795.00/7–1450: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

top secret

124. After allowing time for Indian Ambassador to advise British Ambassador (as Radhakrishnan said he would do in item (c) opening paragraph mytel 111, July 13 to Department, repeated New Delhi as 10) of his own approaches to me on ways of solving Korean question and my unreceptive reaction to this plan, I saw Kelly 6 p. m. yesterday and in course of talk asked if he had seen Radhakrishnan recently. Not since Saturday (8 July) said Kelly but I had a note from him last night (12th), in which Radhakrishnan deplored unhappy situation in Korea, no appeasement possible but could not something be done to restore authority UNSC, such as Chinese Communist representation and return USSE to meeting; and ending with expressions sorrow over bloodshed and hope something could be arranged. Kelly says he wrote in reply that in general he shared sentiments of concern over [Page 379] situation and bloodshed but of course HMG was in close touch with Indian High Commissioner in London as well as through British High Commissioner in New Delhi, with GOI (Kelly did not show me notes nor had he made any report this exchange).

I then summarized my two talks: That of 7 July (Embtel 76, July 8)1 which Kelly said Radhakrishnan had mentioned on 8 July visit to British Embassy; and that of 12 July (Embtel 111). British Ambassador was surprised at Indian Ambassador’s lack of frankness with him but said in view Radhakrishnan’s assurances to me (as per (a) in mytel 111 that suggestion was abandoned), it was perhaps just as well Radhakrishnan had sent his note since personal visit just then might have made difficult avoid reference to recent talks British Ambassador with Gromyko.

I left the matter there with understanding that fuller briefing for background could be given Kelly whenever desirable. We did agree Radhakrishnan was vague and starry-eyed, rather professorial in manner, and gave impression of not always paying close attention to what was being told him. However both Kelly and I are of opinion Radhakrishnan inclines to exaggerate his powers although to Nehru he may have private pipeline.

Indian Embassy press release (Embtel 123, July 142) is hard to reconcile with statements made to me on Wednesday3 at 5 p. m. except on assumption Radhakrishnan received further instructions.

Department pass London, Delhi; repeated info London 46, Delhi 13.

  1. Not printed; it dealt mainly with Indian concern over the reaction of the People’s Republic of China to the recent U.S. course of action respecting Formosa (794A.00/7–850).
  2. Not printed; it transmitted the press release dealing with the Indian Ambassador’s visit to Mr. Gromyko at 4 p. m. on July 13, to deliver an urgent personal message from Prime Minister Nehru for Generalissimo Stalin (601. 9161/7–1450). The message was similar to that sent to Mr. Acheson (see the memorandum by Mr. McGhee, July 13, p. 372.
  3. July 12; see telegram 111, from Moscow, July 13, p. 370.