Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

841.20/11–1748

Report by the Office of Intelligence Research

[Extract]¹

secret

[Washington,] November 17, 1948.

No. 4769

Britain’s Rearmament Policy: Political and Economic Implications

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv. regional defense and western union^*

Although there is general agreement in the UK about the imperative need for building a regional defense system based on the Brussels union, only the outlines of Western Union defense have so far emerged and British attitude toward firm commitments remains cautious. Between the conception of a Western European defense union and its reality lie a series of difficulties: Anglo-French jealousies and differences over the form, leadership, and strategy of Western European defense, rivalry over allocation of weapons in short supply, uncertainty about American aid, the problem of fitting Commonwealth countries and peripheral European areas into the defense scheme, and, in general, British preference for a pragmatic, step-by-step approach rather than tidy, paper plans. Over everything hovers the fear that the assumption of a large-scale defense and rearmament burden will undermine the foundations of British and European economic recovery.

Britain’s actual defense plan has been fashioned largely in insular terms. Nevertheless, the progress made toward a Western European regional defense arrangement has been striking in view of original British reluctance to assume commitments beyond those of a traditional military alliance. In fact, it is in the field of defense that Western Union has given the greatest appearance of vitality. Beyond the consultative arrangements provided by the Brussels Pact, Britain has agreed in principle to (a) joint defense planning by the five Defense Ministers and establishment of the framework of a common military organization, (b) consideration of the financial implications of the problems of supply, (c) collaboration in a North Atlantic military alliance, and (d) continuous ministerial consultation on a common defense policy for Western Union.

A. Brussels Pact

The framework of all defense arrangements is provided by the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense between the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries, signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948. In addition to setting up a defensive military alliance under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (Art. IV of the treaty), the Brussels Pact creates a Consultative Council—“so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously”—which may be convened at any time to “consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace.” (Art. VII.) In actual practice the Consultative Council met three times between March and October 1948 as a conference of Foreign Ministers of the five signatories to consider action taken by subordinate bodies under the Brussels Pact. In the field of defense, the most important action of the Consultative Council was taken at its Paris meeting of October 25–26, 1948, when it (a) approved the decision of the five Defense Ministers at their meeting on September 27–28, 1948 to set up a joint Western Union defense command; (b) decided to set up a committee of experts to study the financial and economic implications of defense; and (c) agreed on the principle of a North Atlantic defensive pact and “on the next steps to be taken in this direction.”

Of importance to the future defense system is the discussion which has been taking place during the summer and fall of 1948, both in official and unofficial circles, regarding the constitutional form which European union should assume at this stage. The chief difference is between the Franco-Belgian proposal for some sort of European representative assembly and the tentative suggestion by Bevin for the establishment of a European Council of Ministers appointed by and responsible to the governments. While Bevin’s proposal has not had the sanction of the British Cabinet,^† it is known to represent the official British view, which opposes a rigid framework for Western Union and prefers a council responsible to the governments and free to consider measures of cooperation in any field and to consult with non-Brussels powers. This view reflects British preference for leaving political and defense commitments largely undefined at this stage and for continuing to work through the Consultative Council. As a compromise, the Consultative Council decided to set up a committee of representatives chosen by the governments (five French, five British, three Belgian, three Dutch, and two Luxembourgers) to consider the various schemes for European unity, including the Franco-Belgian and British suggestions, and to report to the next meeting of the Consultative Council.^‡

B. Joint Defense Planning

The first step toward joint defense planning was taken by the five Defense Ministers and their Chiefs of Staff on April 30, 1948, when agreement was reached on the organization and composition of a permanent military committee to examine common defense problems within the scope of the Brussels treaty.^§ With a separate secretariat headed and largely staffed by British officers, the military committee reports not to the permanent commission of the Brussels powers but to the individual Chiefs of Staff and Defense Ministers. It performs primarily a study function, and its first directive was to survey existing effectives and equipment, requirements which could be met by the five powers out of their own resources, and the extent to which United States aid would be required.^||

The Defense Ministers did not meet again until September 27–28, 1948, when they considered the joint recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff and the work of the military committee. Although knowledge of the meeting is limited almost exclusively to the official communiqué, there is little indication that achievement went much beyond what is publicly claimed. The Ministers agreed upon “a common defense policy which should govern the detailed work of their own military staffs,” designed “to ensure the security of the Five Powers as a whole within the scope of the Treaty of Brussels and of the Charter of the United Nations.” The Ministers decided to set up a permanent organization under the authority of the Defense Ministers “to give effect to this policy and to deal with problems of production and procurement of equipment.” This organization “will include the nucleus of a land, air and naval command with a permanent military chairman” and “will study the tactical and technical problems of Western European defense.”^¶

It is much too early to speculate on what the ultimate scope of the permanent military organization will be. In theory, advanced British thinking on the subject grants that in order to be effective the Brussels structure must be completed “by the kind of pooling which united British and American forces during the war—by a Combined Chiefs of Staff committee at the top of the pyramid of command” and by the integration of all three services backed by “the complete standardization of weapons and equipment and by the division of production according to national capacity.”^** Actual achievement to date is far short of this goal. The British cabinet approved Alexander’s report on the Defense Ministers’ meeting and by implication approved the implementation of a common defense policy which would deal with problems of production and equipment as well as those of a tactical and technical nature.^†† In effect, the immediate function of the military organization is limited largely to the study of strategic and logistical problems involved in coordinated defense. Lack of proper staffing and preparation for the Defense Ministers’ conference^‡‡ led to the premature disclosure of General Juin’s name as the candidate for chief of land forces and resulted in much embarrassment when he refused to accept.

Appointments to the Permanent Defense Organization were finally confirmed on October 5, 1948. Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery resigned as Chief of the Imperial General Staff to become permanent Military Chairman of the “Commanders in Chief Committee”; instead of General Juin, General de Lattre de Tassigny was appointed Commander in Chief of the Land Forces; Air Marshal Sir James Robb became Commander in Chief of the Air Forces; and the position of Flag Officer, Western Europe, to be filled by French Vice Admiral Robert Jaujard, was created to provide naval coordination. Mainly because of Anglo-French differences over the nationality of the naval commander for Western Union the position of naval commander in chief was left vacant. In addition to the Permanent Military Organization and the Permanent Military Committee (noted above), the Brussels powers’ Permanent Commission has set up a Military Committee on Equipment and Armament to consider military supply problems. American and Canadian observers attend meetings of these committees.

Joint defense planning has thus reached the stage where machinery for shaping joint policy and the nucleus of an integrated command exist and can be used as the governments determine. A small and hesitant beginning has also been made in studying financial questions arising out of military coordination.^§§ But it is clear that concrete accomplishment in this field must await the resolution of the economic and political difficulties which have held up more rapid progress of the formation of Western Union. One of the most important is the relation of the US to the Western European alliance.²

1. Another portion of this document is printed on p. 1121.
2. For other aspects of British policy on Western Union, see OIR–3728, Britain and a Western European Bloc, secret (forthcoming). [This and subsequent footnotes (except footnote 2) are in the source text. OIR–3728 is not printed.]
3. T–4710, London, November 2, 1948, secret. One of the principal British arguments against an assembly is that there would be no way of excluding Communist participation. On Commonwealth reaction to Bevin’s proposal, see A–1996, London, November 1, 1948, secret. [Telegram 4710 and Airgram 1996 not printed.]
4. Conservatives, led by Churchill, voiced strong criticism of the all-Labor make-up of the British delegation on this committee and charged that the head of the delegation, Hugh Dalton, opposes a united Europe except upon a Socialist basis. New York Herald Tribune, November 19, 1948.
5. T–1872, London, May 1, 1948, plain. [Not printed.]
6. T–1912, London, May 4, 1948, secret. [Not printed.]
7. Manchetser Guardian, September 29, 1948.
8. Barbara Ward, The West at Bay, New York, 1948, p. 196.
9. Times, October 1, 1948.
10. Spaak blamed the British for failure to appoint a proper secretary general for the Defense Ministers’ “council.” T–1854, Brussels, October 11, 1948, secret. [Not printed.]
11. T–5471, Paris, October 20, 1948, secret. See also New York Times, October 17, 1948. [Telegram 5471 not printed.]
2. A more detailed description of the Brussels Pact Consultative Council, Permanent Commission, Organization of Defense, the Economic and Financial Organization, and the Cultural and Social Organization appears in a study by the Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission dated December 21, 1948, entitled “Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission—Treaty of Brussels.” It is in Department file 840.00/2–2149 as an enclosure to despatch 299 from London, February 21, 1949, not printed.