PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Administrative Transition.”

Paper Prepared in the Department of State1

top secret

Outline for Secretary’s Use in Briefing General Eisenhower Novermber 18, 1952


Fundamental Character of Repatriation Issue3

In relation to cleavage between West and Kremlin—noting Vishinsky’s spurning of idea individual welfare and choice of loyalties as valid considerations.

In relation to the mixed character of the struggle in Korea as both an international and a civil conflict.

Position of UN Command (i.e., U.S.)

Firm position as to no forcible repatriation stated last spring, with general attitude of firmness on principle and flexibility as to mode of effectuating it.

Recess of negotiations at Panmunjon on Oct. 8 at instance of UNC pending acceptance of any one of UNC proposals or proffering of an alternative by Communists.

The Issue in the General Assembly

UNC position—strongly supported by all UNC participants and opposed by no non-Communist government—brought into focus before General Assembly in resolution put forth by U.S. and 20 other sponsoring governments after intensive diplomatic preparation—with purposes

  • To maximize pressure on Communists to come to terms on apparent last obstacle to armistice in Korea.
  • To get explicit endorsement of UNC (i.e., U.S.) position.

Negotiating position in General Assembly now very fluid in consequence of other proposals, put forth formally or broached informally among delegations.

U.S. attempting to steer these along courses most useful in buttressing our position—willing to accept any form consistent with the fundamental principle at stake.

[Page 7]

Question of Policy of Incoming Administration

President-elect’s trip to Korea as an occasion for uncertainty among some delegations as to continuity of U.S. adherence to the main principle.

Concern among some delegations as to continuity of practice of consulting participants in regard to major decisions as to Korea.

Exploitation of this situation by Communist and neutralist delegations.

Of great possible assistance in meeting this situation—a statement by4 the President-elect—

  • implicitly recognizing UN aspects of action in Korea
  • supporting efforts now being made by U.S. Government in General Assembly.

Offer of Assistance

Department’s readiness to make available to the President-elect or his designated representative, Senator Lodge, full information as to—

  • Relationships of U.S. with UN and principal allies of UNC.
  • The disturbed domestic situation in Korea.

the iran problem5

The Sequel to Nationalization in Iran

Social unrest in light of nonfulfillment of expectations following take over of British oil properties.

Budgetary difficulties due to loss of oil revenues, with consequences of inflation, curtailment of public works, and signs of serious demoralization among payless army and public servants.

Persistence in the Government of suspicion of motives, misunderstanding of the facts of life in the marketplace, and intransigence toward the U.K.

Necessity of a Settlement

Need to get oil flowing again to revivify the Iranian economy.

Danger of increasing its vulnerability to Soviet penetration, whether by direct interposition or by subversion.

Importance in strategic position in resources.

The British Attitude

Importance of issue to U.K. from standpoint of

  • Prestige.
  • Fiscal factors.
  • Danger as example to others if nationalization is rewarded.

Need for U.S. to keep good relations with principal Atlantic ally as a limit on action in seeking settlement and in avoiding budgetary aid to Iran pending satisfaction of British claims.

U.S. Course

One unrealistic possibility—no action in hope hardship would soften Iranians.

Another unrealistic possibility—buying time by giving budgetary aid, a lane that might have no ending.

The course chosen—to seek a solution and incidental to solution to provide funds to bolster Iranian Government pending adequate revenues from oil flow;

This course envisaging

  • Settlement of the compensation issue by agreed lump sum payment on Iranian initiative (alternative to British demand of compensation set by arbitration).
  • Commercial arrangements to handle Iranian oil either by AIOC alone, by AIOC with several major U.S. companies, or by U.S. companies alone.
  • Advance to Iranian Government of up to $100,000,000 available under Defense Production Act.

Foreign Oil Policy and Anti-Trust Laws6

Possible participation of U.S. oil companies in arrangements for handling Iranian oil a matter of bringing into focus broad question of application of U.S. anti-trust policies.

Possible necessity of a restudy of oil policies by a high level commission, either within Government or with participation of public interest groups.

problems raised by issue of status of morocco and tunisia on general assembly agenda7

Status of Problem

Distinguishing between problem of competence and problem of substance.

Not yet reached on GA agenda.

[Page 9]

Arab-Asian Attitude

Seeking to use UN and all other means as fulcrum for prying loose colonial areas.

Pressing for full independence of areas concerned.

The French Attitude

Firmness in denial of General Assembly’s competence.

Refusal to be bound by General Assembly actions.

These reflecting of French sensitivity as to future of position in North Africa.

Relation to French fears of greater disparity of power in relation to Germany.

Suspicion of U.S. as covert ally of anti-colonialists.

In French view, greatest single issue in international field.

Problem in US. View

U.S. deeply concerned in need of sound relations with—

  • France and other NATO allies.
  • Also Arab and Asian areas where we have strong strategic and political interests.

No apparent way of reconciling—and even no apparent way of satisfactorily balancing—these conflicting pulls.

problems raised by issue of racial policies of union of south africa on agenda of general assembly8

Present Status

Problem placed on agenda by 13 Arab and Asian States.

Now before Ad Hoc Political Committee.

Issues and Dilemmas

In relation to human rights—

  • Question of competence under Article 2 (7) of Charter—
  • Issue of any discussion at all.
  • Issue as to whether resolution directed to one state is proper.

In relation to future and effectiveness of UN.

Possibility in face of adverse vote of South Africa quitting UN or withdrawing air squadron from UNC.

Twin dangers: reducing GA to desuetude or making it a forum for interference without responsibility.

[Page 10]

U.S. Position

U.S. pressed by desires to keep friendly relations with anti-imperialist Arab-Asian bloc and with South Africa and to avoid excessive stresses on UN structure.

Initial view—now abandoned—of seeking International Court of Justice opinion on jurisdiction.

Efforts—still unavailing—to get mild, generalized resolution.

Intention to abstain on vote of competence and on final vote (unless resolution is positively harmful—in which event U.S. will vote no).

problems in nato9

Issue Whether To Hold Dec. 15 Council Session

First session since Lisbon.


  • Several items of routine business.
  • Approval of study on Soviet foreign policy in light of recent developments.
  • Most important—the Annual Review to reconcile requirements and capabilities so as to set—
    • Firm force goals for 1953—an exigent matter in U.S. view.
    • Sketchy force goals for 1954—a highly important matter in U.S. view.

Prospect of useful meeting as of Dec. 15 fading because of lag in Annual Review preparations due (in Ambassador Merchant’s view) to flagging leadership in International Staff and passive resistance in other delegations.

Choice between

  • Unsatisfactory meeting.
  • Troublesome delay with perhaps further loss of momentum.

Prospective Future Meetings

Soon after start of new Administration—a meeting to complete the Annual Review.

Possibly a fall meeting—

  • To consider results of studies of new weapons and tactics.
  • To weigh maintenance and replacement costs.
  • To acquaint European allies with general posture of new Administration—a matter of such interest that others may press for such an additional meeting even in late spring.

[Page 11]

development of the european defense community10

Importance of Undertaking

Prompt ratification as only developed formula for introducing German forces into defense of West essential to NATO program.

Integral also to whole effort at European integration, thus bound with eventual success of Schuman Plan and Political Community.

Status and Prospects as to Ratification


  • Issue linked to Saar, North Africa, Indochina, and fear of German ascendancy.
  • Outcome uncertain.
  • No final action till February or maybe March.


  • Bundestag approval expected this month.
  • Final action, contingent on a court ruling, expected in about two months.


  • Vote awaiting action on other legislation.
  • Final prospect favorable.


  • Government not yet taking strong favorable line.
  • Linking issue to question of uniform conscription period.
  • No prospect of action until after France.


  • Ratification in December in prospect.


  • Attitude generally linked to Belgium’s.

Planning Function

EDC Interim Commission at work in strict secrecy.

Not yet effective in its work—

  • Too much preoccupation with charts.
  • Not enough attention to substance.
  • Lacking in adequate authorizations.

United States Attitude

As to ratification— [Page 12]

  • Interested but not pressing as this is something of vital concern to Europeans themselves.
  • Not disposed to be jockeyed into buying ratification by giving concessions on remote problems.
  • Importance of encouragement by U.S. statements without giving appearance this is a U.S. scheme.

As to getting more effective planning—

  • U.S. observers seeking to encourage more attention to production plans and German build-up.
  • Next NATO meeting as opportunity to push for wider authorization for Interim Commission.

allocation of u.s. resources (NSC 135)11

Purpose and Status of NSC 135

One in a series of studies generally familiar to General Eisenhower, previous ones being NSC 20 (1948), NSC 68 (1950), and NSC 114 (1951).12

Specific questions as to which answers are sought:

  • Adequacy of free world needs increasing in level of programs and forces to cope with threats.
  • Appropriateness of present balance between military and economic aid.
  • Appropriateness of present allocation as between U.S. and other free world forces.
  • Appropriateness of allocations by areas—Far East, Middle East, and Europe—in relation to U.S. security and commitments.

Progress to Date

Commencement of study directed by President in September.

Agreement on terms of reference by State–Defense–MSA Steering Group in September.

Work on all phases now well on way.

Deadline for completion directed by President—January 1, 1953.

suggested draft statement by general eisenhower

It should be clear that the sole purpose of my visit to Korea will be to obtain that understanding of a complex situation which can [Page 13] come only from firsthand knowledge and observation. I intend to visit General Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations forces and other members of his command. I also hope to the extent practicable to visit the troops of the United States, the Republic of Korea and the many other nations, composing the United Nations Command, all of whom have fought so long and so valiantly for the vital principles at stake in that struggle. I also hope to see President Rhee and other members of the Government of the Republic of Korea whose land is being defended against this most brutal and callous aggression.

I know that with the knowledge and understanding thus obtained I will better be able to face those grave responsibilities I am about to assume.

I am following with close interest the progress of the discussion of Korea in the United Nations General Assembly and am in full agreement with the efforts being made there by the United States and other like-minded nations to support the long and patient efforts of the United Nations Command to bring about an armistice in Korea compatible with the conscience of all free people.13

  1. The source text does not indicate the identity of the drafting officer(s) or Bureau(s), nor the date drafted. A copy of this paper is also in the PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Record Copies.”
  2. For documentation on Korea, see volume xv.
  3. This and all the other italic headings in this document are sidenotes on the source text, presumably for the Secretary’s easy reference.
  4. The following typewritten footnote appears at this point in the source text: “Note to Secretary: Draft attached after page 18 for use in event General Eisenhower asks for it.” For the draft under reference, see p. 12.
  5. For documentation on Iran, see volume x.
  6. For documentation on foreign oil policy and the foreign policy aspects of anti-trust legislation, see pp. 817 ff. and 1259 ff.
  7. For documentation on Morocco and Tunisia, see vol. xi, Part 1, pp. 599 ff. and 665 ff.; for documentation on U.N. affairs, see volume iii.
  8. For documentation on U.S. relations with the Union of South Africa, see vol. xi, Part 1, pp. 902 ff.
  9. For documentation on NATO, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.
  10. For documentation on the European Defense Community, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 571 ff.
  11. NSC 135, “Status of U.S. Programs for National Security as of June 30, 1952,” a collection of eight reports submitted to the NSC Aug. 6–22, 1952, was noted at the 122d Meeting of the National Security Council on Sept. 3, 1952. For information on NSC 135, see volume ii.
  12. NSC 20, “Appraisal of the Degree and Character of Military Preparedness Required by the World Situation,” July 12, 1948, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 2, p. 589; NSC 68, “U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security,” Apr. 14, 1950, is printed ibid., 1950, vol. i, p. 234; NSC 114/1, “Status and Timing of Current U.S. Programs for National Security,” Aug. 8, 1951, is printed ibid., 1951, vol. i, p.127.
  13. President-elect Eisenhower made no statement prior to his departure for Korea which was in fact kept from public knowledge. Eisenhower’s own version of his trip to Korea is in Mandate for Change, pp. 93–96. Upon Eisenhower’s departure from Korea on Dec. 5, 1952, the U.N. Command at Seoul issued a brief communiqué, the text of which is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 15, 1952, pp. 948–949.