Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

396.1 PA/4–2653: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State ¹

secret
priority

Paris, April 26, 1953—2 p.m.

5669. Tripartite meeting April 25 devoted entirely to discussion of means for testing Soviet intentions, with particular reference to order in which different problems might best be taken up.² French representatives were Bidault, Pleven, Letourneau, Parodi; British Butler, Lloyd, Alexander, Harvey; United States Dulles, Wilson, Humphrey, Stassen, Aldrich, Dillon, Draper. No conclusions reached and agreed pursue exchange of views through diplomatic channels. Bidault thought Pravda editorial contained nothing really new in substance.³ He saw danger of imminent Soviet proposals placing Germany at top of agenda for four-power meeting. Proposed anticipating this by early western proposals which would forestall Soviet call for such talks before it is made. This best accomplished by placing disarmament first on agenda (as most basic and difficult item), followed by Austria and then Germany. Obviously hostilities would have to stop everywhere before talks could commence. He feared Soviets might accept last western proposals re free German election, thus precipitating “chain reaction” in German and French opinion which would make German neutralization difficult to refuse.⁴ Neutralization of course completely unacceptable as it would involve Soviets withdrawing 200 kilometers while United States would withdraw 5,000. To accept discussion “small” problems first could play into hands of Soviets who may be ready close out certain bankrupt operations. Unwarranted climate of hopefulness would then make trouble.

Secretary recalled order envisaged in President’s speech which, while deliberately kept flexible, has certain advantages. Korean armistice talks will provide first test Soviet sincerity within couple weeks as we would not allow them be drawn out. Next would be end of direct and indirect attacks in Indochina where problem more complicated since conflict not recognized as international. French might consider bringing French, Laotian or joint complaint re invasion of Laos before SC, which would help make IC conflict subject international negotiations. Austria would seem next urgent subject where Soviet sincerity easily tested with least complications to ourselves. President had spoken next of Germany and Eastern Europe with idea that if progress made in all aforementioned problems were [sic] adequate to give confidence, disarmament might be approached. This did not mean complete agreement on all these problems necessary for disarmament to be discussed but some progress on them would be condition precedent. Also fact that disarmament still under discussion in United Nations is important. Above views re priorities tentative and subject to tripartite discussion and own consultation with President.

Butler said Churchill would agree on desirability west be prepared for possible Soviet initiative and is also mindful of public opinion. While Soviets had recently not been wholly negative on disarmament, there is as yet no evidence of sufficient change in their position to warrant hope of real progress. While that subject should continue be pursued British would think others better suited to testing Soviet sincerity.

Lloyd thought Pravda article indicated Soviets temporizing rather than taking any initiative. Disarmament could only follow, perhaps long after real confidence created by settlement other problems. If purpose putting disarmament first is to “keep discussions safely bogged down” then good idea but not sure that would be wise. While desirable to bar Soviet move re Germany, west bound by September tripartite proposals which embodied carefully thought-out and sound position. High Commissioners, individually rather than collectively, should also consult Adenauer so that three governments may take account of his views.

He said British proposals for early deputies meeting on Austria accepted by French with United States response still outstanding.⁵ Soviet conditions for meeting would indicate insincerity. British agree Korea talks must not be allowed to drag indefinitely. If however talks went badly manner in which they were broken off would be important from point of view public reaction and United Kingdom would certainly want to be fully consulted. Also we should seek full benefit from Indian resolution.⁶ Did not see how Indochina fitted into picture and asked how we might help French politically in dealing with it.

Bidault reiterated Soviet initiatives would come and would involve small package deals difficult to refuse but holding specious and divisive appeal designed lead west along Soviet-chosen path harmful to western interests. If disarmament the first test those difficulties would be avoided. French Government not inflexible on priorities as shown by acceptance idea convening Austrian deputies. Danger, however, that Soviets would insist on linking Germany to Austrian discussions. Besides Soviets would make trouble re Article 35. In any event they would remain in Hungary, Rumania, basing such action on their treaties with satellites and citing NATO precedent. If Germany discussed before disarmament and if Soviets accepted free elections, French opinion would make refusal of neutralization difficult and “we would be caught in own trap”.

He agreed end of Indochina hostilities should be precondition for any talks. French reluctant raise Laos in United Nations where unanimity all non-Communist nations would be helpful but unlikely in view position France was placed in December United Nations discussions. Certain countries giving in to expediency and demagogic appeals might doubt independence Associated States. Moreover diverse demands might be provoked which would not help prosecution war. While not preventing Laos from presenting appeal France not encouraging it.

Dillon

1. Repeated to London, Bonn. Moscow, and Vienna.
2. The six-page U.S. Delegation minutes of this meeting are in file 396.1 PA/ 4–2553.
3. Under reference here is the Apr. 25 editorial in Pravda which contained a commentary on President Eisenhower’s address on Apr. 16. Extracts from the editorial are in Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp. 51–57; for the text of President Eisenhower’s address, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 599–603, AFP, vol. i, pp. 65–71, or Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 179–188.
4. The proposal under reference here has not been identified further, but presumably Bidault was referring to the tripartite note to the Soviet Union, Sept. 23, 1952. For documentation on this note and the question of all-German elections, see volume vii .
5. Documentation on the participation of the United States in the negotiations for an Austrian State Treaty is presented in volume vii .
6. Presumably this is a reference to the United Nations General Assembly resolution, adopted Dec. 3, 1952, on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war; for text, see AFP, vol. ii, pp. 2651–2654. Documentation on this resolution is presented in volume xv .