On November 25, 1947 the National Security Council received a report from
the Secretary of the Army on the problem of Palestine with the request
that it be considered by the National Security Council.2
At the meeting of the Consultants of the National Security Council on
December 12, 1947,2 it was agreed
that the State Department should
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prepare, on a priority basis, the initial draft of a National
Security Council report on the position of the United States with
respect to Palestine, taking into consideration U.S. security interests
in the Mediterranean and Near East areas and the recommendation of the
UN General Assembly on the partition of Palestine.
This paper has been prepared in close collaboration with Mr. Henderson,
and has his general approval. The tenor of the recommendations has also
been discussed at length with Mr. Rusk, who has voiced no objection to
their presentation by the Staff but has not seen the final draft or
committed himself to it.
We have not thought it wise to attempt to draw outside consultants into
the preparation of this paper; but it has been seen by Ambassador
Grady4 and has his
general approval. You may recall that Ambassador Grady was alternate to
Secretary of State Byrnes on the President’s Cabinet Committee on
Palestine.
I recommend that the paper be approved as the Department’s initial
position for further discussion in the National Security Council.
[Annex]
Report by the Policy Planning Staff on Position of
the United States With Respect to Palestine5
top secret
[Washington,] January 19,
1948.
PPS/19
The Problem: 1. To assess and appraise the position
of the U.S with respect to Palestine, taking into consideration the
security interests of the U.S. in the Mediterranean and Near East
areas, and in the light of the recommendation of the General
Assembly of the United Nations regarding the partition of
Palestine.
Analysis
2. Palestine occupies a geographic position of great strategic
significance to the U.S. It is important for the control of the
eastern end of the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. It is an outlet
for the
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oil of the Middle
East; which, in turn, is important to U.S. security. Finally, it is
the center of a number of major political cross-currents; and events
in Palestine cannot help being reflected in a number of directions.
For these reasons, and particularly in view of the Soviet pressure
against the periphery of that area, and Soviet infiltration into the
area, it is important that political, economic, and social stability
be maintained there.
Because of the present irreconcilable differences between Arabs and
Jews in Palestine, great danger exists that the area may become the
source of serious unrest and instability which could be readily
exploited by the USSR unless a workable solution can be
developed.
3. The UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947, recommended the
partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish sovereign
states, substantially as proposed by the majority report of the UN
Special Committee on Palestine. The partition plan provides for an
economic union of the two states, administered by a Joint Economic
Board, and for the city of Jerusalem to be placed under
international trusteeship. The mandate for Palestine would be
terminated by August 1, 1948 and the newly created states and
special regime for Jerusalem would come into” existence by October
1, 1948. Provision was made for a five-member UN Commission to take
over progressively the administration of Palestine and to establish
Provisional Councils in each new state.
4. The boundaries of the proposed new Arab and Jewish states do not
satisfy Zionist aspirations from either the political or the
economic viewpoint, and the whole plan of partition with economic
union is totally unacceptable to the Arabs. Although frequent
reference has been made to “sacrifices” accepted in the interest of
compromise, the partition plan was strongly supported by the Jewish
Agency for Palestine and by various Zionist organizations favoring
the establishment of a sovereign Jewish political state in
Palestine. It did not, however, have the support of the Irgun, the
Revisionists or the Stern gang (the so-called leftist groups), whose
influence among the Jews of Palestine appears to be increasing.
5. The Arabs of Palestine and the Arab states have uniformly and
consistently maintained their unequivocal opposition to any form of
partition. The Arabs of Palestine have indicated their determination
not to establish a separate government in the Arab area of Palestine
designated by the UN, and to boycott all activities of the UN
Commission charged with the transfer of authority from the British
to the new Arab and Jewish states. Even if partition were
economically feasible, the Arab attitude alone renders it improbable
that any economic union could be effected between the two new
states.
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The General Assembly, in adopting the recommendation for partition,
left unanswered certain questions regarding the legality of the plan
as well as the means for its implementation. Nor did the General
Assembly, in the circumstances prevailing at the time, have an
opportunity to explore the last minute announcement by the Arab
States on November 29 of their willingness to accept the principle
of a Federal State in Palestine6 which
they had previously opposed. There was no indication of any real
effort by the UN toward conciliation between the Jews and the
Arabs.
6. The U.S. and USSR played leading roles in bringing about a vote
favorable to partition. Without U.S. leadership and the pressures
which developed during UN consideration of the question, the
necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly could not have
been obtained. From this there has grown a belief that the United
States has a heavy responsibility for seeing that partition works.
It has been shown that various unauthorized U.S. nationals and
organizations, including members of Congress, notably in the closing
days of the Assembly, brought pressure to bear on various foreign
delegates and their respective home governments to induce them to
support the U.S. attitude on the Palestine question. Evidence to
this effect is attached under Tab A.7
7. The decision of the U.S. Government to support the UN Special
Committee’s majority plan was based primarily on the view, expressed
to the GA by Secretary Marshall on
September 18 [17], 1947, that “great weight”
should be accorded the majority opinion of a UN Committee.8
8. Strong nationalistic and religious feelings were aroused
throughout the Arab world as a result of the UN recommendation on
Palestine. Widespread rioting has followed. In Palestine, the
outbreaks have consisted of armed clashes between Arabs and Jews; in
certain of the Arab states, there have been attacks on Jewish
quarters and demonstrations directed primarily against the U.S.
These manifestations of popular feeling have not so far represented
organized Arab resistance to partition, although a “jihad” (holy
war) against the Jews of Palestine has been proclaimed by Moslem
leaders in most of the Arab states and has been joined by Christian
leaders in Syria.
9. As British forces are progressively withdrawn from Palestine and
as steps are taken with a view to implementing the UN decision,
organized large scale opposition by the Arabs is to be expected.
Irregular military units are now being organized in Iraq, Syria,
Egypt, Transjordan and Saudi Arabia to fight in Palestine. There are
strong
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indications that at
an appropriate moment at least some of these units will move into
the Arab portion of Palestine as defined by the UN. That these
forces will come into violent conflict with the Haganah or other
Jewish military bodies operating from the Jewish state is
probable.
10. In order to protect themselves and to secure the establishment of
a Jewish state, Zionist representatives will seek armed support from
the U.S., for without substantial external assistance the proposed
Jewish state cannot be established or exist. This may take the form
of an attempt (a) to obtain money, arms and
volunteers in the U.S. and/or (b) to induce
the U.S. Government to assist in organizing an international armed
force under the UN to enforce partition.
11. The UN decision did not provide for outside armed forces to
impose the partition scheme, either in maintaining law and order in
the two new states or in affording protection to the five-member UN
Commission which is to implement the decision. The UN Commission is
almost certain to meet with armed Arab opposition in seeking to
discharge its functions. Palestine police authorities have declined
to assume responsibility for its safety outside of Tel-Aviv. There
can be no assurance that in the present and foreseeable
circumstances, local security forces will be able to maintain law
and order; rather may their failure to do so be confidently
predicted.
12. The U.S. has suspended authorization for the export of arms,
ammunition and other war material intended for use in Palestine or
in neighboring countries.9 If we
resist pressure by the Zionists to alter this position, the question
then arises whether we should send troops to Palestine as part of an
international force under the UN. It may be assumed that the Soviet
Union would, in certain circumstances, be prepared to contribute
troops to such an international force. If the USSR should do so, it
would be awkward for the U.S. to decline to take similar action. If
Soviet troops are sent to Palestine, further opportunities would be
provided for the exercise of Russian influence in the whole Near
Eastern area.
13. U.S. support of partition has already brought about loss of U.S.
prestige and disillusionment among the Arabs and other neighboring
peoples as to U.S. objectives and ideals. U.S. support of the
principles of self-determination was a basic factor in the creation
of the Arab states out of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. U.S.
officials, missionaries, and educational institutions in the Near
East have built successfully on this foundation, and U.S.
businessmen have reaped the benefit of the widespread belief that
the U.S. had no political motives in the area inimical to Arab
welfare.
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14. The position of Saudi Arabia in the Palestine question is of
particular importance. King Ibn Saud values the friendship between
his country and the U.S. and recognizes the significant financial
aid to Saudi Arabia derived from oil royalties. He is reluctant to
sever political and economic ties with the U.S. Nevertheless, he is
under strong pressure from other Arab states to break with the U.S.
Prince Faisal, his son and Foreign Minister, departed for Saudi
Arabia from the UN General Assembly in a bitterly anti-American mood
and may give strength to a faction of less moderate elements which
will force the King’s hand. Important U.S. oil concessions and air
base rights will be at stake in the event that an actively hostile
Government should come into power in Saudi Arabia.
15. In view of the evident determination of the Arabs to resist
partition with all the means at their disposal, it may be
anticipated that, if an attempt is made to carry out the UN decision
(with or without U.S. assistance), the more moderate and
intellectual leaders of the Arab states, most of whom have ties with
the west, will be swept out of power by irresponsible elements.
Leaders such as Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League,
would be displaced by extremists such as the Grand Mufti of
Jerusalem. Hatred of the Zionists or of those identified with
Zionism might be extended to include all westerners in direct
proportion to the latter’s support of Zionist armies in general and
of partition in particular.
16. Any assistance the U.S. might give to the enforcement of
partition would result in deep-seated antagonism for the U.S. in
many sections of the Moslem world over a period of many years and
would lay us open to one or more of the following consequences:
- (a)
- Suspension or cancellation of valuable U.S. air base rights
and commercial concessions, cessation of U.S. oil pipeline
construction, and drastic curtailment of U.S. trade with that
area.
- (b)
- Loss of our present access to the air, military and naval
facilities enjoyed by the British in the area, with attendant
repercussions on our overall strategic position in the Middle
East and Mediterranean.
- (c)
- Closing or boycotting of U.S. educational, religious and
philanthropic institutions in the Near East, such as the
American University at Beirut established in 1866 and the
American University at Cairo.
- (d)
- Possible deaths, injuries and damages arising from acts of
violence against individual U.S. citizens and interests
established in the area. Official assurances of the Arab
Governments to afford protection to U.S. interests could not be
relied on because of the intensity of popular feeling.
- (e)
- A serious threat to the success of the Marshall Plan. The
present oil production of the Middle East fields is
approximately 800,000 barrels a day. To meet Marshall Plan
requirements, production must be raised to about 2,000,000
barrels a day, since no oil for Europe for this purpose could be
provided from the U.S., from Venezuela, or
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from the Far East. Before the
current disturbances, U.S. oil companies had made plans for the
required development in the Middle East, with which it will be
impossible to proceed if the present situation continues.
17. The USSR stands to gain by the partition plan if it should be
implemented by force because of the opportunity thus afforded to the
Russians to assist in “maintaining order” in Palestine. If Soviet
forces should be introduced into Palestine for the purpose of
implementing partition, Communist agents would have an excellent
base from which to extend their subversive activities, to
disseminate propaganda, and to attempt to replace the present Arab
governments by “democratic peoples’ governments”. The presence of
Soviet forces in Palestine would constitute an outflanking of our
positions in Greece, Turkey and Iran, and a potential threat to the
stability of the entire Eastern Mediterranean area.
18. It is not certain, however, that the USSR would choose to send
its forces into Palestine. To do so would be to place those forces
in an exposed position, far from a base of supply, and without
suitable lines of communication. Rather than risk the enmity of the
Arab world by such action, the Soviet Union might prefer to have
U.S. forces bear the brunt of enforcement and incur the odium of the
local population and Moslems everywhere as a result.
19. Other choices are open to the USSR besides the furnishing of
troops. Evidence is accumulating that the USSR may be covertly or
indirectly supplying arms not only to the Jews but to the Arabs,
thus aggravating the friction in the Near East. From the Soviet
viewpoint, it might be preferable to exploit in this manner the
explosive character of the situation created by partition rather
than to enter the area in a military sense.
Whether or not Soviet forces should assist in implementing partition,
the UN decision is favorable to Soviet objectives of sowing
dissention and discord in non-communist countries. The partition of
Palestine might afford the USSR a pretext on the basis of
“self-determination of minorities” to encourage the partition of
areas in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Greece, with a view to setting up
separate [Kurdish?] Azerbaijani, Armenian and Macedonian states
enjoying the support of the USSR.
All in all, there is no way of telling in exactly what manner the
USSR will attempt to turn partition to its advantage. It must be
assumed, however, that Moscow will actively endeavor to find some
means of exploiting the opportunity.
20. Various other factors would enter into the situation if an
attempt is made to enforce the UN recommendation. The foregoing is
intended merely to suggest the principal elements in the problem. So
numerous would be the ramifications of mounting Arab ill will, of
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opening the door to
Soviet political or military penetration, and of generally chaotic
conditions in Palestine and neighboring countries that the whole
structure of peace and security in the Near East and Mediterranean
would be directly or indirectly affected with results impossible to
predict at this stage in detail but certainly injurious to U.S.
interests.
Conclusions
21. As a result of U.S. sponsorship of UN action leading to the
recommendation to partition Palestine, U.S. prestige in the Moslem
world has suffered a severe blow and U.S. strategic interests in the
Mediterranean and Near East have been seriously prejudiced. Our
vital interests in those areas will continue to be adversely
affected to the extent that we continue to support partition.
22. The original U.S. premise in supporting the partition of
Palestine was founded on the belief that, with certain modifications
in the majority proposals of the UN Special Committee on Palestine,
a just and workable plan could be devised immediately which would receive broad international
support, provided always that there was
cooperation between the parties concerned. A study of the
present plan raises serious doubts as to its workability because of
the artificial and arbitrary political subdivision of a complicated
economic area. Events have demonstrated that the Arab inhabitants of
Palestine will not cooperate even to endeavor to make the partition
plan work. Therefore, one of the major premises on which we
originally supported partition has proved invalid.
23. The United States should not send armed forces to Palestine,
either on a volunteer or contingent basis, for the following
reasons: (a) This would represent a political
or military commitment of which the dimensions, both in time and
space, cannot be calculated or foreseen and which might carry us
into actions of a major character, out of all proportion to the
foreign policy objectives involved; and (b)
to do so would invite the possibility of the movement of Soviet
armed forces to the strategic Near Eastern and Mediterranean area.
For similar reasons, the U.S. should oppose the sending of armed
forces of any nationality to Palestine.
24. While the governments in Arab countries have partially succeeded
in restraining demonstrations against the Jews within their borders,
in the case of open conflict major massacres of Jews in Moslem
countries would seem to be inevitable, despite efforts of the
governments of those countries to control popular feeling. Moreover,
a basis would be provided for anti-Jewish agitation in other parts
of the world. The process of assimilation or integration of the
individual Jew in the life of the country of which he is a citizen,
which has been strongly advocated by World Jewry in the past, would
be made more
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difficult and
lie would be singled out for attack as an alien political factor. In
the U.S., the position of Jews would be gravely undermined as it
becomes evident to the public that in supporting a Jewish state in
Palestine we were in fact supporting the extreme objectives of
political Zionism, to the detriment of overall U.S. security
interests.
25. Unless an effort is made to retrieve the situation, the prestige
of the UN itself will be at stake because of the notoriety and
resentment attendant upon the activities of U.S. pressure groups,
including members of Congress, who sought to impose U.S. views as to
partition on foreign delegations. Furthermore, the probable
abstention by the Arab states from active participation in many UN
activities may further weaken the effectiveness of the UN and the
U.S. position within the UN, as has Soviet abstention in certain
other activities.
26. The U.S. Government should face the fact that the partition of
Palestine cannot be implemented without the use of force, and that
the U.S. would inevitably be called upon to supply a substantial
portion of the money, troops and arms for this purpose. The British
have made it clear that they would not accept any role in the
enforcement of partition. No other nation except Russia could be
expected to participate in such implementation to any appreciable
extent.
26a. It must be concluded that the partition
of Palestine will not be possible of attainment without outside
assistance on a substantial scale. If the U.S. is determined to see
the successful establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine (either
as proposed or as may be geographically modified because of Arab
noncooperation in the proposed economic union), the U.S. must be
prepared to grant economic assistance, together with aid to the
Jewish authorities through the supply of arms, ammunition and
implements of war. Ultimately the U.S. might have to support the
Jewish authorities by the use of naval units and military forces. It
should be clearly recognized that such assistance given to the
Jewish state, but withheld from the Arabs and the Arab States, would
in Arab eyes be a virtual declaration of war by the U.S. against the
Arab world. It is improbable that the Jewish state could survive
over any considerable period of time in the face of the combined
assistance which would be forthcoming for the Arabs in Palestine
from the Arab States, and in lesser measure from their Moslem
neighbors. The preparations now being made for intensive guerrilla
warfare by the approximately 400,000 Arabs resident in the proposed
new Jewish state are alone giving rise to serious doubt as to
whether the Jewish people in Palestine could themselves control the
situation.
Recommendations
27. We should take no further initiative in implementing or aiding
partition.
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28. We should oppose sending armed forces into Palestine by the UN or
any member thereof for the purpose of implementing partition. We
should also oppose the recruitment of volunteers for this
purpose.
29. We should maintain and enforce our embargo on arms to Palestine
and neighboring countries.
30. We should endeavor as far as possible to spread responsibility
for the future handling of this question, and to divest ourselves of
the imputation of international leadership in the search for a
solution to this problem.
31. When and if the march of events has conclusively demonstrated
that the effort to carry out the partition plan as prescribed by the
UN General Assembly offers no reasonable prospect for success
without the use of outside armed force, we should then take the
position that we have been obliged to conclude that it is
impracticable and undesirable for the international community to
attempt to enforce any form of partition in the absence of agreement
between the parties, and that the matter should go back to the UN
General Assembly,
32. Thereafter, our position in the UN should be that we would
cooperate loyally in working out and implementing any proposals
designed (a) to encourage pacific settlement
between the Palestine Arabs and Palestine Jews or (b) to investigate the possibilities of any other suggested
solution such as a federal state or trusteeship, which would not
require outside armed force for implementation.
33. We should oppose referring to the International Court the
question of the UN recommendation on Palestine on the grounds that
the fundamental issue, i.e. whether the two communities involved
will cooperate to make the partition plan effective, is not a proper
question for the Court.10
