740.5/8–3154: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State 1
confidential
priority
priority
Paris, August 31,
1954—2 a.m.
893. We shall report by despatch2 additional observations on EDC debate which are now largely of no more than historical interest. Following are our views on significance of rejection of EDC3 in terms of the future and specifically on likely developments during coming months:
- 1.
- As slight consolation it may be recalled first of all that Assembly debate constituted only first of four hurdles: second would have been Council of Republic, next the second reading in Assembly and finally the constitutional issue which might have been raised by Upper House. [Page 1093] Had treaty passed Assembly in first reading it might still have taken three months before it became clear whether French ratification would actually take place.
- 2.
- There will be interminable discussions whether lineup of 319 to 264 actually constituted strength of anti and pro-EDC forces and whether under different circumstances results would have been different. From point of view of future developments, it may be concluded that margin is so large that chances of bringing treaty up once more for discussion appear slight. In any event such action would presuppose not only overthrow of Mendes-France government but also major international crisis.
- 3.
- Government does not seem in danger in immediate future. Assembly will doubtless go on vacation on Tuesday. There are no major outstanding issues other than German defense contribution on which government could encounter difficulties prior to budget debate, since Indochina issue disposed of for time being, North African policy approved by large margin and economic powers voted until April 1955. Mendes-France still has no cohesive coalition but he is not in particularly vulnerable position in Parliament at present.
- 4.
- Despite fact that he will be criticized from many sides and of course particularly by EDC proponents, we should therefore prepare ourselves for possibility he may continue in office for considerable time. He is no longer the miracle man who can make difficult decisions or pull rabbits out of his hat, but he has hardly exhausted his credit in country even though doubts are increasing as to his ultimate foreign policy objectives. He may undertake some new spectacular initiative to assuage those doubts.
- 5.
- We do not anticipate major difficulties in putting contractual agreements with Germany into effect. Possible that Mendes will seek in this context new assurances that Germany will not be armed without France’s consent, but we believe he will make effort to avoid any break in Western solidarity over contractuals issue. He has stated Assembly will probably be recalled for special session to approve revised Bonn treaty and Daniel Mayer has stressed that Foreign Affairs Committee’s endorsement of Aumeran motion did not imply desire to block contractuals.
- 6.
- Believe it deserves to be stressed that major factor in rejection of EDC was nationalistic reaction to attitude of France’s partners at Brussels conference, as represented by Mendes-France. This reaction was evident throughout the brief debate and will have to be taken into account in future dealings with government. Rejection of EDC represents triumph of nationalist elements which according to Mendes’ own estimate have increased during the few months of his administration.
- 7.
- Mendes’ position on alternative policy to EDC is not yet clear but whatever his personal views may be on desirability of German rearmament he has reiterated its political necessity to maintain Western solidarity. We expect he may propose formula voiding outright NATO membership and may in other respects align himself closely with British position on safeguards. After debate there is still stronger impression than before that he has received British assurances that unrestricted German rearmament can be avoided.
Dillon