facilitated the acceptance of EDC. Instead, the new-found optimism was channeled into national assertiveness and a resentful reaction to the attitudes of France’s friends and partners. That reaction was not a necessary one although it was perhaps not unnatural under the circumstances. But there is no reason to believe that it will be a lasting attitude. Many non-Communist enemies of EDC still go to great pains to stress that they are not against European unity. This is a testimony to the vitality of the idea of European unification, whose value may also become more clearly apparent in the search for alternatives and substitutes for the defeated policy.

1. Transmitted to the Department in despatch 554 from Paris, Sept. 16. The note of transmittal by Minister Achilles reads in part: “The enclosed memorandum on the rejection of the EDC treaty by the French National Assembly represents an effort to analyze the controversy which attended that event and to give the Embassy’s best appreciation of the truth or falsity of various claims and counter-claims that were made before, during and immediately after the ratification debate” (740.5/9–1654).
2. Unless otherwise noted, the many despatches and telegrams cited in the source text are not printed, but may be found in file 740.5.
3. Not printed. (751.5/9–153)
4. Not printed. (751.5/12–3153)
5. The telegram in question is dated Mar. 12, 1954. Presumably the Bidault–Dillon conversation alluded to in the source text took place in March 1954, not March 1953.
6. For a record of Dulles’ meeting with Mendès-France, see p. 1018.
7. Dated Aug. 12, p. 1026.
8. Dated Aug. 13, p. 1031.
9. Ante, p. 1056.
10. Ante, p. 1023.
11. No record of this document has been found in Department of State files. However, the summary and quotation in the source text would indicate that it closely paralleled the Foreign Office telegram to the British Embassy at Washington handed by Counselor Watson to C. Burke Elbrick on Aug. 17. See memorandum of conversation by Elbrick, Aug. 17, p. 1045.
12. Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1039.
13. Because the question of how many anti-EDC Socialists there were in mid-August has been highlighted in many exchanges with Mendès-France, it should be stressed that the 53 anti-EDC Socialist votes (52 after rectification) cast after the Prime Minister in effect washed his hands of the treaty, are of course no true index of the Socialist opposition to EDC under other circumstances; particularly since many of the anti-EDC Socialists were strongly committed to Mendès-France and his policies in other fields and could thus have been expected to respond favorably if he had put the question of confidence. Mendès-France’s remark to the Ambassador (Embtel 747) that a member of the Bruce Mission had contended there were only 30 anti-EDC Socialists is not quite correct, since in a wager in which one side takes the figure of 59 and the other 30, the effective difference of opinion starts when the figure is above or below 44½. An officer of this Embassy made a similar wager with Daniel Mayer on May 26 when the latter contended there would be 45 anti-EDC votes cast by members of his party; but he would wager only that the figure would be above 35. It is entirely reasonable to suppose that if Mendès-France had defended the original treaty and put the question of confidence, the number of anti-EDC Socialist votes would have been closer to 35 than to 45. [Footnote in the source text.]
13. Dated Aug. 24, p. 1071.
14. Presumably the message dated Aug. 21, p. 1058.
15. Regarding this Indochina debate, see telegram 292 from Paris, July 22, vol. XIII, Part 2, p. 1871.
16. For text, see telegram Secto 711 from Geneva, July 21, vol. XVI, p. 1500.
17. As an indication of the lengths to which Mendès-France is capable of going when he wishes to give the impression that he has secured something of great value, even when that thing is only a simple declaration, it may be of interest to quote the passage from his July 23 speech in which he extolled the Bedell Smith declaration: “We wanted to succeed, and to succeed with the American guarantee. That is why it took the unilateral form with which you are familiar. The Government of the United States first declares that it will interpose no obstacle to the agreement, that it will respect it: that means that it does not intend to destroy the equilibrium which was established at Geneva and that guarantee is of great importance even for our opponents. It added that it would not tolerate that anyone should destroy that equilibrium, that it would consider any act of aggression in the zones envisaged in the Geneva agreement as a threat to world peace. I do not believe that one should minimize that undertaking … If poor Czechoslovakia had benefited from such a guarantee, it would no doubt not have been attacked. If the U.S., Great Britain and France had signed such a clause in 1938, … it is probable that Germany would not have dared to attack Czechoslovakia six months later.” Here the impression was thus given that a simple declaration was a momentous development and the full equivalent of a signed international guarantee. [Footnote in the source text.]
17. Dated Aug. 30, p. 1091.
18. Not printed.
19. See editorial note, p. 1088.
20. See telegrams 158 and 165 from Brussels, Aug. 20 and 21, pp. 1056 and 1061.