501.BC Indonesia/4–648: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
268. Gocus No. 216. US delegate and adviser discussed outstanding problems of interim period with Roem and Pringgo Digdo at lunch yesterday given by latter. Indos advanced basic idea that Netherlands should transfer large powers to Prov. Fed. Govt. at time Republic’s [Page 135] entry therein, apparently having in mind that Republic would transfer its attributes sovereignty also to this government rather than to Netherlands. In particular, Indos considered Prov. Govt. should be accorded rights its own foreign representation, enabling Republic representatives pass directly into service Prov. Govt. instead of being recalled. They admitted they motivated by question of face, viz., what to do with Republic representatives already on foreign assignments, what to tell countries with whom Republic has treaty relations and what to do with Republic Ministry Foreign Affairs. Regarding other major issues which have arisen in Netherlands-Republic political talks, Roem and Pringgo Digdo stated they had largely reached agreement with Netherlands delegate on structure USI but that they wanted complete agreement on USI and Netherlands-Indo union before attempting decide arrangements for transitional period in order safeguard Republic’s long-term interests. They also wished clarificationi regarding powers Republic would retain as state before it entered Prov. Govt. With reference plebiscites, they reiterated view plebiscites should follow 6 months after Renville Agreement and should be held only in Netherlands occupied areas, stating inhabitants Republic areas, being solidly Republican, would be puzzled and upset if called upon vote for or against inclusion in Republic, and expressing some question as to what alternative would be.
We took occasion to make clear once for all USDel’s views these issues. We stated that under Renville Agreement there could be no doubt where sovereignty resided in interim period, that Republic had no right foreign representation and that Prov. Govt. would have no such right until sovereignty turned over to USI. As face saving device, we suggested Republic representatives be redesignated some sort commissioners or information officers, without diplomatic status, and pointed out there no excuse for reported Republic move obtain representation in Burma (Indos gave no sign they had heard of such move). We offered view that powers Prov. Govt. would initially doubtless be very limited but would be enlarged gradually until USI created. Regarding Republic’s desire for assurances respecting its position in USI and union before committing self interim arrangements, we contended Renville Agreement itself contained ample assurances, guaranteeing that independence would be accorded USI and that Republic would carry full weight therein. We held that Netherlands had thus made most far-reaching concessions that could be asked and that any reluctance on part Republic to joint Prov. Govt. and cooperate fully in interim period could be based only suspicion Netherlands not intending carry out Renville commitments. Since we completely convinced Netherlands would not and could not fail live up to its Yalta [Page 136] agreement,1 we unable sympathize any reasoning based contrary assumption. We considered main objective Republic now should be hasten creation formation USI which we believed depended faithful adherence by Republic to first of 6 principles. We expressed view that Netherlands could turn over sovereignty only to organized, functioning government and that any effort by Republic to retain sovereign rights could only delay formation such government any transfer sovereignty by Netherlands. Regarding plebiscites, we said there never any doubt plebiscites would be held throughout Java-Madura-Sumatra, that inhabitants Republic areas had right express free choice and that disposition on part Republic rule out plebiscites in Republic areas could only be interpreted by world as evidence Republic weakness. We further held that plebiscites were to follow political, not Renville, Agreement but that question of timing could be left for consideration when political agreement reached.
While atmosphere conversation most pleasant, it impossible to say degree to which Indos disappointed or influenced by our position.
In connection Republic’s foreign representatives, Pringgo Digdo cited January 13 Kaliurang meeting as giving Republic reason expect continue such representation. We stated we regretted Republic had been misled at Kaliurang.
At end lunch we offered view that Republic might eventually decide there better method delineation states than through plebiscites, formation USI would be followed by delineation states on rational basis.
At Steer Committee meeting later in day (ourtel 2182), before we had chance brief him, Vredenburch took floor and went over much of same ground we covered at lunch, insisting that questions of Republic’s foreign representation (particularly with respect reported extension representation to Burma) and of extent and timing of plebiscites be dealt with by PolCom on basis urgency. Vredenburch took severe line and pressed Republic very hard. On learning later in private talk with Dubois we endeavoring bring Republic around in informal talks, he expressed some dismay at his having forced issues in open at this juncture. It is hoped that this explanation to Vredenburch will result in continuation of crosstable talks on these points in ad hoc committee and easier attitude on his part.
Department pass Hague.3
- For Declaration on Liberated Europe, signed at Yalta, February 11, 1945, see Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference, Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 975, 977.↩
- Telegram 270, April 6, not printed.↩
- This was done the same day.↩