Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

867N.01/12–2848: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Wells Stabler ¹

top secret

Washington, January 3, 1949—5 p. m.

2. Dept has given careful consideration to Jerusalem tel No. 1550 Dec 23² rptd Amman 15 and to ur 173 Dec 28,³ 172 Dec 28⁴ and 176 Dec 29.⁵ Dept’s comment on points raised as follows.

Dept anxious see peace restored to Palestine and believes should be accomplished by negotiations, either directly between parties or through Conciliation Commission. Dept would naturally welcome any concrete steps by Israelis or Arabs to bring about such negotiations. In this connection Dept has found reasonable attitude shown by TJ re negotiations with Jews extremely hopeful sign.

US, however, naturally desires avoid becoming involved in inter-Arab jealousies and intrigues and Dept regards question of TJ relations with Arab League as essentially one for determination by TJ. As you point out in ur 176 Dec 29, determining factor seems to be the military one.⁶ Dept believes final attitude TJ re Israelis will be decided by military situation, particularly position of Arab Legion, and by stand taken by UK. Not essential, therefore, and certainly undesirable that US become involved in question TJ attitude re Arab League and other Arab States.

Dept believes that most satisfactory solution disposition greater part Arab Palestine would be incorporation in Transjordan. Therefore Dept approves principle underlying Jericho resolutions.⁷

To sum up, US would like to see TJ negotiate armistice and final peace with Israelis, and believes most of Arab Palestine could be incorporated in Transjordan as outcome such negotiations. However, US can not become involved in inter-Arab politics. If King and TJ officials seek views of US on question of Palestine settlement, you are authorized to state US approval of reasonable attitude so far shown by TJ and to express US hope that TJ, as well as other Arab States, will find way of entering armistice and peace negotiations with Israelis. You are also authorized, if queried re US views on disposition Arab Palestine, to state that US believes logical outcome negotiations between TJ and Israelis would be incorporation greater part Arab Palestine in TJ. You will know best how to do this without giving impression US supporting TJ against Arab League and without involving US in Arab politics.

Lovett

1. Vice consul at Jerusalem; detailed to Amman.
2. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1687.
3. Ibid., p. 1694.
4. Not printed, but see footnote 1, ibid., p. 1700.
5. Not printed.
6. In telegram 176, Mr. Stabler gave his opinion that the “King is now in most difficult position for he sees Jews will continue war against him or Iraqis or both unless he agrees in immediate future to peace negotiations. Also knows that if war is continued, Iraqi Army and Arab Legion can be easily defeated and he will lose everything.” (867N.01/12–2948)
7. Adopted at a meeting of Palestinian Arabs at Jericho on December 1, 1948. It called for the unity of Transjordan and Arab Palestine, with Abdullah as King; see telegram 140, December 4, 1948, from Amman, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1645.