Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63L351: NSC 73 Series

Report by the National Security Council

top secret

[Washington,] August 25, 1950.

NSC 73/4

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on the Position and Actions of the United States With Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation

References:	A. NSC 73 Series
	B. NSC Actions Nos. 348,1 337,2 331,3 3154 and 308b5
	C. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject dated August 9, 16 and 25, 19506

The National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury at its 66th Meeting with the President presiding (NSC Action No. 348), considered a draft report on the subject (NSC 73/3)⁷ and adopted it subject to the deletion of sub-paragraphs 40a (2), (3), (4) and 40b, and sub-paragraph 44c as proposed by the Secretary of State, and the addition of new paragraphs 37c, 45 and 46 based on proposals by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The revised report enclosed herewith, adopted as a working guide with the understanding that final recommendations to the President regarding U.S. actions in the event of any of the contingencies envisaged therein would be deferred until it is established that the event is certain to occur, is circulated accordingly for the information of the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury and referred to the NSC Staff for continuing study and recommendations regarding the contingencies envisaged therein.

The revisions to NSC 73/3 as proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and introduced at the Council meeting by the Chairman, JCS, are being circulated separately for the information of the Council by the reference memorandum of August 25, 1950.⁸

It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the handling of this report.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Report by the National Security Council

top secret

[Washington, August 25, 1950.]

The Position and Actions of the United States With Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation

the problem

1. To estimate possible further Soviet moves and assess and appraise the position and actions of the United States with respect thereto in the light of the Korean situation.

analysis

Introduction

2. In determining our position and our actions in the present crisis we must bear in mind that the fundamental objective of the United States is to maintain the integrity and vitality of its free society and the measure of world order necessary thereto. This involves the willingness to fight for that objective if necessary. Although a global war has not necessarily begun in Korea and may not eventuate, the U.S. has nevertheless been engaged in a crucial struggle for some time involving political, economic and military factors. As the aggressor continues his policy of expansion, we must accept the possibility of local conflicts and must devise the right policies, diplomatic and military, to meet these aggressions. The military capabilities of the United States are not adequate to its current commitments and responsibilities. As a deterrent, and also in preparation for possible eventualities, the degree of our military readiness should therefore be increased as a matter of the utmost urgency. We should also by means short of war build up the military strength of the free world and step up the implementation of a political, economic, and psychological offensive against the USSR.

3. These actions which the United States with its allies should now be taking to regain the initiative, to deter further aggression, and to increase our ability to defeat aggression, are not included in this report, although their critical importance should not be overlooked. The present situation requires many such measures, some of which are now being undertaken. Others are under study and will be the subject of subsequent recommendations, including those which will flow from NSC 68. These measures should be taken regardless of future Soviet actions so long as the USSR retains its present capabilities and intentions to threaten the security of the United States.

General

4. It is a tenet of communism that war between communist and non-communist countries is inevitable. This conviction is a basic premise in the determination of Soviet policy, although history has shown that Russia can be influenced to delay action or retreat from local objectives if strongly opposed. The Kremlin is determined first to protect and to preserve its regime in Russia and second to promote world communism. The USSR is the implacable enemy of the United States and the non-communist world. Therefore, the degradation, weakening and ultimate destruction of the United States are essential to the attainment of the aims of the USSR.

5. In assessing the danger of further aggressive moves directed by the USSR, it is essential to take into account estimated Soviet military capabilities and, in so far as possible, to assess Soviet intentions. The USSR has the military capability to occupy any country on its periphery, to invade Western Europe and the Near and Middle East, to make direct attacks upon the United Kingdom and Alaska and upon shipping, and to reinforce the communist military effort in the Ear East. The USSR also has the capability of initiating limited-scale air attacks on the United States and Canada. The USSR is not, however, believed to have at the present time the capability of preventing the United States from carrying out an atomic attack. On the other hand, the USSR may have the capability of reducing our industrial potential. The USSR, by provoking insurrections and satellite armed actions simultaneously on many fronts, and without openly committing its own forces, would confront the United States and its allies with the following alternatives: abandoning positions of vital political and strategic importance, committing and dissipating available strength on the many fronts chosen by the USSR, or undertaking global war.

6. Given these capabilities, which have existed for some time and are progressively increasing, an attempt must be made, in the light of the Korean situation, to analyze and evaluate further possible short-range moves by the USSR. This is a short-term analysis which attempts to scan only a period two or three months ahead, although the long-range possibilities cannot be ignored.

7. The opening of hostilities in Korea could conceivably mean that the Kremlin intends to embark on any one or a combination of the following courses of action:

a. To initiate global war.

b. To employ Soviet forces, alone or with satellite forces, in isolated or piecemeal attacks against local and limited objectives, not designed to bring on global war.

c. To inspire further aggression using only satellite forces, but not using USSR armed forces.

d. To probe U.S. determination and military effectiveness.

Possibility of Global War

8. It has been our estimate that the Kremlin did not intend to engage in a major war and might be deterred from initiating such a war in the future if confronted with sufficient political, economic and military strength designed to force the retreat of Russian communism. This estimate has not necessarily been invalidated by the events of the past few weeks, which are consistent with the following interpretation:

a. In causing the attack to be launched in Korea, the Kremlin did not intend to bring about a global war and did not expect, although militarily prepared for, United States military involvement in Korea. The probable aim of the Kremlin was simply to gain control of the entire Korean peninsula and thus to strengthen materially its strategic position in Northern Asia with global political and military results.

b. The Kremlin seems to have calculated its moves with a view to keeping the responsibility of the Soviet Government unengaged and its own military forces uncommitted.

9. On the other hand, the events of the past few weeks could be interpreted as the first phase of a general Soviet plan for global war. Should the Kremlin in fact be desirous of or reconciled to a global war, of which the Korean situation is the first phase, the following considerations might govern its actions in the near future:

a. The Kremlin might be disposed to forego any action which it calculated would provoke global war until such time as the United States had reached the point of maximum diversion and attrition of its forces-in-being without involvement of the military forces of the Soviet Union, or until it had developed its atomic striking capabilities to the point which it deemed desirable for a general attack on the West. As long as we are being forced to commit ever greater increments of our forces-in-being in Korea, the Kremlin might not hasten the outbreak of general hostilities since the USSR would be increasing its own capabilities as those of the U.S. diminished. This could change, however, at the point where the Kremlin estimated that our maximum weakness had been reached, and that further passage of time leading to the material strengthening of the relative position and military posture of the United States would not work to Soviet advantage.

b. The Kremlin might undertake immediate and simultaneous attack in all possible theatres of action.

c. Such attack could be accompanied or immediately followed by a direct attack upon the continent of North America, since a Soviet attack upon United States territory as well as upon its armed forces abroad is a Soviet capability.

d. In view of the advantages of surprise and of the desirability for an enemy of the United States to strike a serious blow at the North American industrial potential, the possibility must be constantly borne in mind that the Kremlin might now decide to initiate global war by a direct surprise attack upon the territory of the United States before taking the actions referred to in a or b above.

10. Global war could come in one of three ways: (a) by Soviet design; (b) by a progression of developments growing out of the present situation; or (c) by a miscalculation on the part of either the U.S. or the USSR. If there were evidence justifying the assumption of immediate global war by Soviet design, the only course for the United States would be full preparation at full speed. While not ruling out the possibility that global war is imminent, it is not yet a sufficient certainty to be the assumption on which U.S. action should be based. The present question is one of the degree of preparation we should undertake to improve our ability to meet any of the eventualities treated in this paper. Our efforts should be urgently directed toward preventing global war from developing and toward increasing our war capabilities.

Isolated Use of Soviet Forces Alone or With Satellite Forces to Achieve Local Objectives Not Designed To Bring on Global War

11. USSR action in regard to Korea, and its employment of satellite forces there, should be regarded not as an isolated phenomenon but possibly as part of a general plan which might involve correlated action in other parts of the world. A danger of direct commitment of Soviet forces is in Korea itself where actual conflict is in progress between the United States and a Soviet satellite. A successful repulse of the North Korean invasion would not merely restore the status quo. United States troops would be back in force in South Korea, and a build-up of military strength in certain of the non-communist areas of the Far East would have taken place.

12. The Kremlin might be prepared to accept in varying degrees the risks of a general conflict by launching local armed attacks in order to attain objectives regarded as of importance to the Soviet Union. Without automatically starting global war by attacking American troops or a country covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, the principal areas where actual Soviet forces could be employed for a local purpose are Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Finland. In addition to any one or more of these local operations, the Soviets would still be capable of conducting with surprise important operations simultaneously in Germany and Austria, in the Near, Middle and Far East, and against the United Kingdom and the North American continent. Soviet forces are already deployed in sufficient strength to give them the military capability to act in many areas. The following specific comments apply to: Iran, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Finland, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

a. In the case of Iran, it is possible but not probable that the Soviet Government would regard the risk of general war as relatively small while at the same time the acquisition of the Near Eastern oil fields and the consequent domination of the European economy which would result, and the reduction of a threat to the Baku oil region of the Soviet Union, are important Soviet objectives. Overt USSR attack on Iran would in fact give rise to the risk of global war.

b. In the case of Turkey, the control of the Turkish Straits and the approaches to the eastern Mediterranean represent very important military considerations from the point of view of Soviet defense as well as a traditional and deep-seated Russian objective. The denial of Soviet control of the Turkish Straits is vital to the security interests of the United States. Therefore, a direct USSR attack on Turkey would involve serious risk of precipitating global war.

c. In the case of Greece, the control of the Peloponnesus and the Greek Islands would present to the USSR very important military and political advantages. Geographically, Greece is a salient through the ring of non-communist states which enclose the Soviet hegemony, and its possession would provide to the USSR access to the Mediterranean Sea as well as a strategic position with respect to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Near East, and the Dardanelles. Direct USSR attack upon Greece would probably precipitate global war because of the political commitments and military and sentimental associations of the United Kingdom and the United States with Greece.

d. Re-establishment of Soviet control over Yugoslavia would bring definite military advantages to the USSR. At the same time, the Kremlin would have to weigh the political advantages of eliminating a dangerous source of communist heresy against the political disadvantages of a Soviet armed assault on a communist regime, which would tend to deepen rather than heal the disruptive effect of independent tendencies in the communist parties in the free world. Unless such an assault were quickly successful, the repercussions throughout the foreign communist parties would be harmful to the Kremlin’s prestige and control of the international communist movement. Success in Yugoslavia would enable the communists to renew guerrilla operations against Greece from Yugoslavia as well as from Bulgaria and Albania. Direct USSR attacks on Yugoslovia would include a risk of involving the Western Powers and might lead to global war.

e. Occupation of Finland, while completely within Soviet capabilities, would undoubtedly encounter fierce and continued Finnish guerrilla resistance, which might render Finland less useful to the USSR for the immediate future than the present state of Soviet-Finnish relations.

f. Afghanistan and Pakistan are of strategic value to the USSR because of their geographical position. Afghanistan could be occupied with little effort. An attack on Pakistan would require much more effort and would incur serious risk of global war because of Pakistan’s membership in the British Commonwealth.

13. Unless the Kremlin is willing to accept global war it will not commit Soviet armed forces to action in Germany and Austria.

Soviet-Inspired Aggression Using Satellite Forces

14. The USSR might gain considerably from a policy of initiation of piecemeal attacks by present or created satellite forces against Yugoslavia, Iran, Greece, Turkey, or other states around the Soviet periphery. Further, it might be distinctly to the political and military advantage of the USSR to involve the allied nations progressively in conflict without a declaration of war on the part of the USSR or without commitment of its military forces. Such action might leave the allies with the alternative of fighting an undeclared war, or of being open to the charge of aggression by initiating a declaration of war. None of these areas is one in which the USSR particularly needs the advantage of surprise. Furthermore, the military and political capabilities of the USSR and its satellites are so great as to permit it to direct piecemeal action against isolated areas while still retaining the capability of strategic surprise. A progressive series of peace-meal attacks from the periphery of the USSR would confront the United States and its allies with the issue of global war.

15. It is presently estimated that Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, collectively do not possess the capabilities for a successful assault on Asiatic Turkey, although they could overrun portions of European Turkey. Even with military assistance and leadership from the USSR comparable to that provided the North Koreans, it is estimated that Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary could not successfully attack Asiatic Turkey. A satellite attack on Yugoslavia is a possibility. A resumption of fighting in Greece is also a possibility.

16. The use of Polish and Czechoslovakian troops is always a military possibility in any action in Europe. However, withdrawal of large numbers of troops from Poland and Czechoslovakia might require the employment of other forces to maintain the present communist regime.

17. The use of the East German para-military forces against allied troops in Germany is another possibility. It is doubtful that this force would undertake a direct attack on any of the western zones. Such an attack could not easily be undertaken without directly involving the Soviet Union. If all or a large part of this force were sent into the western sectors of Berlin it might overcome the small forces of the western powers there. Such overt action by the East German police force would again be difficult without directly involving the Soviet military authorities. The East German forces might be useful to the Soviet Union in connection with a blockade of Berlin.

18. Further use of the Chinese communists, including the employment of organized Chinese communist forces against South Korea and Southeast Asia, is a strong possibility. They are the only satellite forces in Asia which could commit major acts of aggression. The Chinese communists are anxious to control Formosa (including the Pescadores) and have announced their determination to do so regardless of U.S. decisions or actions. While an early attack on Formosa is a continuing possibility, its success would be doubtful unless accompanied by a collapse of the Nationalist forces and regime. The United States is proceeding with steps designed to enhance the defensive capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists (NSC 37/10).⁹

19. Chinese communist attacks on the islands near China held by the Nationalists can be expected to continue.

20. Chinese communists, in addition to an attack on Formosa, have the military capability to enter directly the Korean war and to initiate military action against Indochina or Burma or Tibet. Any or all of these actions are possible. A move against Tibet may be expected.

21. Chinese communists have the military capability to capture Macao and Hong Kong. Civil disorder, subversion, and sabotage, appear to be the more likely actions, particularly in Hong Kong, since these could in all probability eventually achieve the objective without military involvement.

22. The capabilities of the Chinese communists outlined above contribute to the over-all capabilities of the USSR since any major military success by these forces in the Far East, with the consequent political results, adds security to the Soviet eastern flank and lessens the probability that the Soviet may have to fight on two fronts simultaneously.

23. Considerable numbers of Japanese prisoners remain under Soviet control and constitute a potential for infiltration of Japan should conditions in that country invite such action. The diversion of U.S. occupation forces from Japan to Korea, the lack of Japanese defense forces, and the inadequacy of Japanese police, present a dangerous situation which must be kept under review.

Probable Non-Military Moves by the USSR

24. The USSR will undoubtedly direct communist parties and stooge groups abroad to embarrass us in every conceivable way. Intensified communist subversive or revolutionary activity might fully engage local military resources throughout Asia, as well as involve additional United States and allied military resources.

25. The following examples will provide cases in point. Current conditions in Iran, though improving, still provide wide opportunities for subversive and communist infiltration, particularly for attempted seizure of the government by the communist-dominated Tudeh Party. In addition, guerrilla operations fostered by the Soviets might be successful in Azerbaijan. The testing of our firmness in other areas may take every form known to communist ingenuity. Provocations and annoyances may occur, even up to and including an attempt to reimpose the Berlin blockade or to blockade Vienna. If any weakness or hesitation on the part of the United States is encountered anywhere it will be instantaneously exploited by the communists to undermine confidence in and support of the United States everywhere.

26. In addition, the USSR may well seek to create division in the UN membership with respect to the police action in Korea by playing upon hopes of a peaceful settlement, creating the impression that major concessions to the UN position may be forthcoming, or even by offering such concessions in a context in which the USSR would gain substantial though perhaps not immediately obvious advantages if such a settlement were made. If the UN forces were to be dislodged from the peninsula the theme of accepting a fait accompli would certainly be played for all it is worth. It is also to be anticipated that the USSR will make every effort to exploit the division between the United States and other non-communist powers on the issue of Formosa. In general there will also no doubt be a continuance of the peace offensive designed both to divide the U.S. and its allies and to create in the latter domestic division between elements determined to resist Soviet aggression and elements which lack such determination. The United States must also be alert to the possibilities of sabotage and subversion in this country.

conclusions

part i

Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Immediate Future

Possibility of Global War

27. Since 1945 the USSR has continued materially to increase its capability to wage global war. Even though there is no conclusive indication that the USSR intends to launch a global war at this time, the danger of Soviet resort to war, either deliberately or by miscalculation, may have been increased by the Korean war. Even an immediate solution of the Korean crisis would not obviate this danger.

Isolated Use of Soviet Forces Alone or With Satellite Forces To Achieve Local Objectives Not Designed To Bring on Global War

28. There is as yet no conclusive evidence that the Soviet Government has or has not decided to commit its forces, alone or with satellite forces, in isolated or piecemeal attacks against local and limited objectives, without intending to bring on global war. However, if a decision should be made to use USSR forces in this manner, action could be taken with varying degrees of risk in any of the following areas: Finland, Korea, the Near and Middle East, and the Balkans.

Soviet-Inspired Aggression Using Satellite Forces

29. Use of European and Asiatic satellite military forces against a variety of objectives is a possibility for the immediate future.

a. An immediate possibility is the use of Chinese communist forces in Korea and against Formosa. The prevention of an invasion of Formosa is primarily the responsibility of CINCFE employing the United States Seventh Fleet and appropriate air forces. The success of an early attack on Formosa would be doubtful unless accompanied by the collapse of the Nationalist forces and regime.

b. In addition, depending upon developments in the world situation, the USSR might inspire aggression by satellite forces against Western Germany (including Berlin), Austria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Tibet, Burma, Indochina, Hong Kong, and Macao.

Probable Non-Military Moves by the USSR

30. We must also expect a variety of Soviet efforts to achieve victories by subversive action and tactical maneuvers in the “peace offensive” to keep us off balance, to divert our attention, to waste our resources, to test our firmness, and to split the free world.

part ii

U.S. Actions To Counter Further Soviet Moves in the Immediate Future

General

31. The Korean war is only an additional and more acute manifestation of the chronic world situation resulting from the Kremlin design for world domination through the international communist conspiracy. This situation requires many measures designed to enable the free world to regain the initiative, to deter further aggression, and to increase ability to defeat aggression if it occurs. Some of these measures are now being undertaken. Others are under study and will be the subject of subsequent recommendations, including those which will follow from NSC 68. These measures should be taken regardless of future Soviet action so long as the USSR retains its present capabilities and intention to threaten the security of the United States.

32. The United States should as rapidly as possible increase the build-up of its military and supporting strength in order to reach at the earliest possible time and maintain for as long as necessary a level of constant military readiness adequate to support U.S. foreign policy, to deter Soviet aggression, and to form the basis for fighting a global war should war prove unavoidable. The program for the increased military stature and preparedness of the U.S. should proceed without regard to possible temporary relaxation of international tension and without regard to isolated instances of aggression unless the latter provide evidence of the imminence of war, which would call for full preparation at full speed.

33. The United States should urgently press forward to obtain, through appropriate channels, knowledge or understandings as to the willingness of United Nations members to hold Russia responsible at a proper time within the structure of the United Nations, for satellite aggression.

34. Pending the fundamental policy decisions, now under study, on which U.S. action to meet further Soviet moves should be based, the United States should take the action set forth in the following paragraphs in response to such further Soviet or Soviet-inspired moves as may occur in the next two or three months.

USSR or Soviet-Inspired Aggression

35. In the event of an overt attack by organized USSR military forces against the territory or armed forces of the United States, the immediate action of the United States should be to react to the attack in accordance with existing directives, and to proceed with full preparation at full speed to meet the situation created. In the event of any attack covered by the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, which includes attack in Germany and Austria, the United States would respond in accordance with its obligations under that Treaty.

36. In case of other overt aggression by organized USSR military forces, or in case of further Soviet-inspired aggression in Europe, and depending upon the nature of the aggression and the country attacked, the United States in common prudence would have to proceed on the assumption that global war is probably imminent. Accordingly, recognizing that its response will vary with circumstances and should be subject to the specific consideration of detailed cases set forth in paragraph 37 below, the United States should immediately:

a. Make every effort in the light of the circumstances to localize the action, to stop the aggression by political measures and to ensure the unity of the free world if war nevertheless follows. These measures should include direct diplomatic action and resort to the United Nations with the objectives of:

(1) In the case of Soviet-inspired overt aggressions, accelerating measures to identify the true source of the aggression in order that at a time most advantageous to the United States, the Soviet Union itself could be exposed as the aggressor.

(2) Making clear to the world United States preference for a peaceful settlement and the conditions upon which the United States would, in concert with other members of the United Nations, accept such a settlement.

(3) Consulting with members of the United Nations regarding their willingness to join with the United States in military opposition, if necessary, to the aggression.

In addition, the United States should give consideration to the possibility of a direct approach to the highest Soviet leaders.

b. Consult with selected allies to perfect coordination of plans.

c. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the eventuality of global war, and therefore prepare to execute emergency war plans; but should, in so far as it has any choice, enter into full-scale hostilities only at the moment and in the manner most favorable to it in the light of the situation then existing.

d. While minimizing United States military commitments in areas of little strategic significance, take action with reference to the aggression to the extent and in the manner best contributing to the implementation of United States national war plans.

37. Specific immediate actions to be taken in general accordance with paragraph 36:

a. In the event of overt attack by organized USSR military forces against:

(1) Finland or Afghanistan: The United States should itself take no military action in these countries to oppose the aggression. The emphasis of the action taken would be placed upon political and psychological measures, which, in the case of Afghanistan would include efforts to induce Pakistan and India to take a leading role.

(2) Yugoslavia: The United States should implement existing policy (NSC 18/4)¹⁰ pending a review of that policy, with the purpose of denying to the USSR effective control of this country.

(3) Greece or Turkey: The United States should provide accelerated military assistance to Greece or Turkey and deploy such United States forces to the support of those countries as can be made available without jeopardizing United States national security. In the case of Turkey the United States should urge the United Kingdom and France to give full support under the Anglo-French-Turkish mutual assistance pact, and should make every effort to obtain the support of Turkey by the Moslem world including Pakistan.

(4) Iran: The United States should initially rely on the United Kingdom for principal responsibility to assist Iran in meeting the aggression, should endeavor to induce Pakistan and India to take a leading role, and should deploy such forces to the Near and Middle East and the Persian Gulf areas as can be made available without jeopardizing United States security or its ability to implement emergency war plans.

b. In the event of Soviet-inspired satellite aggression against Yugoslavia or Greece, the United States should take the same action as if the attack were directly by Soviet forces, as called for in subparagraphs (2) and (3) under a. above.

c. Germany. In the event of a major attack by East German paramilitary forces on Berlin or on West Germany, such attack should be resisted by Allied occupation forces.

38. In the event of any new single overt act of aggression by Soviet satellite armed forces in the Far East, the United States, subject to specific consideration of detailed cases set forth in paragraphs 39–41 below, should:

a. Attempt to localize the conflict.

b. Take all possible counter-measures short of seriously impairing the ability to execute emergency war plans.

c. Seek the support of its allies and take appropriate steps in the UN.

d. Concurrently recognize the increased strain on the fabric of world peace arising from a further act of aggression following on the Korean episode.

39. Formosa. Specific actions to be taken in general accordance with paragraph 38: In the event of a Chinese Communist attack on Formosa or the Pescadores, the United States should repel the assault in accordance with existing directives but should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China. In any event, U.S. ground forces should not be committed on Formosa. In the event the Chinese Communists succeed in defeating the Chinese Nationalist forces, the United States, bearing in mind its desire to avoid general war with Communist China, should review the situation to determine its further action and to decide whether to cease all military operations against the Chinese Communists.

40. Korea. Specific actions to be taken in general accordance with paragraph 38:

a. In the event that North Korean forces, alone or plus such reinforcements as may covertly be brought into action, are powerful enough to compel the withdrawal of UN forces in Korea, the South Korean Government should be evacuated from the Korean mainland and established at an appropriate place in the area, if practicable.

b. In the event of the overt use of organized Chinese Communist forces in Korea:

• “(1) The United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China.
• (2) As long as action by UN military forces now committed or planned for commitment in Korea offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, such action should be continued and extended to include authority to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U.S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further U.S. courses of action;”

41. Other Far Eastern Areas. Specific actions to be taken in general accordance with paragraph 38:

a. In the event of Chinese communist aggression against Chinese inshore islands, Tibet, or Macao, the United States should take political action but would not expect to take military action.

b. If such aggression were directed against Burma, the United States acting through the British, should accelerate its assistance to that government and endeavor to induce states in the neighborhood of Burma to commit ground forces to resist the aggression.

c. If such aggression were directed against Hong Kong the United States should consider furnishing relief assistance to the British and such military assistance as may be appropriate in the light of our own military commitments and capabilities at that time.

d. In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese communist forces against Indochina, the United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China but should, in concert with the U.K., support France and the associated states, and accelerate and expand the present military assistance program.

Non-Military Moves by the USSR

42. Berlin Blockade. In the event the USSR re-imposes the Berlin blockade, the United States should react at once since the maintenance of our position in Berlin is of great importance to the interests of the United States. The matter should be immediately referred to the United Nations. Although the re-establishment of the full-scale airlift would be militarily unsound and is impracticable under present conditions, a partial airlift should be established by the United States, the United Kingdom, and any other states able and willing to contribute pending the completion of a study now under way regarding the measures to be taken to meet such a situation.

43. Vienna Blockade. In the event the USSR should impose a blockade of Vienna, the establishment of a full-scale airlift would be militarily unsound and is impracticable under present conditions. The United States should implement existing policy (NSC 38/6)¹¹ to the extent feasible, utilizing a partial airlift to be established by the United States, the U.K. and any other nations able and willing to contribute.

44. Iran. In the event of internal subversion leading toward the establishment of a communist-dominated government in Iran, the United States should:

a. Accelerate its assistance to the legitimate Iranian Government.

b. Consider seeking an agreement in the UN on charging the USSR with direct responsibility for conditions in Iran.

45. While recognizing the importance of United States assistance and support of the United Nations, and while wholly supporting its aims and objectives, the United States cannot yet rely on the United Nations as the sole instrumentality for safeguarding essential United States security interests.

46. Before commitment is made for any action contemplated in this paper involving use of military forces the Department of Defense will be consulted for a last minute evaluation as to the military soundness of the decision in the light of the military commitments and capabilities existent at the time.

1. Action No. 348 indicated that at its 66th Meeting, August 24, the National Security Council adopted NSC 73/4 (NSC 73/3 as amended) and referred it to the NSC Staff “for continuing study and recommendations regarding the contingencies envisaged therein.” (S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66D95: NSC Actions)
2. Action No. 337 indicated that at its 64th Meeting, August 10, the National Security Council deferred action on draft report NSC 73/2, not printed, pending further study through the NSC Staff, and directed the Staff to expedite completion of the report. (S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66D95: NSC Actions)
3. Action No. 331 indicated that at its 63rd Meeting, August 3, the National Security Council referred draft report NSC 73/1, not printed, back to the NSC Staff for reconsideration in light of revisions proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66D95: NSC Actions)
4. Action No. 315 indicated that at its 60th Meeting, July 6, the National Security Council noted and discussed a statement by the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board (S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66D95: NSC Actions). For text of the statement, see p. 338.
5. See footnote 1, p. 331.
6. None printed.
7. Not printed.
8. Not printed.
9. For text of NSC 37/10, “Immediate U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa,” a statement prepared by the Secretaries of State and Defense based on recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 3, see vol. vi, p. 413.
10. NSC 18/4, “U.S. Policy Toward the Conflict Between the USSR and Yugoslavia,” a report approved by President Truman on November 18, 1949, is scheduled for publication in volume iv.
11. Regarding NSC 38/6, “Future Courses of Action with Respect to Austria,” a report approved by President Truman on May 5, 1950, see editorial note which is scheduled for publication in volume iv.