641.74/12–2251: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State 1
2856. Because of strong evidence “something on the Sudan” might break Anglo-Egyptian impasse, we wld perhaps recapitulate why Eden is so dead set against using this avenue. In this connection it is worth remembering that his judgment is probably backed up by considerable confidence in his own knowledge and understanding of Sudan and Anglo-Egyptian affairs. (It must be remembered in this connection that Eden once resigned from Brit Govt on moral issue.) Here are his reasons.
- 1.
- If all other reasons discounted, recognizing title Egyptian King wld still be impossible because Sudanese wld not have it and wld probably revolt against it with violence. (This feeling is strongly fortified by recent reports from Governor General Sudan that he cannot be responsible for maintenance law and order if this concession made.)
- 2.
- Constitutional and polit obligations which British have undertaken to Sudanese make it morally impossible to recognize Farouk’s title without Sudanese consent. Brit, no more than Sudanese, public opinion wld allow it.
- 3.
- Egyptians wld not be satisfied with recognition mere titular sovereignty and Sudanese know it. Recent proclamations re Farouk’s title to Sudan and Sudan Constitution illustrated Egypt’s real intentions.
- 4.
- At best, Egypt’s claim to exclusive sovereignty over Sudan hangs by very slender thread.
- 1899 condominium agreement is only contractual basis for any Egypt rights there.
- 5.
- Plebiscite now wld be mechanically impractical and if it revealed anything at all, wld only confirm factional splits of which we are already well aware. When Sudanese developed institutions of self-govt to point where referendum cld have some meaning they can choose whatever future they please but UK cannot agree to recognizing in advance King’s title even “subject to referendum,” for reasons stated above.
This combination of practical, polit and moral reasons held by Brit against any compromise affecting the Sudan makes it difficult to see how Eden cld be argued out of his convictions.
If discussions on MEC can be initiated and it becomes evident that settlement of zone problem can be achieved if Sudan question solved, Eden might be willing at least to talk Sudan. Even in these circumstances Brit concessions wld be limited to what they felt they cld do without betraying their obligations to Sudanese. Only other possibility that suggests itself to us at moment is that if Sudan question kept to one side for present and real advance towards self-govt is made during coming year as UK contemplates, this might create new situation allowing for try at some arrangement that wld satisfy Egyptians.
FonOff says that is not fair to say UK is unwilling to try meet Egypt point view on Sudan but rather that it is unable to see now any way in which this can be done.
We believe above background shld be kept in mind in developing US position for coming Washington talks.2