865.248/8–1848: Airgram
The Chargé in Italy (Byington) to the Secretary of State
A–832. Reference Embtel 3232, 30 July,1 transmitting preliminary comments on Italian Embassy N.V. 63512 in which equipment for Italian Air Force was requested.
The Italian note is the culmination of a series of requests which have been placed before the Embassy, on a service level through the Air Attaché, since the original aid gesture as represented by the supply of 50 P–51’s in the Taff–Del Vecchio agreement. The several demands have centered about the critical need for trainer and transport aircraft.
Subsequent to the Italian Government’s decision in January 1948 to sanction purchases directly for the Armed Forces out of that portion of the Bonner–Corbino credit underrun applicable to acquisition of surplus located outside Italy, efforts were directed towards procuring this category of equipment from stocks in Germany through OFLC Headquarters, Europe. Because of the aircraft stock level in Germany, the established priority of other foreign aid programs, and the control features subsequently introduced as respects sale of flyable units, the OFLC negotiations were, in general, fruitless. The only major units obtainable were those listed in paragraph 2, Embtel 3232 and recapitulated herewith: 10 C–45s, 20 L–5s, 13 AT–6s, 10 ANT [Page 804] Link Trainers and 5 Pratt Whitney R–1830–92 engines. Italian Government has accepted the offer of these items at OFLC sales price of $378,415.00 (chargeable to B–C credit) and contractual papers are under preparation. This contract represents, of course, but a fraction of the minimum Italian Air Force requirements.
When it became apparent that OFLC stocks in Europe were inadequate, or at least unavailable, to cover any appreciable portion of Italian desiderata, the Air Attaché transmitted the global major item request to the Department of the Air Force by cable MAR–241, dated 12 May; this list roughly parallels the first page of the Inclosure to the subject Italian N. V. In its reply, WAR–81913, the Department of Air Force re-emphasized the non-availability of equipment in European surplus and suggested that the Italians initiate request at diplomatic level through the Department of State—thus, the presentation of N. V. 6351.
It is worthy of note that while on the one hand the Embassy has repeatedly assured the Italians that the surplus situation in Europe is as reported and, on the other, has indicated that surplus availabilities in the United States are not likely to be promising, the Italian Air Force is of the unvarying opinion that adequate surplus material exists but is being withheld until the foreign policy, political, economic and military of Italy vis-à-vis the remainder of Western European nations is clarified. This feeling gains credence, in Italian eyes, by reports circulating locally to the effect that British propaganda is directed towards discouragement of United States military assistance to Italy.
Viewed within the framework of Treaty limitations, the effectiveness of the Italian Air Force as a combat arm would appear to be slight. The allowed 350 aircraft would be inadequate for the air defense of Italy while their potential contribution to an allied air offensive would be negligible. However, it is appreciated that Italy could be of considerable assistance in the air phases of a conflict in two important instances: first, in furnishing an immediately available reservoir of trained technicians to relieve or supplement allied manpower; second, in preparing and maintaining, in usable condition, airfield and air facilities which might be required on short notice. These two points are of such value as to make it highly advisable for the United States, in its own interests, to provide the necessary wherewithal to help the Italians toward the ultimate execution of these missions.
Directly related to the future availability of a technicians’ pool is the current training situation, in both the regular and reserve force. Only sufficient serviceable craft are available to provide flying for approximately 500 of the 1600 pilots presently on active duty, and [Page 805] this on a minimum basis. Very little equipment is on hand in Aero Clubs for the instruction of new pilots or for sustaining training for reserve pilots on inactive status. As a result, the experience developed during the war is rapidly disintegrating and no new personnel is being trained to replace those pilots beyond the age limits for combat flying. But of even greater seriousness, is the continuing loss and dispersion of skilled ground technicians and for reasons parallel to the foregoing. Thus, the Italian Air Force is atrophying. The remedy revolves upon the provision of new training aircraft in sufficient numbers to make possible an augmented program of instruction, both for pilots and technicians. In a few years the Italian Government hopes to be able to manufacture sufficient training and transport type airplanes for its needs but until production is underway, stop-gap aid is essential. There appears to be no equipment source other than the United States.
In its plans for future aircraft production, the Italian Air Force contemplates maximum conversion to United States design and standards for engines, electrical motors, hydraulic systems, landing gears, propellors, etc. Planning along these lines stems from realistic appraisal of two facts: first, the only dependable source of replacement parts under war conditions would be from American production; second, the deterioration of Italian aviation industry, as a result of the war, makes it just as economical to revamp, in rebuilding, all production methods along American lines as to continue on Italian standards. Standardization would seem to be advisable as a basis for any United States approach towards association with or assistance to any grouping of the free democracies and it would therefore appear most desirable to encourage Italian production planning in this direction. On timing, the earlier positive encouragement is furnished the better, for the aviation industry today is at a standstill. There is reluctance to resume production on Italian design basis while initiation production on basis United States standards awaits the stimulus of our active support.
It is our conviction that the supply by the United States of training aircraft, presently in surplus stocks or which could be declared surplus, would be of tremendous value to Italy and the Italian Air Force and ultimately to the United States. It would ameliorate the critical training situation, in the air and on the ground, and would mean a substantial beginning in the creation of a reserve of skilled manpower acquainted with United States equipment, methods and techniques in training, operation and maintenance. It would provide the incentive for conversion of production facilities to United States types and standards, with important implications for Western Europe and ourselves. Such assistance would also have a direct bearing in influencing [Page 806] the trend of Italian foreign policy towards a courageous stand with the other free democracies against totalitarianism.
Accordingly, it is strongly recommended that efforts be made to furnish the Italian Air Force with 200 training type aircrafts from surplus or potential surplus and that financing be arranged either through WAA or by revision of the Bonner–Corbino credit to make it applicable to purchases in the United States. The aircraft types envisaged are L–5, C–45, C–47, and AT–6.
Airgram containing technical appraisal of detailed enclosure to Italian N. V. 6351 follows.3
- In this telegram, not printed, Byington mentioned that the Embassy had consistently emphasized that the Italian Air Force was inadequate and needed assistance which could come only from the U.S., but that it would be useless now to submit a formal project pending crystallization of the U.S. position toward regional alliances. On the other hand he urged encouragement of the Italians regarding future consideration of their needs. (865.248/7–3048)↩
- Supra.↩
- Not printed.↩