795.00/7–750: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
top secret
niact
niact
Washington, July 7,
1950—12 noon.
83. Eyes only for the Ambassador. Please see Bevin1 or Younger2 immediately and present following US views on Gromyko approach of July 6 to Brit Amb Moscow:
- (1)
- Although it is impossible to be certain that this is not an attempt to confuse issue and weaken our common resolve, we are inclined to regard this as serious approach designed to find way to end Korean affair without undue prestige loss to USSR but presumably for price as yet undisclosed.
- (2)
- We agree that any move which might lead to peace should have the most serious consideration. However, we believe it important not to appear over-anxious and we are not willing to bargain away positions in exchange for termination of aggression against SK.
- (3)
- We believe there would be advantage in Brit Amb Moscow playing matter out somewhat further without involving US or other govts in order to get clearer picture of what Soviets have in mind.
- (4)
- We believe it of greatest importance that further responses to Gromyko should be wholly within framework UNSC Korea Resolutions of June 25 and 27 and should not become involved in other issues on which Soviets might attempt to extort concessions (e.g. Chinese representation in UN or Formosa).
- (5)
- Foregoing for confidential info HMG only. Following three paras contain substance suggested approach to Gromyko.
- (6)
- We believe Brit Amb might see Gromyko and reiterate three specific points in UNSC res of June 25, i.e., immediate cessation of [Page 328] hostilities, immediate withdrawal of NK forces behind 38th parallel, UNCOK observation of withdrawal NK forces, and call Gromyko’s attention to fact that forces are now in SK in response to UNSC resolutions of June 25 and 27. Brit Amb might say UK believes details of arrangements for withdrawal NK forces and restoration status quo ante (but see para (7) below) could be worked out if USSR willing to use its influence NK forces to obtain acceptance three specific points of June 25 res. Time and circumstances of withdrawal of forces from SK which are acting on behalf UN would have to be considered by UNSC in light situation and speed with which peace and security can be restored.
- (7)
- Above is related to immediate restoration peace in Korea and is without prejudice to UN view re ultimate settlement that UNCOK should be permitted to carry out program in Korea as recommended by UNGA.
- (8)
- If Brit Amb is asked whether he is representing views of US, it is suggested he make clear that he is speaking for his own govt but if Gromyko has any comments or views which he wishes to have transmitted to other members of SC, his govt would be glad to assist.
Acheson