Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

London Embassy files, lot 59 F 59, 320 Western bloc (policy): Telegram

The Ambassador in France ( Bruce ) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret priority

Paris , August 25, 1951—5 p. m.

1216. Personal for Secretary. Reference Deptels 1031 and 1066.² This is fifth and last in series of messages responsive reftels. First two have gone forward as Embtels 1184 and 1185 and intermediate messages will follow.³

This contains my recommendations on best approach to Schuman in September, subject to possible further comments after receipt his reply your message August 9 (Deptel 905⁴).

The most effective approach to French Foreign Minister to obtain desired French Government action on three major questions, namely, European Defense Forces, contractual arrangements with Germany and an adequate French defense effort would be to eliminate possible uncertainties in his mind and in those of his colleagues as to US policy on these questions.

A. In order to encourage progress in European Defense Forces Conference US should make clear that its policy is as follows:

1. That US is convinced that European defense comniunity is most practical means:

a. To create and maintain effective European defense with the minimum drain on Europe’s economic resources for this purpose;

b. To obtain German contribution needed for European defense with minimum risk of revival of German militarism.

2. That accordingly US is actively supporting creation of European defense community on the following assumptions:

a. That present French Government is determined to create European Defense Forces as rapidly as possible;

b. That since decisions facing the European countries are very fundamental and hence require reasonable time to obtain firm acceptance by both parliaments and public opinion—even if this requires modification of existing deadlines—pressure will be maintained by all participating governments for rapid settlement of outstanding questions;

c. That treaty will be rapidly signed and ratified;

d. That outstanding questions will have been settled in manner to create an effective defense force;

e. That German recruitment will begin immediately after treaty has been ratified and in any case without waiting for commissioner to be able to exercise his full functions.

3. That US will actively support all realistic steps toward European integration as best means for effective defense, economic progress and political stability. In particular the US:

a. Will work to strengthen European institutions (such as Schuman Plan High Authority and EDF Commissioner) as they are created;

b. Will as appropriate act through European agencies, rather than with the member states, in the areas of their competence;

c. Will strongly urge active British cooperation and support of integration on continent even if they do not wish to join.

B. In order to obtain French cooperation in working out new political status for Germany consistent with role as freely participating member in commen defense, US should ask French government to conduct negotiations on contractual arrangements on premise of establishment of European defense forces. It would be understood that French position is conditional on German ratification of European Defense Forces Treaty. In this way the non-restrictive situation permitted by creation of EDF could reduce controls established under contractual arrangements to minimum. It is preferable to give generous arrangements immediately in order to strengthen democratic forces in Germany sincerely committed to European community rather than have concessions extorted later by extremists in detriment to status of Adenauer and his supporters.

In pressing this policy on Foreign Minister Schuman it should be made clear that US will take account of extra risks assumed by France and other countries in forming defense community with Germany and will urge British to do the same. In particular, this will mean:

a. That US, France and, we hope, Great Britain will assure in some way continuance in Germany of a stable democratic order which will live up to its engagements, and

b. That the US intends to continue its support and assistance on which the success of the European community depends;

c. That US hopes Schuman will be successful in obtaining rapid ratification of coal-steel community treaty;

d. That, if Schuman raises problems of Saar⁵ and development European coal crisis, US hopes he will propose European solutions for their settlement.

C. The French rearmament program as it presently exists is a subject of grave concern to French government. Competent officials and certain Ministers sense substantial revision and postponement may be inevitable for following reasons:

1. In their view, additional substantial increase which would be required in calendar 1952 defense appropriations to carry out present program is out of question because economic assistance from US and other countries will not be large enough to provide flow of supplemental resources into French economy adequate to justify risk of substantial new inflationary financing and to prevent serious depreciation international value of French franc. Rightly or wrongly there is considerable dissatisfaction with administration of US assistance since bilateral talks last October. Revelation that $290 million was ECA figure allocated to French for US fiscal 1952 in light of French plans came as surprise. Assuming additional cuts by Congress will reduce this figure to little more than equivalent of amount necessary to cover their dollar debt servicing, they do not see how US administration can commit itself to additional help even if it should wish to do so.

2. In their view French forces have real significance for security of France and for NATO only in conjunction with collective allied forces and it is questionable whether present French rearmament program provides for creation of type of forces and equipment adequately related to those of France’s allies. Opinion is increasing that substantial revisions in French program are required if French build-up is to proceed in a balanced way and to be fully consistent with European defense forces and collective NATO forces.

3. In their minds there is an increasing political and military urgency for France to make its full contribution to European defense in view of necessity for quick solution German problem. This will require a new assessment of the French effort in Indo-China. The question is very acutely raised as to how France can carry Indo-China and European defense tasks at same time. This relates not only to financial capabilities but also to capabilities in terms of officers, technicians, men and resources as well.

Maximum encouragement will be given France to continue its defense efforts both in Europe and in Indo-China and to take lead in committing member nations to undertake a maximum feasible goal in EDF treaty if the Secretary can declare that US policy will be along following lines:

a. To continue to provide such margin of financial assistance through ECA as would enable France and other countries to carry out level of defense substantially in excess of amounts which would be possible if plans had to be based only on their own resources. If Congressional action should not make it possible to realize this policy fully, to be prepared to consider maximum flexibility in use of US funds, for example, by utilizing US defense appropriations for off-shore procurement to assist in meeting payments problem, or by accepting broader definition of end-items in military assistance program. If this is still not adequate, to seek a supplemental appropriation;

b. To assist the EDF Conference, and later the institutions of the EDF, in working out a balanced defense program to develop in an orderly way over 3 years;

c. To provide a single program of military equipment and supplies in specific quantities for EDF to complement a single production program to be provided by EDF.

René Mayer, as well as Schuman, will probably wish to raise these questions while in Washington. In view of delay and difficulties being encountered with respect to enactment of aid legislation for FY 1952 they realize that it may not be possible to obtain any positive commitments from US in immediate future. However, they feel they must begin to seek your views on these questions in connection with preparation of their 1952 budget, which is scheduled for submission to French Parliament during autumn months. In this connection, they may indicate that if it should appear that an agreed balanced program and an understanding with US will be long delayed, they may have to present military budget on an interim basis on assumption of no US economic assistance with understanding that voting of supplementary program would be requested later in line with agreed allocation of tasks and with amount of assistance forthcoming.

Obvious that French government feels great concern at repercussions both at home and abroad which would result from announcement of downward revision or postponement of French defense program.

Bruce

1. Repeated to London for Gilford and Spofford and to Frankfurt for McCloy. The text of this message was subsequently included as an annex to document WFM T–4/2a, dated September 8, a briefing paper for the Ministers meetings entitled “European Defense Force and the Question of a German Contribution to Defense,” prepared in the Department of State, not printed.
2. Neither printed; regarding these messages of August 17 and 18, see footnotes 2 and 3, p. 856.
3. For telegrams 1184 and 1185, August 24, from Paris, see pp. 856 and 859. Telegrams 1265 and 1266, August 28, from Paris, neither printed, the third and fourth in the series of five telegrams under reference, contained detailed comment and analysis of certain major points in the Interim Report of the European Defense Conference (740.5/8–2851). For extracts from the Interim Report, see p. 843.
4. Not printed; the text of the message under reference is printed, p. 1164.
5. For documentation on the question of the Saar, see pp. 1970 ff.