893.00/2–448: Telegram
The Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 4—8:10 a. m.]
248. Events past 2 weeks and information reaching us from various quarters point to accelerating deterioration situation especially last fortnight and to likelihood worse troubles in immediate future. Grounds apprehension that local authorities will prove less and less able to cope with them effectively. Among more disturbing factors leading us to such conclusions are:
- 1.
- Impressive evidence of well-organized Communist infiltration and bolder agitation in schools and key labor groups: While concrete evidence of Communist instigation of recent mob actions is difficult obtain, weight of evidence and well-informed opinion indicates Communists are constantly fanning discontent, lawlessness and utilizing every oportunity to augment if not instigate disturbances. My French colleague, who is exceptionally well-informed through channels inherited from pre-war French concession days, stated that Communists well-organized in utilities, textile factories and department stores, have [Page 74] elaborate plans for further strikes including French tramways (whose workers would have already staged strike had not their New Year 2-month bonus demands been temporarily met) and are forcing good workers with threats of violence to promise support such demonstrations as may be on their program.
- 2.
- Growing spirit of unrest and lawlessness tending increasingly toward violence: While mayor’s courage in handling recent Tungchi University trouble has won admiration, fact of his being subjected bodily violence is an example likely encourage lawlessness. According to French colleague’s informants, Communists are stressing this factor and plan stage initial series strikes to demonstrate to public incapacity of authorities to cope with mob action, thus preparing ground for general upheaval which Communists have next on program.
- 3.
- Jittery nerves and lack self confidence of local authorities, who admit inability effectively to meet problem of infiltration of city by large numbers Communists among refugees and are resorting ineffectively to emergency measures, contributing to general alarm of populace, such [as?] night patrol, census checkups, and mass police investigations of suspected sections of city with declaration of curfew and martial law a probability in near future. Pressure of raiding Communist forces in areas near Shanghai seem timed to exploit this nervousness. Garrison commandant Hsuan Tieh-wu informed Assistant Military Attaché that Nanking has ordered him despatch half his Shanghai force to Kiangyin to counter Communist threat there leaving him only 10,000 troops inadequate ensure maintenance order here and that after protest he was only able obtain Nanking’s permission for him to organize replacements at own expense. He is reportedly to be canvassing local business men generally a bad omen. Hsuan is known to have advised close foreign friend employed by American firm to have his wife leave Shanghai in view of trouble to be expected in next few months.
- 4.
- Recently issued “shoot to kill” order governing future police action, which, if implemented, will result massacres, likely to spark off more serious events.
- 5.
- Uncertain dependability of troops and police: as indicated by Hsuan’s confidential admission that he has doubts re loyalty his troops and by information from French ConGen that Communists have definitely penetrated municipal police organization. In recent student demonstration re Kowloon, students made conspicuous efforts to keep police friendly to them and create spirit solidarity. Behavior police in connection with other more recent mob demonstrations reported by ConGen suggested apparent reluctance to act promptly and vigorously. This may be attributable in part to long-standing” friction among police and military police and other local govt organs, a serious enough factor in itself which bodes ill for effective handling of more serious troubles. Local authorities dislike of Nanking’s instructions, such as those ordering closure dance halls, said to be additional demoralizing factor. Reports also indicate authorities feel none too certain of support from Tu Yueh-sheng’s22 underground army and are trying to buy his loyalty by increasing favors.
- 6.
- Reports of moves by wealthy Chinese to leave for Hong Kong.
- 7.
- Increasing apprehension of trouble on part of local foreigners, and members Consular Corps, several of whom including British and French have called here recently to express concern over situation and to discuss protective measures and evacuation plans. Such fears are admitted by persons certainly not given to alarmism such as L. K. Little23 who tells me he recently noted in his diary the wish that his daughter were not in China.
- 8.
- Easily arousable anti-American feeling as indicated by demonstration re Kowloon, strength of Communist propagandists and anti-American tone of many local papers foolishly encouraged by Govt.
- 9.
- Difficulties of ensuring protection and evacuation facilities for foreigners as compared with pre-war extraterritorial period.
All this would indicate events moving rapidly toward point where general breakdown law and order endangering foreign communities might well eventuate possibly with great suddenness. As observed by British colleague, danger from without could probably be easily anticipated but danger from within could develop overnight with little or no warning. ConGen in consultation with our Army and Navy authorities is making such preparations against trouble as are possible and warranted while carefully refraining however at this stage from any steps which might result in public awareness of our concern and alarmism in American community.
Sent Nanking 189; repeated Dept 248.