Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 36: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President ¹

top secret
operational immediate

Washington, 7 December 1951—6:24 p. m.

JCS–89090. From JCS. Req Presidential approval of folg proposed msg to CINCFE, approved by JCS, Sec Def and State:

Reur CX 55993² and CX 58195³ and JCS 95354, 30 Jun 51.

Part I.

1. Subpara 5H, JCS 95354 is rescinded and folg substituted:

“H. POW exchange on a one-for-one basis should be sought initially for purposes of negotiation.⁴ Your present planned procedure to attempt to obtain the disclosure of names and numbers, by nationality, of POWs held by the Communists should assist in this respect. However, if it appears necessary in order to secure the release of all, or a maximum number of, UN and ROK POWs, or to avoid unacceptable delay in their recovery, or to prevent a breakdown of the armistice negotiations, you will be authorized to agree to an exchange or release on a basis such as that discussed in Part III below.

(1). Generally, POWs should be exchanged as expeditiously as possible. Until the exchange of prisoners is completed, reptvs of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall be permitted to visit all POW camps to render such assistance as they can.

(2). In implementation of any agreed exchange, it is recognized that the Communist authorities may attempt to exchange ROK prisoners, withholding other pers temporarily or indefinitely. It is suggested, therefore, you insist that the exchange of prisoners be carried out on the basis of group-for-group, composed of mixed Chinese Communist forces (CCF) and North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) for mixed US/UN and ROK groups.

(3). During your negotiations for exchange of POWs, you should consider the release of certain specifically named civilian internees on generally the same basis as POWs without raising the larger issue of exchange or return of:

(a). Civilian captives taken from South to North Korea by NK forces, and

(b). NK refugees. At least 55 of these non-Korean civilians are believed to have remained in area of conflict after outbreak of hostilities in Korea. A list of these civilians believed to be in hands of NK authorities will be forwarded you in a separate msg.

(4). State Dept is considering the political aspects of repatriation of Korean civilians including advisability of securing a specific list of leading ROK civilians believed to be in Communist hands.”

Part II.

2. Procedures in Subparas 1A and 1B of CX 58195 are approved.

Part III.

3. Re new Subpara 5H of JCS 95354 quoted in Part I above and Paras 1C and 1D of CX 58195, JCS think that if an acceptable agreement cannot be reached within terms of Paras 1A and 1B of CX 58195 Communist agreement might be sought to a procedure which respected desires of individual POWs with regard to their exchange. The only practical possibility appears to be an agreement which would provide that prior to their release, all POWs held by either side would be screened by teams composed of mbrs of each side; individual POWs expressing a desire not to be exchanged would be permitted to remain under jurisdiction of their captors. This procedure would be considered as fulfilling obligations of both sides under armistice agreement but would not involve any commitment on part of captor as to future disposition of such POWs.

4. Agreement would not be reached to adopt the procedure described in Para 3 above until Communists have submitted a list of names or numbers of UN and ROK POWs conforming satisfactorily to our best estimates of those they hold.

5. Your comments on Paras 3 and 4 above are requested. Considering an agreement on some such basis as a possibility, it is thought that all UNC proposals and discussion on Item 4 should be phrased in terms of “release of POWs” rather than of “return of POWs”.

Part IV.

6. Final action on Paras 1C and 1D of CX 58195 is withheld pending your comments on Paras 3 and 4 Part III above. JCS have no further suggestions but would welcome any solution of the problem which, while insuring return of maximum number of UN and ROK POWs in Communist hands, would also protect POWs in UN hands. Recognizing that attaining a completely acceptable solution of this problem, is problematical and that we may be forced to return to Communist certain personnel whose retention would be desirable, including criminals we should like to prosecute, JCS assume that you are maintaining a complete record of individuals in categories indicated in Subpara 1D of your CX 58195 for such use as may later be desirable.

Part V.

7. Discussions in armistice negotiations regarding disposition of war criminals should be minimized although any arrangements such as those described in Part III above, should explicitly provide that release by both sides should include even such POWs who are suspected, accused, or convicted of war crimes or who have been convicted or are awaiting trial for post-capture offenses.⁵

1. This telegram was addressed to the Naval Aide to President Truman aboard the presidential yacht Williamsburg on which the President was cruising at the time.
2. Dated October 27, p. 1068.
3. Dated November 28, p. 1197.

4. A note attached to the source text, dated December 10 and initialed by U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, read as follows:

   “Note to be attached to JCS 89090 of December 7.

   “In order to meet the views of the President, State concurrence today was given to JCS for amendment of paragraph 1 (H), Part II [Part I], foregoing message, so that the first sentence thereof will read as follows:

   “‘POW exchange on a one by one basis should be sought initially for purposes of negotiation and negotiators should vigorously maintain that position as long as possible without precipitating a break in negotiations.’”

5. The President’s response was transmitted by his Naval Aide from the Williamsburg to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in telegram 081731Z, December 8; it read as follows:

   “Pres approves JCS 89090 with understanding that action indicated para 6 part IV will be referred to him for final decision. Pres holds strong view that negotiators should vigorously maintain position of one for one basis of exchange.” (Black Book, Tab 37)