Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles A. Fraleigh of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs


Subject: Administrative Agreement with Japan

Participants: Mr. Earl Johnson
Mr. Young
General Hamblen
Mr. Nash
Mr. Haydock2
Mr. Rusk
Mr. Hemmendinger
Mr. Fraleigh

Defense Measures in Event of Hostilities

There was discussion whether a separate agreement along the lines of Chapter IV of the JCS draft3 on the subject of collective defense measures should be concluded simultaneously with the negotiation of the Administrative Agreement. It was agreed that the idea of a separate secret agreement was probably not desirable and that the subject should be covered in Article XXII of the Administrative agreement or else postponed until some time in the future when questions of rearmament and regional arrangements for security in the Pacific area are negotiated. The JCS had reserved a decision on the language to be included in the Administrative Agreement until they hear from General Ridgway.

Mr. Rusk presented copies of a State draft of Article XXII4 which would incorporate most of the language of Chapter IV of the JCS draft, but would leave out the significant phrases in paragraph 1 of the JCS draft, “in the opinion of either party” and “at the option of the United States”. Mr. Rusk stated that giving the United States the option to establish a unified command under a United States commander would prompt the Japanese to question whether we were prepared to commit ourselves to defend Japan. He referred to General Marshall’s decision in 1947 in refusing to take command of a European army on the ground that his taking command would be an implied commitment by the United States to come to the defense of Europe. He also referred to Mr. Dulles’ opinion that the establishment of a unified command under the United States would involve a commitment to defend Japan which the United States may not be willing to give.

The representatives of Defense agreed that the United States was [Page 1475] not prepared to commit itself to defend Japan. They thought giving the United States the option whether to establish a unified command was less of a commitment than the omission of such an option. They also thought the option was needed in order to make sure that the United States would not be obliged to appoint a United States commander when, at some future date, Japanese security forces would greatly out number United States forces in Japan. They recognized, however, that the JCS draft was so worded that the United States would have the right to appoint a United States commander of forces largely Japanese even though the United States might have no intention of exercising the right.

The representatives of Defense indicated that the phrase “Japan area” in the JCS draft was intended to be vague, and to permit the United States to argue that hostilities affecting Formosa, Sakhalien or Korea would be hostilities affecting “the Japan area”.

It was agreed that the question of the language of Article XXII should be given further consideration by both State and Defense.

Directive to General Ridgway on the Work of the Committee

It was agreed, first, that it will probably be unnecessary to work out a separate memorandum of agreement with the Japanese containing terms of reference for the Joint Committee.5 It was agreed, secondly, however, that it would be desirable and appropriate for the United States Government to issue a directive to General Ridgway, giving him policy guidance for use by the United States representative on the Joint Committee. This directive, it was expected, might be framed by the State Department, but would be transmitted to General Ridgway through the usual channel, i.e., through the JCS.

It was agreed that it would be appropriate in the Governmental directive to General Ridgway to include instructions concerning the relinquishment of facilities and areas in downtown Tokyo, and also to include a policy decision that no more housing should be obtained for dependents. The Defense representatives were to consider further just what might be said about housing for dependents in the directive, while State was to prepare a draft of a directive as soon as possible, and send it over to Defense for their consideration.

Memorandum to President

Mr. Rusk said that he intended, in preparing the memorandum for the President, to ask for the following decisions by the President: (1) that the Administrative Agreement should be handled as an executive agreement; (2) that the President approve the United States draft (after being advised of the principal points of the draft) and; [Page 1476] (3) that one of the alternate articles on criminal jurisdiction should be chosen.6 The memorandum would include a statement of positions of State and Defense on the Criminal Jurisdiction Article. We might also ask for the approval of the President on the draft directive to CINCFE, but the draft directive might not have to go to the President at the same time as the draft Administrative Agreement. Work on the draft directive should, however, be pretty well completed by the time the memorandum on the Administrative Agreement is sent to the President. The President would also be asked in the memorandum to approve the designation of the negotiating team.

Negotiating Team

The question was raised whether an informal group should be established as soon as possible to start work on the determination of facilities and areas. Mr. Rusk proposed that this group might be set up after General Ridgway has received the basic directive and after the draft of the Administrative Agreement has been given to the Japanese. It was generally felt that the decision to set up an informal group now should depend on whether its establishment would help or hinder the negotiation of the Administrative Agreement. The Defense representatives seem to think that the negotiation of the Administrative Agreement might be delayed if a group were set up before the conclusion of the Administrative Agreement.

Mr. Johnson said that he had tentatively arranged for a plane to Tokyo for the 19th of January which would be about the time it was expected that clearance for the negotiations could be obtained from Congressional committees. Mr. Rusk said there would be a maximum of five persons to go from State. For Defense, it was expected that Ken Young, General Hamblen and a lawyer from the Office of the Secretary of Defense would go. Mr. Rusk said State might draw on the personnel of the Diplomatic Section in Tokyo also.

Time Table

It was agreed that the attempt would be made to send the memorandum to the President by the end of next week. Defense, of course, would have to wait until they receive General Ridgway’s views. After the views have been received it was expected that the JCS would act [Page 1477] quickly because they want to get the Agreement negotiated before the Peace Treaty is ratified. General Hamblen mentioned his problem with G–3 of Army, which wants to take another crack at the draft Administrative Agreement, but it was decided that this was a matter to be decided within Defense.

  1. “OK D[ean] R[usk]” is written in the margin of the original.
  2. Robert Haydock, Jr., Counsel for the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense.
  3. Apparently the draft dated October 22, discussed in the memorandum from the JCS to Mr. Lovett, November 16, p. 1404.
  4. This draft of Article XXII has not been found in Department of State files.
  5. That is, the Joint Committee projected in Article XXIV of the draft Administrative Agreement of December 21, p. 1464.
  6. Reference is apparently to Article XV of the draft mentioned in footnote 5 above and Chapter I, paragraph 7 of the Defense draft dated October 22. The latter draft is discussed and cited in the memorandum from the JCS to Mr. Lovett dated November 16, p. 1404. In that draft, Chapter I, paragraph 7 includes, only one change from the language quoted in footnote 8, p. 1283.

    The change is the addition of the following sentence at the end of subparagraph (1): “In such cases, the determination of the duty status is reserved to the United States.”