Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/9–1751

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹

secret

[Washington,] September 17, 1951.

Ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty

Four factors argue against immediate ratification of the peace treaty with Japan at this session of Congress:

1. The Department of Defense fears that there will be difficulties in connection with using Japan as the base for operations in Korea once Japan becomes a sovereign nation instead of an occupied power.

2. The Administrative Agreement which is to implement the bilateral security agreement with Japan must include certain rights for the United States forces in Japan and adequate financial arrangements between Japan and the United States for the support of those forces. The Department of Defense believes that much of our bargaining position will be lost and that it will be more difficult to get a satisfactory arrangement if the peace treaty has already been ratified.

3. It is expected that the joint resolution recommending the termination of war with Germany will soon pass the Senate and be sent to the President.² As soon thereafter as the state of war with Japan is ended, the emergency powers of the President which rest upon the existence of a state of war will vanish. Some 50 to 75 laws are affected. This is another problem which particularly concerns the Department of Defense.

4. In view of the various comments about the steamrolling tactics of the United States in getting the treaty signed, it may be desirable to let some of the other nations which have signed the treaty ratify it before the United States does.

The foregoing factors are not suitable for public presentation. There are, however, certain rationalizations which could be used to explain that we will move as rapidly as possible toward ratification but that it is unlikely that it will be feasible to secure the action at this session of Congress:

1. Japan will not take action to ratify the treaty until a special session of the Diet which is scheduled to meet in October. It seems more appropriate that the Japanese should act first to accept the treaty before the nations which were at war with Japan take their action.

2. The Japanese peace treaty is a highly important matter which should not be rushed through the Senate. Adequate time should be allowed for hearings, so that those interested in various aspects of the treaty can have the opportunity to make their views known. It is not possible to do this at this session of Congress.

3. We want to have the treaty ratified as early as is consistent with the orderly working out of the problems connected with the group of four related treaties.

Various possibilities have been suggested for demonstrating the will to move ahead without actually having the Senate take final action at this session. One possibility would be to have hearings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (or a subcommittee) during recess. Another might be to bring the Senate or the Foreign Relations Committee back a few days earlier in January to take up the peace treaty. A third might be a simple announcement that the peace treaty will be made the first order of business by the Senate in January.

1. A typed marginal note reads: “Noted by Acting Secretary—See Memo of Conv. w/Pres. on 9/17/11, eal.” For the text of the document mentioned, see infra.
2. For the Joint Resolution which passed the Congress October 19, see 65 Stat. 451. For the President’s Proclamation terminating the state of war between the United States and Germany, October 24, see 66 Stat. c3.