Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/4–2354

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)¹

top secret

[Paris,] April 23, 1954.

Participants:

• Prime Minister Laniel
• M. Vidal
• M. Bougenot
• Mr. MacArthur
• Mme. Laniel (also present but did not enter into conversation)

I had lunch privately with Mr. Laniel today at the Matignon. Messrs. Vidal and Bougenot were present for most of our conversation, as was Madame Laniel, who did not enter into the conversation.

Laniel opened by referring to our conversation last week regarding EDC.² He said that he was determined to push ahead with EDC as rapidly as possible. Delays by his government in having the Assembly debate EDC would be disastrous and play into the hands of EDC enemies.

I said I was not familiar with the details but the French Socialists seemed to be the key, and I understood that Mollet was having difficulties with his Party. Laniel said that Mollet had agreed to the announcement which had been made and had told him that it was adequate for his purposes. Subsequently, Mollet had encountered difficulties within his own party. Laniel was convinced that Mollet was sincere in trying to bring French Socialists solidly into line. Laniel wished us to know privately that he was approaching Spaak (whom he described as an outstanding and moderate European Socialist) with a request that he use all his influence on Mollet. He was also asking Maurice Schumann to see Mollet so that Mollet’s difficulties could be straightened out by French governmental action. Vidal interrupted to say that he thought Laniel should see Mollet. Laniel assented and asked Vidal to try to arrange a quiet night meeting with Mollet at Laniel’s private residence in the next couple of days. Bougenot then said that in view of the delay of the French Socialists in calling their Party Congress he did not think that the EDC debate would be possible until the first half of June. Laniel said that any such delay would, he knew, create great difficulties with U.S. opinion and every effort must be made to have the Socialist Congress meet in time for a subsequent Assembly debate about May 25.

Laniel then referred to the activities of the URAS members of his government who yesterday issued a statement saying they had no confidence in his foreign policy. Laniel said that he had refused to receive the URAS Ministers since, if he had done so, they would have issued untrue and contentious statements about his position after the meeting.

At this point in our conversation Laniel was informed that Delbos wanted to speak to him on the telephone. Laniel accepted the call in our meeting room and came away from the telephone encouraged. He said that Delbos had called to congratulate him for refusing to receive the URAS Ministers yesterday and had also told him that he (Delbos) would do his utmost to get further support for EDC among the Radical Socialists. Laniel asked Delbos on the telephone whether he thought there was a majority for EDC in the Assembly. Delbos replied he believed that there would be a small majority in a public vote but a considerably larger majority if there were a secret vote. Laniel then said that he was having great difficulties within his own cabinet. For example, Edgar Faure (Radical Socialist) who had been a strong proponent of European unity including EDC, now had suddenly taken the position that Molotov’s European security proposal³ had real merit. This was preposterous but indicative of the difficulties he had within his own cabinet. Faure was also strongly supporting Mendes-France’s views on Indochina. He said that Bidault was the only member of his government on whom he could really depend, with respect to EDC and Indochina. Bidault was courageous and absolutely solid but he had no one else to support him vigorously in these two vital questions. Laniel asked me to assure the Secretary that he was doing everything in his power to move, with respect to EDC, and he believed that the French Parliament would ratify unless Dien-Bien-Phu fell, which would be a disaster vitally affecting French policy both in Indochina and in Europe.

I said that I was very glad to hear Laniel was determined to push forward swiftly on EDC. If France could not ratify EDC we, and other of the Allies, would be obliged to move without her. In particular I felt we would be obliged to put the contractuals agreement with Germany rapidly into effect and readjust our entire European strategy.

I asked Laniel how much trouble the Juin affair was causing for EDC.⁴ He said it had created additional problems for his government which were difficult to handle without making a martyr of Juin. He hoped that The North Atlantic Council would ask for Juin’s relief. A request from NATO would facilitate his removal of Juin without giving the enemies of EDC a single target—the French Government to shoot at. It was, of course, essential that Juin be replaced by a French officer and he had General Guillaume in mind.

Reverting to Indochina, Laniel then said that if Dien-Bien-Phu fell the entire French picture would be changed. With all Bidault’s qualities he did not think that he, or any other French Foreign Minister, could avoid reaching an agreement with the Communists at Geneva—even if unfavorable—if Dien-Bien-Phu fell.

He said that he had seen General Ely yesterday and asked him the following two questions:

1. Could Dien-Bien-Phu be saved? General Ely replied that if the US would intervene with about 200 to 300 carrier aircraft, he was convinced Dien-Bien-Phu could be saved, but hours were of the utmost importance and in 3 or 4 days such intervention would be meaningless.

2. Could the garrison of Dien-Bien-Phu fight its way out? Ely replied that under existing circumstances it could not make a fighting withdrawal. However, if US aircraft intervened massively, there was the possibility of a French relief column of a few battalions moving up from Laos. This was not a good prospect but might be feasible with US air intervention. Otherwise, it was not possible. Laniel summed up as follows: If Dien-Bien-Phu falls, France will have no choice but to accept a cease-fire. Also, this defeat will have a profound effect on EDC, probably destroying the possibilities of favorable French action.

I said to Laniel that the picture he had painted seemed to me catastrophic in terms of France’s future. In essence, what he was saying was that the fall of a small outpost—important though it might be psychologically—would result in a capitulation by France and other decisions which would nullify all progress made in the past few years in our collective endeavors. It seemed to me that France would be left in a position of weak and defeated isolation. I could not conceive how any Frenchman could reason that the fall of an outpost in Indochina must result in the abandonment of that area and the destruction of the collective defense system which we had together developed for the defense of Western Europe. Laniel replied that he agreed it was not logical but the Dien-Bien-Phu had become a symbol in the minds of the French people and Parliament. It had became a tremendously emotional thing and Frenchmen were no longer capable of reasoning about it. I said that in essence the picture he painted would seem to leave the US no choice but to rethink, not only its strategic policy, but its entire political relationship with respect to France. Laniel said this would be a tragedy and one which he would do his utmost to avert, but he did not think that he could control the ground swell which would follow the loss of Dien-Bien-Phu and doubted that he would be long in office after its fall.

I said that while Laniel had made no direct requests to me for US air intervention, he had certainly implied such a request. On a personal basis I could only tell him that I saw little possibility of any US intervention if it were not part of an effective collective arrangement for united action in that area. In confidence, I could tell him that we had had consultations on a bipartisan basis with members of the US Congress. We felt that if there were effective collective arrangements we would probably be in a position to participate more actively but to ask us to intervene with aircraft to save Dien-Bien-Phu was in effect asking us to commit US prestige to save not only that fortress but the rest of Indochina without any political basis for such action. To me this did not seem possible. Bougenot said that US prestige need not be committed. The carrier based aircraft could be under nominal French command for the strikes and it need not be more than an isolated action lasting two or three days. If necessary, the aircraft could be painted with French insignia. They could, for example, be construed as part of the Foreign Legion for this limited action.

I replied that it just was not possible to commit US forces to battle in the way envisaged. There would certainly have to be Congressional support for such action. We could not commit US forces on a temporary basis as part of either the Foreign Legion or the French military establishment without the support of the US Congress.

Laniel said that if we could do nothing to save Dien-Bien-Phu, he thought the future was very dark. He repeated his conviction based on General Ely’s estimate, that massive US carrier based aircraft would permit the holding of Dien-Bien-Phu.

I said that I was not a military man and, therefore, not capable of any military judgment. Personally I doubted seriously that intervention by aircraft would save the garrison. With respect to the future I thought that one had to always envisage the worst happening and if Dien-Bien-Phu fell in the coming days, I wondered what position his government would take, quite aside from the question of French Parliamentary and public opinion. Laniel said that he could not tell me what would happen. He personally was opposed to any agreement which would lead to the turnover of Indochina to the Communists, whether it be by a territorial division or the fusion of the VietNam and VietMinh governments. However, he thought there would be an irresistible ground swell in France calling for a cease-fire on almost any terms and he did not think any government could remain in power, which did not take this into consideration. He said that no one who did not live in France could understand the depth of French feeling against continuation of the Indochinese war. One might call this psychological, but it was nonetheless a deep and burning reality. Furthermore, if the fortress fell he thought all the Viet Nam fence sitters, including members of the present Viet Nam administration, would scramble toward Ho Chi Minh’s bandwagon. He did not exclude defections by Viet Nam military units.

I said that I could only repeat what I had said previously, to the effect that it would be a tragedy for France and the free world if everything we had achieved together over the past few years were cast aside because of the loss of a relatively minor outpost in Indochina. I recognized the psychological implications but it seemed to me that the French must think how to limit the damage if Dien-Bien-Phu falls, rather than to throw up their hands in abandonment. Laniel said that he agreed but thought there was no possible way he could see to limit the damage.

In conclusion, he said that he would be glad to have General Ely give the Secretary a first hand estimate of the situation in Indochina from the French military view if the Secretary so desired. I said I believed the Secretary had seen General Ely yesterday but would pass on this message. Laniel also said that he understood Admiral Radford was arriving tomorrow. He would like to see Admiral Radford if this were possible. He understood that Radford was sympathetic to the idea of supporting Dien-Bien-Phu with US aircraft and he would appreciate the latter’s estimate on what was possible. I made no comment.

1. The meeting took place at the Hotel Matignon from 1 to 4 p.m. on Apr. 23. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in telegram Dulte 9 from Paris, Apr. 23 (740.5/4–2354).
2. For a report on this conversation, see the memorandum of conversation, p. 932.
3. Reference is to the proposal set forth by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov at the Berlin Conference on Feb. 10 for a general European collective security treaty and a subsequent Soviet note of Mar. 31 along similar lines. See the editorial note, p. 487.
4. On Mar. 30, Marshal Juin declared in a public speech that the EDC was neither workable nor capable of being made so. As a result of his remarks, the Marshal was removed from all his posts within the French Army and was reprimanded by the NAT Council. Documentation on this incident is in file 740.5.