893.00/12–2148: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 22—8:22 p. m.]
2598. Personal for the Secretary. May I outline below my personal views re political outlook in China and bearing of this on American policy. This is partly for record but chiefly in order to have full benefit of your instructions.
As you are well aware my original hope had been that by military aid to Chiang Government, especially in form of advice upon which all else would be conditioned, it might have been possible to keep area south of Yangtze intact and clear coastal region from Nanking northward of militant communism. It would have been expected that again with American technical advisers and economic aid there would be improvements in local government and in people’s livelihood which would compare favorably with conditions in Communist territory. National Government would guard its frontier but carry on no aggressive warfare against Communists. This would allow public opinion to take form in both sections and be basis for some sort of negotiated settlement. Whether this would have proven practicable and results have justified our efforts now is immaterial.
Dealing with present realities one must begin as always with President Chiang. It is distressing to observe how completely he has lost public confidence in recent months and how widespread is desire he retire. This sentiment is shared by most officials of all ranks in Government and is almost universal among politically conscious citizens. Opposition to him is primarily because of conviction that war as he has been conducting it is hopeless and is bringing upon people almost unendurable economic and other distress. View is not infrequently expressed that he is best asset Communists have. It is ironical therefore that he refuses to turn over active direction of affairs as he has been repeatedly advised to do because this would be in his opinion tantamount to allowing Communists overrun country. Issue is thus confused in his mind as apparently in case of many in US as though American military aid to him were only alternative to complete Communist domination of China. But it would be in violation of basic principle of democracy to maintain in power man who has lost support of his own people. It would arouse [Page 675] greater sympathy for Communist cause and violent anti-American feeling.
In any case our military men all seem to be agreed that such aid would be too late, even under new leadership. It is probable that resistance groups will carry on for some time in south and west and may form a loose federation. But our military aid to these would at this state be in my opinion very unwise and would certainly complicate matters in coastal provinces and central area.
Government leaders are all constantly asking what American policy is going to be or what our advice to them would be or, more insistently, whether it would not be in order for us to advise President to retire or go abroad for trip or in some way eliminate himself from absolute control of affairs. He meanwhile is coercing Sun Fo to form new Cabinet without delay but new Premier, in addition to having undergone rather painful operation and being met by refusals as he invites one or another of inner circle of party members, is being thwarted by President’s interference as he attempts to make up his list. Dr. Sun is therefore in mood of frustration and Government lacks even semblance of functioning Cabinet. President has been advised by various people to organize small emergency [group?] in Cabinet to which he could delegate full administrative authority while he exerted only his constitutional prerogatives. It is generally recognized that this would only be possible if he withdrew to Kuling or elsewhere under some pretext which at present he has no serious thought of doing. However, after having repeatedly tried without success to persuade Hu Shih to become Premier, he has induced him to come to Nanking for consultation. He is proposing that Hu form a sort of advisory group as “braintrust” but as Hu points out this would be in effect paper-cabinet and would have no more real power than one it would supersede.
On December 17 I had long talks, in each case at their request, with Sun Fo and Hu Shih, and these only served to accentuate quandary that Government is in. The conversation with Hu was especially saddening because he represents finest type of patriotic idealism in his attempt to be loyal to Chiang Government. Hu’s argument is that Communism is so implacable and intolerant, so diabolically thorough in its indoctrination and so ruthless in enforcing its totalitarian control even in China that Chiang Kai-shek should be supported despite his shortcomings because he alone sees this and has been uncompromising in resisting it, also because he almost alone among Kmt leaders has been free from taint of avarice or other typical vices of Chinese officialdom. He believes that if Chiang were forced to retire Central Government would disintegrate and Communists take over virtually on their own terms. He wonders therefore if America could even [Page 676] now be persuaded to recall JUSMAG and assist Chiang in carrying on war rather than allow Communists dominate country and mold it to their own ends. Tears came to his eyes when he asked me, on basis of our long friendship, to tell him what he should say to President Chiang and what else he could do now that he had determined to give up academic career for service to nation. I told him that primary weakness of Chiang Government was moral rather than military, in sense that troops had lost fighting spirit and people had lost confidence in Government’s ability to provide for them as well as in cause for which they were being asked to suffer. America was powerless under these conditions. I had repeatedly urged upon President Chiang supreme importance of rallying public opinion behind him but had failed. I wondered if Hu could lead in another “new thought movement” or “literary revolution” on issues of freedom and democracy as he had done with brilliant success 30 odd years ago. He said he bitterly regretted not having used talents in this field since VJ day rather than selfishly returning, as he had, to more congenial academic activities. This lengthy comment is to prepare way for discussion of our policy if coalition government will in course of time be formed. Presumably CP will dominate at outset. But whether they continue to do so or will allow their original [position?] to be diluted or modified will depend on number of factors. One of these is extent to which non-Communist elements will participate and exert liberalizing influence. Another is necessity for CP to adopt tolerant course at beginning because of their own limitations. This would doubtless be nothing more than temporary tactics but in that period interaction between their own ideology and more liberal ideas might have permanent effects.
But I am more than ever convinced that American policy will be most influential among as yet undetermined factors. Chinese Communists as they are now and characteristics of other Chinese are alike fairly well known. Former will be relentless in pursuing their objectives but surprisingly flexible in method.
If we are willing to continue economic aid on certain conditions, such as the basic freedoms, we can stop this whenever conditions are infringed upon or threatened and make public the reasons. Such aid might emphasize industrial projects and rural reconstruction rather than relief. In this framework all the voluntary agencies might be encouraged, educational, religious, etc. Our own official publicity would be extremely useful. In all our public and private activities we might put emphasis largely upon constructive gestures, our desire to help Chinese people, our advocacy of democratic institutions and free international intercourse, our traditional support of China’s national independence, rather than engaging in too much overt criticism of Marxist philosophy or expansionist aims of USSR.
[Page 677]This is on assumption that we have only two sharply defined alternatives of staying with whatever new government takes form or withdraw off completely. Former would derive from conviction that communism can be fought by other means than military force and can only in long run be defeated by these.
One final word. I cannot avoid impression that organized institutions, commercial, religious, educational, as well as governmental, tend to be fearful about progressive movements, especially when these seem to be dangerously radical. They tend therefore to support status quo rather than encourage what is new and strange. I earnestly hope that American Government will not, in its wholly justifiable hatred of international communism, fail to recognize indisputable elements of progress and reform in its Chinese variety which have so powerful an attraction for more idealistic of Chinese youth, in contrast with now decrepit Kmt which has long since lost most of its earlier youthful and heroic spirit of adventure. It may be naively visionary but I dare to believe that despite all suspicion, bigotry and perversion of Chinese communism, it can with our assistance be grafted on to this ancient culture with fruition better than either of dominant parties could alone produce, and that experiment is in any case better than abandoning China to her fate and is abundantly worth effort. If in China also communism follows its familiar pattern and clamps down on fundamental freedoms we can be fairly confident that sooner or later somewhere on fringe of national life young leader will arise in tradition of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Shih and many others in China’s long history, who will rally people in new revolutionary movement against this latest reversal to reactionary tyranny. When we have evidence that new movement has vitality and public support we can give it our unstinted assistance. Meanwhile we should in my opinion maintain flexible policy of helping Chinese people make their will articulate and improve their livelihood leaving it to CP to decide whether our assistance is worth price of personal and national freedom, and making it known to world if they prefer to enforce their exclusive system and their subservience to Soviet Union.