Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

top secret

[Washington,] September 26, 1949.

Foreign Minister Van Zeeland and Ambassador Silvercruys came in to see me at their request “to review the wording of the U.S.–U.K.–Belgian Agreement of September 26, 1944.” I showed them the Agreement as well as a summary of the contracts that had been entered into under its provisions. I also showed them notes on a meeting which their two scientists deHemptinne and Gerard had with Secretary Marshall on August 25, 1948, and my notes of a meeting these two gentlemen had with me and Mr. Chase on September 10, 1948.¹ In connection with the latter I had prepared a summary of assistance which has been rendered to Belgium in the various non-classified fields since the visit of last fall.²

Mr. Van Zeeland stated that when he had seen the Secretary some ten days ago he had indicated that he had no matters to raise as regards the Agreement but would reserve the right to bring the matter up again in 6 or 8 months time. This was before President Truman’s announcement of last Friday. This event seemed to him to put a different light on the whole matter. He had in preparation a note to the Secretary of State which would be presented in due course by the Belgian Ambassador, probably on the 29th or 30th. He indicated that the note would raise the question whether appropriate Belgian and American representatives might meet together to examine the provisions of the Agreement with particular regard to sections 6 and 9. He stated that the publicity attendant on the Blair House talks, the fact that tripartite discussions were now going on, and the recent Presidential announcement made it rather more imperative that he be in a position to give responsive answers to questions which might be asked of him concerning this Agreement in Parliament. While he had no specific suggestions as to what might be done or what should be done, he felt nevertheless that some discussions of the problem would be useful. He appreciated that the paramount consideration in all of these matters, particularly since last Friday’s announcement, was security. He was confident that Belgium would not propose any action which would in any way jeopardize security. He mentioned by way of example that if we felt it was unwise from a security point of view for a research reactor to be located in Belgium, we should then consider what other location or arrangement might be feasible. Might a reactor in the Congo be safer? Or if that were unsafe, could Belgian scientists be admitted to participate in some phase of the reactor program in the United States? He stressed that this was only an example and did not constitute a proposal on his part.

I inquired what people he had in mind would be involved from their side. He responded that they would attempt to match the personnel we would designate to conduct the discussions. I said that inasmuch as the problem was a rather complicated technical one we would probably want to rely rather heavily on people from the Atomic Energy Commission. He suggested that they had a well-qualified man available in New York, Dr. Jacques Errera,³ who could be brought down.

It developed that the Foreign Minister would be in this country through October 6 and could be available should this prove desirable.

I inquired whether the Foreign Minister would propose that the British be brought into the discussions at the outset. He replied that he had no strong views on this but had-thought that the approach should be made to us in the first instance and we might then determine when we might best ask the British to come in. He thought that a copy of his note to the Secretary of State would be handed to the British as well.

While the Foreign Minister was examining the text of the Agreement of 1944 and the exchange of letters between Spaak, Sir John Anderson, and Winant,⁴ there developed a discussion between him and the Ambassador as to the precise French translation of the word “agreement.” They apparently satisfied themselves that the Agreement of 1944 was indeed an “agreement” and should not be characterized by any other form of words. They felt that the French word “accord” was the best translation. I gather from this discussion that the Foreign Minister had in mind the statement that Prime Minister Eyskens had made in response to a question in Parliament on August 18, 1949, to the effect that “No secret treaty exists with any foreign country whatever for purpose of (en vue de) delivering to it uranium or any other raw material. My declaration is forthright and formal.” It was evident that both the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador were quite convinced that the arrangements between the U.S. and U.K., on the one hand, and Belgium, on the other, were indeed an “agreement,” although not a “treaty.”

1. For the records of these two meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 2, pp. 747 and 752, respectively.
2. The summary is not printed.
3. Professor at the University of Brussels; Counsellor, Permanent Belgian Delegation at the United Nations.
4. Reference is to the agreement of September 26. 1944, effected by an exchange of letters between Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, British Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir John Anderson, and United States Ambassador in the United Kingdom John G. Winant; for texts, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. ii, pp. 1028–1030.