UNP files, lot 59 D 237, “Slates”
Memorandum Circulated by the Bureau of United Nations Affairs to the Geographic Bureaus1
Council Slates
security council
-
Present Members
- Term expires 12/31/53
- Chile
- Pakistan
- Greece
- Term expires 12/31/54
- Denmark
- Lebanon
- Colombia
- Term expires 12/31/53
-
Permanent Members
- China, France, UK, US, USSR
-
Candidates
- Brazil, Peru
- New Zealand
- Iran
1. Candidacies of Brazil and Peru
Brazil requested our support for its election to Chile’s seat in May, 1952. It has already served on the Security Council for two terms (1916–47 and 1951–52). Last fall Peru announced its interest in being elected to the Council to succeed Chile, and pointed out that it has never been represented on the Council. (However, USUN has been advised recently that Peru might step down.)
It has been our usual policy in the past to support the candidate preferred by the Latin American Members. However, we have also taken the position that one of the two Latin American seats should always be held by a large State.
It is believed that either Peru or Brazil would be satisfactory members of the Council from our standpoint.
Tentative Recommendation
We should remain non-committal and leave the choice as between Brazil and Peru to the Latin American countries.
2. Candidacy of New Zealand
New Zealand has asked for our support for its candidacy to succeed Pakistan. Pakistan’s seat has generally been considered a commonwealth seat and it has been our policy to support whichever country [Page 462] the Commonwealth Members have decided among themselves should occupy it.
It is believed that we should adhere to our past policy and support New Zealand if it has Commonwealth backing. The latest information available indicates that the UK, Canada, Australia, South Africa and Pakistan are certain to support New Zealand. The position of India is as yet unclear. The New Zealand Delegation still hopes for India’s support and has pointed out that when New Zealand stepped down in favor of India’s candidacy several years ago, Nehru assured New Zealand of India’s support when it stood for this seat. However, the Delegation expressed some fear that India might now claim that Pakistan’s seat is an Asian seat.
Tentative Recommendation
We should support New Zealand if it is the choice of all the Commonwealth Members and should inform it of our support at an appropriate point during the summer.
3. Successor to Greece
There are no announced candidacies for the seat now held by Greece. However, the Soviet Union will probably run a satellite in an attempt to recapture this seat, which was held by Soviet bloc Members from 1946 through 1949, but which was subsequently held by Yugoslavia and Greece. The Soviet Union claims that the Soviet bloc is entitled to one of the non-permanent seats on the basis of an informal understanding reached in London in 1945 under which one of the non-permanent seats was allocated to Western Europe, one to Eastern Europe, one to the Near East and Africa, one to the British Commonwealth, and two to Latin America.
In 1951, the United States strongly opposed the election of Byelorussia and waged an active campaign on behalf of Greece. We took the position that the 1945 informal understanding applied to the first year only, that the election of a Soviet candidate would seriously increase Soviet obstructive capabilities in the Security Council, and that a Soviet bloc Member did not qualify under Article 23 of the Charter. (This article provides that in electing non-permanent members, due regard should be given “in the first instance to the contribution of Members … to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.”) However, many countries outside the Soviet bloc, including the UK and France, opposed our position or at any rate did not wish to make a major issue out of what they considered to be a lesser matter. As a result, it was only on the 19th ballot that Greece was finally elected.
A number of Members at the Eighth session may feel inclined to make concessions to the Soviet Union as a result of the Soviet “peace-offensive”, [Page 463] and might also argue that since the Soviet Union has not had one of the non-permanent seats for four years, it is time for a Soviet satellite to be returned to the Council. We might therefore run into strong opposition even from some of our key allies in opposing a satellite. In addition, it can be argued that the election of a satellite would probably not jeopardize our voting margin on the Chinese representation issue as long as the UK agrees to support the moratorium procedure on this issue and as long as Tsiang remains the permanent representative of the National Government, nor would it seriously weaken our position in the Security Council on East–West issues.*
However, if the UK changes its position on Chinese representation and if other Members on the Council should also switch, the election of a satellite could make it possible for the Soviet Union to muster seven votes in favor of a motion to exclude the present Chinese National Government representative and seat a Chinese Communist.† In this event the only way we could attempt to prevent the adoption of the motion would be to resort to the veto, but even this attempt might fail if the same seven Members which supported the Soviet motion also took the position that the veto was not applicable. Also, if the Chinese National Government should designate a new representative, it might be difficult in any case for us to muster the necessary seven votes needed to approve his credentials and the election of a satellite could be the crucial factor.‡ Moreover, the election of a Soviet candidate after the General Assembly has twice decided to reject a satellite, and in the absence of sufficient evidence to justify a reversal of its previous decision, would be politically undesirable. It would involve an important concession even though the Soviet Union has not demonstrated by deeds its intent of peaceful purpose and would lend encouragement to the Soviet Union to continue its obstructive [Page 464] policies in the United Nations. For these reasons it is believed that the United States should support a non-Soviet state which does not recognize the Chinese Communist regime and that we should stimulate a candidacy which would have the best chance of defeating a satellite. Since the election of a non-Soviet candidate may depend in large part upon UK and French support, we should discuss the question with these countries in the near future.
With respect to possible non-Soviet candidates, it would be impracticable to consider a country from Latin America, Western Europe, the British Commonwealth, or the Arab League, all of which are adequately represented on the Council. From the standpoint of equitable geographic distribution, a country from the Far East would be most entitled to succeed Greece, since no country from that area has ever occupied a nonpermanent seat. There are two countries from this area which would be satisfactory to us—the Philippines or Thailand. However, many Asian states, which consider the Philippines to be a US “stooge”, and also the UK and France, would not be favorably disposed toward a Philippine candidacy and it would be difficult if not impossible to obtain its election. Thailand would probably be able to obtain wider support, although Prince Wan’s candidacy for the Presidency would be a complicating factor.
The other countries which could be considered as possible candidates are Turkey and Ethiopia. Of these, Turkey would be far preferable to us. Furthermore, it is believed that it could obtain greater support than Ethiopia or even Thailand. For even though it occupied the Near East seat on the Security Council in 1951 and 1952, it is a state which borders on and has a direct interest in the Eastern European area. A number of countries, particularly the Latin American Members, might fear that the election of a country from an area far removed from Eastern Europe would upset the geographic pattern which has generally been followed for the Security Council. For this reason, they might be more willing to vote for Turkey than for a candidate from the Far East or Africa even though these areas are more entitled to a non-permanent seat.
Should Turkey become a candidate for the Security Council, it would probably be desirable for it to resign from ECOSOC, to which it was elected last year.
Tentative Recommendation
We should in the near future hold discussions with the UK, France and a few key delegations from other areas on the question of a successor to Greece, stressing the strong importance we attach to the election of a non-Soviet candidate. We should mention Turkey as our preferred candidate, but might also suggest Thailand and Ethiopia as possibilities.
[Page 465]ecosoc
-
Present Members
- Term expires 12/31/53
- Philippines
- Poland
- Sweden
- USSR
- UK
- Uruguay
- Term expires 12/31/54
- Argentina
- Belgium
- China
- Cuba
- Egypt
- France
- Term expires 12/31/55
- Australia
- India
- Turkey
- US
- Venezuela
- Yugoslavia
- Term expires 12/31/53
-
Candidates
- Afghanistan, Indonesia,
- Pakistan and Thailand
- (Satellite)
- Norway
- (USSR)
- (UK)
- Ecuador, Uruguay and Bolivia
- Dominican Republic
- Colombia
1. Candidacies of Afghanistan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Thailand
Thailand informed us of its candidacy for ECOSOC last fall, and expressed the hope that its candidacy would not adversely affect Prince Wan’s election to the Presidency. It has never served on ECOSOC, but has served on the Trusteeship Council for one term (1951–1953).
Indonesia requested our support for election to ECOSOC (and also to the Trusteeship Council) this Spring. It was also a candidate for ECOSOC last year but we supported India instead. It has never served on any of the major Councils.
Afghanistan and Pakistan also requested our support this spring. Like Indonesia, Afghanistan has never been a Member of a major Council. Pakistan is presently on the Security Council and served on ECOSOC for the period 1950–1952. It was a candidate for reelection last year, but we supported India.
From the standpoint of geographic distribution, Thailand or Indonesia would be the most logical successor to the Philippines. Of these two, Thailand would be preferable to us as far as the substantive work of ECOSOC is concerned, and since it is the only candidate for this seat which does not recognize the Chinese Communist regime. However, as noted above, we may wish to consider Thailand for the Security Council. In this event, we would have to consider other candidates to succeed the Philippines.
[Page 466]Tentative Recommendation:
We should take no decision on the successor to the Philippines pending further developments on the Security Council slate.
2. Candidacy of a Satellite
While no Soviet bloc candidacy has been announced, the Soviet Union can certainly be expected to run a satellite.
Until this year there have always been two satellites on the Council. Last year, however, Yugoslavia defeated Czechoslovakia after 13 ballots, thereby reducing Soviet bloc representation. The United States supported the election of Yugoslavia.
Most Members of the United Nations would probably be unwilling to further reduce Soviet representation on ECOSOC this year, and it is likely that we would be defeated if we should try to elect a non-Soviet candidate. Furthermore, the election of a satellite would not jeopardize our voting position on the Council. Finally, we might obtain less support for a non-Soviet candidate for Greece’s seat on the Security Council if we also tried to defeat a satellite for election to ECOSOC.
Tentative Recommendation:
We should not campaign against the election of a Soviet satellite to succeed Poland.
3. Candidacy of Norway
Norway requested our support for its election to Sweden’s seat in April. This seat has always been held by a Scandinavian country (Norway in 1946 and 1947, Denmark from 1948 through 1950, and Sweden from 1951 through 1953). According to the Norwegian delegation, Iceland, the only Scandinavian country which has not yet served on ECOSOC, does not intend to seek election this year.
Tentative Recommendation:
We should vote for Norway to succeed Sweden. After we have formulated our position on the total ECOSOC slate, we should inform Norway and others, when asked, of our decision.
4. Candidacy of USSR and UK
There has been a general agreement from the beginning that the five major powers should be represented on ECOSOC.
Tentative Recommendation:
The United States should vote for the reelection of the UK and the USSR.
5. Candidacies of Ecuador, Uruguay and Bolivia
Ecuador requested our support in November 1952, and Fabregat of Uruguay last month asked that Ambassador Lodge be informed of Uruguay’s candidacy for reelection. We gave the usual non-committal [Page 467] reply. Bolivia has not yet asked for our support but is apparently a strong candidate for reelection.
Tentative Recommendation:
We should not decide which candidate to support until the views of the Latin American states are known.
trusteeship council
-
Present Members
- Term expires 12/31/53
- Dominican Republic
- Thailand
- Term expires 12/31/55
- El Salvador
- Syria
- Term expires 12/31/53
-
Candidates
- Haiti
- Indonesia, India and
- possibly Liberia
-
Administering Powers and Other Permanent
Members
- Australia
- Belgium
- China
- France
- New Zealand
- United Kingdom
- United States
- USSR
1. Candidacy of Haiti
Haiti requested US support for its candidacy to succeed the Dominican Republic in January, and we gave the usual non-committal reply. To our knowledge, there are no other Latin American candidates.
Tentative Recommendation:
In accordance with our usual policy concerning Latin American candidates we should make no decision on Haiti’s candidacy until the views of the Latin American States are known.
2. Candidacies of Indonesia and India
Indonesia requested our support for its election to the Trusteeship Council in March. In May India asked for our support. It was also a candidate last year for the Trusteeship Council, but stepped down in favor of Syria.
Liberia has often in the past expressed interest in election to the Trusteeship Council, but we have heard nothing definite on this lately.
As already indicated, Indonesia is also a candidate for ECOSOC. It will be recalled that it requested our support for election to ECOSOC last year but we supported India instead. In addition, Indonesia has never served on a major Council, while India has been a member of the Security Council and is presently on ECOSOC.
Tentative Recommendation:
We should probably support Indonesia to succeed Thailand.
- Source text attached to UNA memorandum of June 29 to USUN cited in footnote 1, p. 457. It was drafted by Paul W. Jones on the basis of conclusions reached in the UNA meeting of June 26, and circulated to the geographic bureaus for discussion at a meeting on July 2. (This memorandum follows rather closely discussion in an earlier memorandum of June 23, drafted by Jones for internal UNA use in the meeting of June 26, not printed. UNP files, lot 59 D 237. “Slates”.)↩
- Assuming that New Zealand and either Peru or Brazil are elected, we could probably count on 8 votes on East–West issues even if a satellite were elected: US, China, France, UK, Denmark, Colombia, New Zealand, and Peru or Brazil. With respect to the Chinese representation issue, we can probably count on four certain votes—those of the US, China, Colombia, and Peru or Brazil. As long as the UK agrees to continue the moratorium procedure, and assuming France, Denmark and New Zealand would follow its position, we could muster more than enough votes to prevent the exclusion of the present Chinese National Government representative or the seating of a Chinese Communist. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- The USSR, UK and Denmark would not approve the credentials of a new representative of the Chinese National Government, and Lebanon might abstain. Even if France and New Zealand could be persuaded to vote with China, the United States, Colombia, and Peru or Brazil to approve his credentials, we would still need one more vote. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- If the UK changed its position, and if France, Denmark, Lebanon and New Zealand followed suit, their votes, together with those of the USSR and a Soviet satellite, would total seven. [Footnote in the source text.]↩