Hickerson–Murphy-Key files, lot 58 D 33, “Membership”
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)1
- Subject:
- United Nations Membership Question
Background
Ambassador Lodge has informed us (Tab A)2 that Belaunde of Peru, Chairman of a General Assembly Committee to explore prospects for breaking the membership deadlock in the UN, indicated to him at Caracas that if we would consent to the admission of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, it might be possible to make an advantageous arrangement as regards the admission of other countries. Ambassador Lodge asks whether the Department proposes to adhere without deviation to the policy of the previous Administration on this matter (i.e., no package deal). He is “inclined to hope that this would not be the case,” and says that the Secretary clearly inferred to him “that he might not be averse to a deal which could be really advantageous to the United States in securing the admission of a substantial number of free states in exchange for the admission of a few communist ones.”
If we decide to accept a political settlement on membership, one possibility might be to agree to admit three of the Soviet applicants (Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania) in return for Soviet agreement to admit ten of the non-Soviet applicants (Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Nepal and Portugal). This arrangement would not provide for four present applicants we favor (Republic of Korea and the three Indo-China States), or for future applicants like Germany or Spain. However, it would be more advantageous to us than the Soviet package of five Soviet applicants (including Albania and Outer Mongolia in addition to Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania) and nine non-Soviet applicants (excluding Japan as well as the Republic of Korea and the three states of Indo-China).
[Page 989]Questions for Consideration
In considering an answer to Ambassador Lodge, the main questions which require reexamination are:
- 1.
- If we agreed to admit Soviet candidates despite their conduct, would it be harder to keep out the Chinese Communists?3
- 2.
- How serious would public and Congressional opposition be to the admission of Soviet candidates as part of a deal?
- 3.
- If Soviet candidates were admitted, would serious difficulties arise because article 4 of the Charter says that membership is open to “peace-loving states” which are “able and willing to carry out their Charter obligations?
- 4.
- Would the admission of Soviet candidates dignify the puppet regimes and discourage opposition elements in these countries, or would new contacts through the UN between the free world and the satellites be helpful to us?
- 5.
- Would a settlement along the lines outlined above materially increase obstructive capacities of the Soviet bloc and increase our difficulties in obtaining free-world majorities?
- 6.
- If we proposed a deal which the Soviets refused, could we then, without having to use the veto, prevent adoption of the Soviet package proposal or a “compromise” proposal unacceptable to us?
- 7.
- Is there some other arrangement on which agreement might be reached which would be preferable to the one outlined above? For instance, would it be better to have a larger package which, in addition to the candidates suggested above, included Albania in return for Soviet agreement to include Spain (which has not yet applied)?
- 8.
- Should we propose as a part of a deal that the permanent members agree not to use the veto in future cases? Should we also try to get a guarantee that Germany, Korea and the three states of Indo-China will eventually be admitted?
- 9.
- Might this question be discussed with the U.S.S.R. during or after the Korean Political Conference, or should it be handled exclusively through Belaunde and his Good Offices Committee (Peru, Netherlands and Egypt)?
Recommendation
That you call a meeting of Assistant Secretaries to discuss these questions. Ambassador Lodge is anxious for instructions before April 1, when Belaunde arrives in New York.