867N.113/5–1949

The British Embassy to the Department of State 1

secret

Palestine Arms Embargo

In view of British treaty relations with certain of the Arab states and of the British Government’s concern about internal security in the Middle Eastern countries, the Foreign Office have been giving [Page 953] thought to the question whether the time has not come, now that armistice agreements have been signed, for the Palestine arms embargo to be lifted. Mr. Bevin thinks that, as Dr. Bunche has announced that he considers his mission complete, there will be no need to discuss the matter with him, but Mr. Bevin would like to learn the views of the United States Government on this question.

2. Mr. Bevin is convinced of the urgent need to make some immediate and favourable response to repeated Arab requests for arms. Now that armistice agreements covering the whole front in Palestine have been signed, and in view of the declaration which Mr. Bevin made at the signing of the Atlantic Pact to the effect that it did not minimise either British interest in or determination to support others not included in the Pact with whom the British Government had had long years of friendship and alliances, there appear to be no sufficient arguments to justify continued British refusal to supply the armaments requested. This is particularly so in the case of Egypt where, as the State Department know, the first steps towards technical military talks between the British and Egyptian authorities are now being taken. The British Ambassador at Cairo considers that the talks cannot succeed unless the arms embargo is raised, at least so far as Egypt is concerned. In order to secure British military requirements there, the British Government must be prepared to assist the Egyptian Government to build up their own military strength. The British Government cannot hope to persuade any Egyptian Government to agree to their requests unless they can prove conclusively that they are willing to help in the development of strong, well trained and well equipped Egyptian armed forces. Mr. Bevin believes that Mr. Acheson will agree that a military agreement with Egypt would have an important effect on the stability of the whole of the Middle East.

3. The need to fulfil British treaty obligations to Iraq and Transjordan is, in Mr. Bevin’s view, hardly less pressing than in the case of Egypt. There is reason to fear trouble in Arab Palestine from the ex-Mufti’s irregulars, who must now be disbanded, as well as from the Kurds in Iraq. The British Government therefore feel that the least they can do is to permit the supply of certain quantities of war material to Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan and, if necessary, to the other Arab states for internal security and training purposes. The British Government would ask for suitable guarantees that these supplies would not be used for offensive purposes in Palestine. Such supplies would, however, in any case amount to so little that any resumption of fighting against the now well-equipped Israeli army would be out of the question.

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4. Mr. Bevin is sure that Mr. Acheson will agree that it cannot have been the intention of the United Nations to make it impossible for the Arab states to keep order within their own frontiers, yet this has been the effect of the embargo, notably in Iraq. In view of the approval given by the Acting Mediator some time ago to the supply of war material by France to Syria for internal security, and of the fact that Dr. Bundle’s functions have virtually come to an end, the British Government would be prepared, provided they had the support of the United States Government, to proceed on the lines suggested above without further reference to the United Nations.

5. It may be that the United States Government, if they are in general agreement with these arguments, would prefer to deal with the matter in one stage by raising the embargo altogether forthwith. The British Government would not object to this. But since it might be held necessary to obtain a United Nations resolution for that purpose, there are perhaps advantages in going no further than the proposal made in paragraphs above. In this connexion the British Government would see no objection to the supply of war material by the United States to Israel for internal security purposes.

6. The British Government would be grateful for the views of the United States Government on this question as soon as possible.

  1. Handed to Secretary Acheson by British Ambassador Franks on April 29; see Secretary Acheson’s memorandum of conversation, April 29, p. 958.