868.014/4–849: Telegram
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Cannon) to the Secretary of State
390. Moscow’s excellent 829, April 41 poses what well may be central issue in current Macedonian situation, namely your own ability and willingness follow through on implications of support for first successful rebellion in Soviet Empire. If Soviets are left to believe we regard Macedonian question as squabble over disposition remote territory by three Communist states all within Soviet orbit, they may feel free proceed with military plans of one sort or another (Legtel 389, [Page 293] April 82) as ruthlessly as they did in past within their own borders. Basis UN or other intervention can readily be obscured by casting their Macedonian exertions in form of ostensibly indigenous guerrilla actions, so-called civil war or free Macedonian Republic secession right to which both Communist theory and Yugoslav Constitution acknowledge.
It was precisely this possibility we had in mind when proposing multilateral Balkan border pact (Embtel 272, March 16) though Athens sees problem from other viewpoint (Athens 626 April 1). We would not of course recommend renunciation Epiran claim in vague hope of exemplary influence. What we were concerned with was development approach which would compel Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania to give to Greece and each other border guarantees or make it impossible for them to mask their territorial designs behind so-called guerrilla movements. We hoped our project would be thought to provide that quid fro quo which Ave entirely agree with Athens is owed to Greece.
We also thought we saw advantages in proposing that Greek Government should take lead as genuine conciliator in Balkans along these fundamental lines thus correcting popular misinterpretation its stand on Epiran territories. Value Greek claim will sooner or later have to be assessed realistically and we wonder if Greeks can count on CFM to put through question to Greece. Very bluntly present utility of claim might thus be its greatest.
If, however, Greek Government finds itself obliged hold to Pipenellis position we would suggest further study of proposal our 272 using some other sponsor. We think Bulgarians and Albanians will be wholly unable offer guarantees requested without disclosure of or serious embarrassment to Moscow’s plans for Macedonia and liquidation of Tito. Above all, proposal presented to UN would have merit focussing world attention on threat to peace inherent present Macedonian situation and thus might well impress Soviets with fact they cannot carry out overt or camouflaged aggression in Macedonia area behind curtain their own security apparatus and world indifference.
Sent Department, repeated Sofia 25, Athens 25, Moscow 52.
- The telegram under reference here expressed the belief of the Embassy in the Soviet Union that the Soviet Government was committed to the liquidation of the Tito regime in Yugoslavia and that Soviet efforts to that end would continue at an accelerating pace. The Embassy felt that the Soviet efforts would be indirect and that Yugoslavia was likely to face widespread guerrilla activity on the Greek pattern. The complete text of this telegram is printed in vol. v, p. 808.↩
- Not printed; in it Ambassador Cannon observed that the removal of Markos Vafiades taken together with recent purges in Albania and Bulgaria could possibly be seen as a prelude to hostilities in the Macedonian area, but Cannon could find no local evidence to establish the probability of early armed action. Among the consequences of the Balkan purges was the surrounding of Yugoslavia by leadership groups thoroughly subservient to the Soviet Union and the possible exploitation of the idea of a united Macedonia against Yugoslavia. (860H.002/4–849)↩